Duong v. Kaiser, 4:25-cv-07598

Duong, Cambodian refugee and long-term lawful resident, released on parole after a murder conviction and subsequent prison term; ICE detained him briefly under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) after parole release; release was based on individualized risk assessment and Zepeda Rivas settlement terms; ankle monitor and observation program followed by de-escalation of release conditions; ongoing immigration proceedings including a second notice to appear after successful termination of prior removal proceedings; recent arrest on Sept 6, 2025 prompted habeas petition and motion for TRO; court previously granted TRO and held a hearing; court grants preliminary injunction pending further proceedings.
Duong previously released on bond due to an individualized risk assessment; 5-year-plus interval of freedom heightened liberty interest; prior detention history and current family responsibilities bolster due process concerns; government argues Demore controls but that case addressed post-detention bond hearings; due process requires a pre-detention hearing or, here, a bond hearing before re-detention given prior release.
The court applies Mathews v. Eldridge factors and finds a bond hearing required before re-detention given Duong’s release history and liberty interest.
Duong’s liberty interest supersedes the government’s interest in quick re-detention, and due process requires a neutral bond decision in light of prior individualized release.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Duong is entitled to a hearing before re-detention	Duong (Duong) has a heightened liberty interest after release.	Government argues Demore framework applies; no bond hearing required.	Yes; due process requires a hearing before re-detention.
Whether due process requires a bond hearing under Mathews factors	Mathews factors favor a hearing due to liberty interest and minimal administrative burden.	No bond hearing necessary under Demore for those detained after privilege release.	Mathews factors favor a bond hearing.
Whether burden of proof at bond hearing is clear and convincing evidence	Government must show flight risk/danger by clear and convincing evidence.	Standard not explicitly stated in prior practice.	Clear and convincing standard applies.
Whether irreparable harm supports injunction	Detention harms health, family, and mental health; irreparable injury.	Harm cannot be shown without detention.	Irreparable harm shown; injunction appropriate.

Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001) (establishes four-factor framework for TRO/PI and likelihood-irreparable-harm analysis)
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (U.S. 2008) (injunction standard; extraordinary remedy requires likelihood of relief)
All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (serious questions going to the merits may support relief if hardships and public interest weigh in petitioner’s favor)
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (U.S. 2001) (freedom from detention is core liberty interest; due process requires justification for deprivation)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (liberty interest in parole; due process requires notice and opportunity for a hearing before revocation/detention)
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (facially upheld mandatory detention but left open as-applied challenges; later courts address individualized release scenarios)
Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (U.S. 2019) (statutory scope did not foreclose constitutional challenges to applications of §1226(c) on due process grounds)
Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1982) (due process may require keeping one legally released from detention if premature return undermines liberty interests)
Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022) (summarizes Ninth Circuit position on burden of proof for flight/danger in detention)