Elliott Graiser v. Visionworks of America, Inc.
819 F.3d 277
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Elliott Graiser filed a putative Ohio class action (originally seeking injunctive relief and attorney’s fees) challenging Visionworks’ “Buy One, Get One Free” eyewear promotion; he later amended to add actual and punitive damages and a class defined by purchasers since June 24, 2012.
- Visionworks first removed to federal court on diversity grounds; the district court remanded for lack of Article III standing on the injunction claim. State court gave Graiser leave to amend.
- Graiser’s April 23, 2015 amended complaint did not quantify class size or specify a damages formula; on September 18, 2015 Graiser sent a letter setting forth a damages theory and estimated damages through Jan. 31, 2015 of $3,940,042.
- Visionworks produced sales data through Oct. 15, 2015; applying Graiser’s formula to that data, Visionworks calculated potential class damages exceeding $5,000,000 and removed under CAFA on Nov. 10, 2015.
- Graiser moved to remand as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), arguing the thirty-day removal clock began earlier (either at the amended complaint or when Graiser’s Sept. 18 letter was sent); the district court agreed and remanded.
- The Sixth Circuit granted interlocutory review and reversed, holding (1) the § 1446(b) 30-day CAFA clock is triggered only by a plaintiff document from which CAFA removability can be unambiguously ascertained, and (2) a defendant may remove under CAFA when it first ascertains CAFA removability even if an earlier removal window under a different theory had expired.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the § 1446(b)(3) 30-day clock begin for CAFA removals? | Graiser: clock began at the Amended Complaint (or at latest when he sent the Sept. 18 damages letter) because Visionworks had data to ascertain CAFA jurisdiction. | Visionworks: the clock begins only when plaintiff provides a document from which CAFA removability can be unambiguously ascertained; it was not triggered here. | The court held the CAFA 30-day clock begins only when the defendant receives a plaintiff document (initial pleading, amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper) that unambiguously shows CAFA jurisdiction. The clock never began here. |
| Can a defendant remove under CAFA after an earlier 30-day removal window (under a different federal theory) has expired? | Graiser: an earlier removal window under another federal theory bars later CAFA removal; there is one window. | Visionworks: CAFA creates a separate basis; once defendant ascertains CAFA removability a new 30-day window applies. | The court held a defendant may remove within 30 days of ascertaining CAFA jurisdiction even if an earlier removal window under a different theory has passed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013) (describing CAFA’s jurisdictional standards and aggregation of class members’ claims)
- Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) (no anti-removal presumption for CAFA removals)
- Cutrone v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 749 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (bright-line rule: § 1446(b) clocks in CAFA cases start only when plaintiff serves a document that specifies amount in controversy or facts from which it can be ascertained)
- Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 770 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2014) (adopts bright-line approach limiting inquiry to plaintiff-provided papers)
- Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc., 727 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2013) (same bright-line rule for § 1446(b) in CAFA context)
- Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff’s pleadings must make removability apparent to trigger the 30-day clock)
- Jordan v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 781 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2015) (defendant may remove within 30 days of ascertaining CAFA removability even if earlier removal window existed)
- Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiffs can protect against defendant gamesmanship by providing documents that trigger § 1446(b) clock)
- Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2006) (for federal-officer removals, the 30-day period begins when plaintiff discloses facts sufficient for that basis; used analogously for CAFA)