Douglas Fauconier v. Harold Clarke, 966 F.3d 265

Background

Plaintiff Douglas Fauconier, a Virginia inmate with myasthenia gravis, had performed prison jobs competently for years but was assigned a medical "Work Code D" that VDOC said made him ineligible for all jobs after an October 2010 hospitalization.
After October 2010 Fauconier was required to reapply for his prior job and was denied multiple subsequent job applications expressly because of his Work Code D classification.
Fauconier exhausted VDOC administrative remedies (informal grievance → formal grievance → regional denial) and was later transferred to another VDOC facility and reclassified to Work Code C.
He sued pro se under Title II of the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection), seeking damages and injunctive relief; the district court dismissed on multiple grounds.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded: it held his § 1983 damages claims against the State officials are barred by Eleventh Amendment, affirmed qualified immunity for individual-capacity damages, held his ADA official-capacity damages and injunctive relief against the Director survive, and found his claims timely after tolling for administrative exhaustion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Statute of limitations accrual/tolling for ADA and §1983 claims	Each refusal to hire is a discrete act; administrative exhaustion time should toll limitations	Limitations began when first put on notice (earlier denials) and ADA claim untimely	Court: discrete-act accrual; §1983 timely; ADA timely because federal equitable tolling applied during 70-day PLRA exhaustion period
Adequacy of ADA (Title II) pleading	Fauconier alleged he was regarded as disabled (Work Code D), was otherwise qualified, and was denied jobs because of classification	Defendants argued complaint lacked facts showing a qualifying disability or discrimination	Court: Liberally construing pro se complaint, allegations plausibly state Title II claim (regarded-as-disabled + qualified + adverse action)
Adequacy of Equal Protection claim	Alleged disparate treatment: other hospitalized inmates returned to jobs without reapplying; VDOC policy categorically excluded Work Code D inmates without explained basis	Defendants said comparators not similarly situated (no allegation they had Work Code D) and policy is rationally related to penological interests	Court: Complaint plausibly alleged disparate treatment and that categorical exclusion may be irrational under Turner factors; equal protection claim survives pleading stage
Eleventh Amendment and Title II abrogation	Congress abrogated state immunity for Title II insofar as conduct also violates Fourteenth Amendment	Defendants argued Eleventh Amendment bars official-capacity damages claims	Court: Because plaintiff plausibly alleged Title II and Fourteenth Amendment violations, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not defeat ADA damages claims at this stage (claims may proceed)
Qualified immunity for individual-capacity damages	Officials acted pursuant to VDOC policy and good-faith reliance on medical classifications; any right was not clearly established	Plaintiff argued conduct violated Title II / Fourteenth Amendment	Court: Affirmed qualified immunity — right was not clearly established for reasonable officials following VDOC policy
Mootness of injunctive relief	Sought prospective relief against both Powhatan officials and VDOC Director Clarke to stop discriminatory policy	Defendants argued transfer moots claims against facility officials and Director because plaintiff now Work Code C	Court: Claims for injunctive relief are moot as to Powhatan staff but not as to Director Clarke in his official capacity because the challenged VDOC policy may still apply across facilities

Key Cases Cited

A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2011) (limitations borrowing rule and related principles)
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (use state personal-injury statute of limitations for §1983 claims)
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (each discrete adverse employment act triggers new accrual)
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (PLRA exhaustion applies to all prisoner suits about prison life)
Battle v. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708 (4th Cir. 2019) (federal equitable tolling during PLRA exhaustion)
O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (ADA claims by prisoners subject to PLRA exhaustion)
Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 739 (4th Cir. 2018) (elements of a Title II ADA claim)
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (Title II abrogation of state sovereign immunity only to extent conduct violates Fourteenth Amendment)
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (official-capacity suits are suits against the State; §1983 does not authorize damages against States)
Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified-immunity standard — clearly established law)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (deferential Turner test for prison restrictions)
Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying Turner factors to equal protection claims in prisons)