Elaine Robinson v. Pfizer, Inc.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7656
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Sixty-four plaintiffs from 29 states sued Pfizer in Missouri state court alleging Lipitor caused diabetes; six plaintiffs were New York citizens, as was Pfizer.
- Pfizer removed the action to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction, arguing the New York plaintiffs were fraudulently or procedurally misjoined and thus should be disregarded for diversity purposes.
- Plaintiffs moved to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and sought attorney’s fees, alleging Pfizer’s removal was in bad faith and contrary to Eighth Circuit precedent.
- The district court remanded and awarded $6,200 in attorney’s fees, concluding Pfizer’s removal was not objectively reasonable given repeated similar remands.
- Pfizer appealed only the attorney-fee award, arguing removal was objectively reasonable and asking this court to resolve the jurisdictional question broadly; plaintiffs then filed a satisfaction of judgment disclaiming interest in collecting the fee award.
- The Eighth Circuit concluded the appeal was moot (satisfaction of judgment extinguished the controversy) and vacated the district court’s fee award, dismissing the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pfizer’s removal was objectively unreasonable under § 1447(c) (i.e., whether fees were proper) | Remand was proper and fees warranted because Pfizer’s grounds for removal were foreclosed by district precedent; removal was not objectively reasonable. | Removal was objectively reasonable; New York plaintiffs were fraudulently/procedurally misjoined so complete diversity existed. | Moot—court did not decide on the merits; vacated fee award after case was mooted by satisfaction of judgment. |
| Whether appellants’ satisfaction of judgment moots the appeal of a fee award under § 1447(c) | Satisfaction extinguished any live controversy and thus the appeal is moot. | Satisfaction does not moot appeal because the challenged order harms reputation or has other continuing effects. | Appeal is moot; satisfaction extinguished enforceable relief and reputational-harm argument rejected. |
| Whether a § 1447(c) fee award is a "sanction" capable of causing reputational injury that preserves an appeal despite satisfaction | The fee award here was not a sanction and did not cause reputational harm; Martin treats § 1447(c) as fee-shifting. | Fee awards under § 1447(c) can be sanctions and thus can cause reputational injury preserving appellate review. | § 1447(c) is a fee-shifting statute, not necessarily a sanction; the court found no cognizable reputational harm here. |
| Whether vacatur is appropriate when prevailing party unilaterally moots the appeal by satisfying judgment | Vacatur is appropriate to prevent a prevailing party from insulating a judgment from review; parties agreed vacatur remedied any possible harm. | Pfizer argued it suffered harm and sought merits resolution; did not oppose vacatur's appropriateness strongly. | Vacatur of the district court’s fee order granted under U.S. Bancorp practice; appeal dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (fee-shifting standard for § 1447(c); removal objectively reasonable test)
- Hubbard v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 799 F.3d 1224 (Eighth Circuit precedent on diversity jurisdiction and citizenship analysis)
- Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407 (appealability of § 1447(c) fee awards)
- Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (mootness — Article III requires a live controversy throughout litigation)
- Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 965 F.2d 597 (limitations on mootness where sanctions or court-ordered penalties remain at issue)
- U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (vacatur of judgments when case becomes moot on appeal)