650 F. App'x 703
11th Cir.2016Background
- McMullen, a Wakulla County volunteer firefighter, was denied promotion to a paid battalion chief position in 2013 because of an unrepaired hernia; he sued under the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794) for disability discrimination.
- Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing the Rehabilitation Act did not apply because the County’s Fire Rescue Department did not receive federal financial assistance.
- The district court applied the Restoration Act’s amended definition of “program or activity,” treated the Fire Rescue Department (comprising fire services, EMS, and animal control) as the relevant unit, and found no division received federal funds.
- McMullen appealed, arguing (1) the Restoration Act made the county as a whole the relevant entity (overruling Doyle), and (2) factual disputes existed about whether the Fire Rescue Department received federal grants or FEMA aid.
- The Eleventh Circuit held Doyle’s narrow pre-Restoration Act approach was no longer controlling but interpreted the Restoration Act to cover “all of the operations” of a department or agency (here, the Fire Rescue Department), not the entire county.
- The court found no genuine dispute that the Fire Rescue Department received federal financial assistance: (a) Payments in lieu of taxes were characterized as compensation, not federal subsidies; (b) testimonial references to small grants were speculative and contradicted by the County Finance Director’s review showing no federal funds to the Department—so summary judgment for the County was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of “program or activity” under the Rehabilitation Act | The Restoration Act’s amended definition makes the entire county the relevant unit if any county part receives federal funds | The relevant unit is the department or agency (Fire Rescue Department), not the whole county | Doyle’s narrow test is overruled; the correct unit is the department/agency (Fire Rescue Department), not the whole county |
| Whether the Fire Rescue Department received federal financial assistance | Testimony suggests the Department used federal grants for equipment and benefited from federal payments in lieu of taxes | Payments in lieu of taxes are compensation (not subsidies); testimony was speculative and contradicted by Finance Director’s review showing no federal funds to the Department | No genuine dispute: payments in lieu of taxes are compensatory, not financial assistance; no evidence the Department received federal grants, so Rehabilitation Act does not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Doyle v. Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham, 680 F.2d 1323 (11th Cir. 1982) (previous narrow interpretation of “program or activity” requiring direct federal assistance to the specific program)
- Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court 1984) (limited, program-specific coverage under Title IX and related statutes prior to Restoration Act)
- Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting the Civil Rights Restoration Act undermined Grove City’s continued vitality)
- Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Restoration Act to cover all operations of a department/institution but not the entire municipal government)
- Thomlison v. City of Omaha, 63 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1995) (treating public safety department as the relevant unit where some divisions received federal funds)
- Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that an entire state is subject to the Rehabilitation Act because one component receives federal funds)
- Shotz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 420 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (defining federal financial assistance as a federal subsidy rather than compensation)
- Lawrence Cty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256 (Supreme Court 1985) (describing Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act as compensatory for lost tax revenues)