Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Dolgencorp, LLC
899 F.3d 428
| 6th Cir. | 2018Background
- Linda Atkins, a type II diabetic and Dollar General lead sales associate, requested permission to keep orange juice at her register as a quick treatment for occasional hypoglycemic episodes.
- Store policy generally prohibited eating/drinking on the sales floor, but allowed for "religious and/or disability-related exceptions depending on the circumstances."
- Atkins suffered two hypoglycemic episodes while working alone; each time she drank a bottle of store orange juice from the cooler, paid for it after the episode, and reported the incidents.
- After a store audit for shrinkage, Dollar General fired Atkins for violating its anti-"grazing" policy.
- The EEOC sued under the ADA; Atkins intervened. A jury found for Atkins on a reasonable-accommodation claim and a discriminatory-discharge claim, awarding back pay and compensatory damages; the district court awarded attorney’s fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of EEOC charge | Filing with Tennessee agency tolled federal deadline to 300 days because Tennessee law prohibits disability-based firing. | Tennessee law allegedly does not recognize reasonable-accommodation claims, so it cannot be a deferral agency. | Filing with Tennessee Commission sufficed; 300-day period applies. |
| Reasonable accommodation duty | Dollar General refused Atkins’s request and failed to explore alternatives; denial of accommodation violated ADA. | Employer claims alternative glucose sources (tablets, candy, honey) obviated need to permit orange juice at register. | Jury reasonably found employer failed to engage/offer a reasonable accommodation; alternatives were not shown to be practically equivalent. |
| Discriminatory discharge | Termination stemmed from employer’s failure to accommodate—direct evidence of discrimination. | Termination was a lawful, nondiscriminatory enforcement of anti-grazing policy. | Failure to accommodate can be direct evidence; employer cannot rely on neutral policy when refusal to accommodate causally led to discharge. |
| Attorney’s fees award | Fee award reflects lodestar based on market rates, complexity, and comparable cases; no impermissible enhancement. | Magistrate double-counted success/complexity in contravention of Perdue and awarded excessive rates; past lower rates for attorneys suggest reduction. | Court did not abuse discretion: lodestar appropriately calculated and not impermissibly enhanced; no duplicative billing found. |
Key Cases Cited
- EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (bright-line rule for deferral-state tolling of EEOC filing deadlines)
- Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (state agency authority, not exact statutory parity, controls deferral analysis)
- Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007) (employer duty to explore reasonable accommodations)
- McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (failure to accommodate that leads to discharge constitutes discharge "because of" disability)
- Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing direct evidence from indirect burden-shifting proof)
- Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (limits on enhancing the lodestar fee)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (standard for lodestar fee awards)
- EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057 (6th Cir. 2015) (standard for evaluating prejudice from jury instruction error)