Emil Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale
904 F.3d 280
| 3rd Cir. | 2018Background
- After a 2010 single-vehicle crash, police and state troopers subdued Emil Jutrowski; during the takedown one officer kicked him in the face, fracturing his eye socket. Jutrowski cannot identify which officer inflicted the blow.
- Jutrowski sued four officers (two Riverdale PD officers and two NJ state troopers) plus the Township and State under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and for federal/state civil conspiracy (pre- and post-incident conspiracies to use force and to cover up).
- Discovery established all four named officers were in the immediate vicinity when the kick occurred, no officer admitted being the kicker or saw who did it, and dashcam footage from one Riverdale officer (Biro) was not produced.
- The District Court granted summary judgment on all counts, reasoning that § 1983 requires personal involvement by each named defendant and the plaintiff failed to identify the actor; it also refused to draw an adverse-spoliation inference as to Biro’s dashcam and found no pre-incident conspiracy and insufficient evidence of post-incident collusion.
- On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the excessive-force claim (personal-involvement requirement) but reversed as to the post-incident conspiracy claims (cover-up denying access to courts), remanding those claims for trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive-force liability under § 1983 when plaintiff cannot identify which officer kicked him | Jutrowski: proof that some officer used excessive force and that all named officers were in the immediate vicinity suffices to take all to trial | Defendants: § 1983 requires each named defendant’s personal involvement; mere presence is insufficient | Held: Affirmed for defendants—plaintiff must show personal involvement of each named officer to survive summary judgment; mere inability to identify the actor is fatal |
| Adverse spoliation inference from nonproduction of Biro’s dashcam | Jutrowski: absence of Biro’s recording supports an adverse inference that it would have shown wrongdoing | Defendants: no evidence the recording existed or was intentionally withheld; Biro offered an explanation | Held: District Court did not abuse discretion refusing adverse inference at summary judgment because plaintiff failed to show the video existed or was actually suppressed |
| Pre-incident conspiracy to use excessive force | Jutrowski: officers acted pursuant to a common plan (e.g., moving ambulances, simultaneous grabbing) | Defendants: no specific evidence of an agreement before the kick; assertions are speculative | Held: Affirmed for defendants—no sufficient specific facts to infer an agreement before the kick |
| Post-incident conspiracy / "conspiracy of silence" to cover up and deny access to courts | Jutrowski: inconsistencies and omissions in reports, discussions among officers about reports, missing dashcam, and altered accounts support an after-the-fact cover-up that impeded access to courts | Defendants: no concerted agreement; individual reports and testimony negate a meeting of the minds | Held: Reversed and remanded—evidence suffices to create a triable issue that officers may have conspired after the fact to conceal the kick, denying access to courts under § 1983 and state law |
Key Cases Cited
- Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (§ 1983 requires direct responsibility; no liability where defendant played no affirmative part)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (each government official liable only for his/her own misconduct; no vicarious liability under § 1983)
- Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972) (no liability where plaintiff identifies only that one of a subset committed the wrong without identification of which)
- Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff could not identify which of many officers inflicted injury)
- Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 2002) (distinguishing cases: where plaintiff credibly testifies all named officers participated, fact issues preclude summary judgment)
- Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2017) (recognizing tension between personal-responsibility rule and situations where officers’ conduct prevents identification; suggesting conspiracy-of-silence theory as alternate avenue)
- Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (right of access to courts is a protected interest; conspiracy to impede access actionable under § 1983)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard: genuine dispute exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party)
