Edgerton v. Clinton, 86 A.3d 437

On Aug. 5, 2005, Matthew Vincent (a volunteer firefighter/security guard) pursued a hit-and-run Infiniti for ~3 miles after it struck his car; Vincent used a cell phone to relay location, plate, and description to Clinton 911 dispatcher Ellen Vece.
Vincent spoke calmly on the 911 call, provided the Infiniti’s plate early, gave location updates, but did not tell Vece he was driving fast or using blue courtesy lights; audio contained no background sounds indicating high speed.
The Infiniti subsequently crashed and caught fire; passenger Walker Hopkins sustained catastrophic brain injuries and required permanent care.
Plaintiff (successor conservator of Hopkins) sued the town under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(1)(A), alleging the dispatcher’s failure to order Vincent to stop the pursuit fell within the identifiable person–imminent harm exception to governmental immunity.
A jury found the town liable under that exception and apportioned 90% fault to Vece; the town appealed.
The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed whether a reasonable dispatcher would have found it apparent that failing to stop Vincent’s pursuit would likely subject an identifiable person to imminent harm, and whether Vece’s omission was a proximate cause (the court resolved only the apparentness issue).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the identifiable person–imminent harm exception to governmental immunity applied (i.e., would it have been apparent to Vece that failing to stop Vincent’s pursuit likely would subject an identifiable person to imminent harm?)	The facts (plate known, limited duration and geography of pursuit, dispatcher’s knowledge of road layout, ongoing updates of locations) made the imminent danger apparent to Vece.	Vece only knew what she heard on the 911 call; the call showed a calm caller, no noises indicating high speed, and nothing to show misuse of blue lights — so it was not objectively apparent that imminent harm was likely.	Held for defendant: exception did not apply — a reasonable dispatcher, based on the information actually available during the call, would not have found imminent harm apparent.
Whether Vece’s failure to act was proximate cause of Hopkins’ injuries	Vece’s omission contributed to the dangerous pursuit and thus was a proximate cause.	If the identifiable-person exception fails, governmental immunity protects the town; court need not resolve proximate cause.	Court did not reach proximate-cause question after ruling immunity applied; remanded with direction to render judgment for town.

Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607 (Conn. 2006) (articulates identifiable person–imminent harm exception and explains apparentness as objective inquiry into information available to the official)
Fleming v. Bridgeport, 284 Conn. 502 (Conn. 2007) (apparentness requires considering only what was known to officials at the time; no duty to speculate)
Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101 (Conn. 1998) (focused on imminency prong for child-injury context; distinguished here)
Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324 (Conn. 2010) (applies identifiable person–imminent harm exception under § 52-557n)
Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147 (Conn. 1982) (public vs. private duty distinction; private duty may be shown when failure to act likely would subject an identifiable person to imminent harm)
Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91 (Conn. 2007) (discusses public policy rationale for discretionary-act immunity)
Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640 (Conn. 1994) (recognizes special duties owed to schoolchildren; distinguished on facts)