Donnetta Smith v. Stoneburner
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9472
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- Charles Smith shoplifted a $14.99 phone charger at Walgreens; charger was damaged/hidden and Charles allegedly stole it.
- Sturgis Officers Stoneburner and Knapp went to the Smith home, first entering Logan’s home without a warrant to question Charles.
- Logan told officers to wait on the porch; Stoneburner entered the house despite Logan’s implied request, bringing Charles and Donnetta downstairs.
- Outside, Stoneburner patted Charles down; Charles was then pulled outside, restrained over a railing, and arrested for third-degree retail fraud (later pled to a lesser misdemeanor).
- Plaintiffs allege two Fourth Amendment home-entry violations and excessive force; district court denied qualified immunity on all claims; summary judgment granted for Charles on Stoneburner’s second entry.
- The court analyzes whether the entries violated Payton/Welsh presumptions and whether force used against Charles and Donnetta was excessive; Michigan law immunity is addressed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Stoneburner violate the Fourth Amendment by entering the home first time? | Smiths contend Logan invited entry; entry without consent or exigency violated Payton. | Stoneburner argues implied consent from Logan and exigent circumstances supported entry. | Triable issue on consent; summary judgment not warranted. |
| Was Stoneburner’s second entry to arrest Charles valid under the Fourth Amendment? | No exigency; entry for a misdemeanor arrest was unlawful under Payton and Welsh. | Exigencies or pursuit doctrine could justify entry. | Unlawful entry; qualified immunity not available for second entry. |
| Were the officers’ actions during arrest excessive force against Charles and Donnetta? | Head banging, tight handcuffing, and shove violated the Fourth Amendment and caused injuries. | Any force was reasonable given resistance and circumstances; factual disputes preclude summary judgment. | Jury questions remain; qualified immunity not warranted at this stage. |
| Do Michigan government-immunity, good faith, and discretionary/ministerial duties shield the officers from state-law claims? | Bad faith possible; immunity not fully warranted. | If acted in good faith and within discretionary duties, immunity applies. | Jury question remains on good faith; state-law immunity not clearly decided at this stage. |
Key Cases Cited
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1980) (no warrantless home entry absent exigency or consent)
- Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (U.S. 1984) (presumption against warrantless entry for minor offenses; exigency must be serious)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (consent requires voluntary invitation, not mere acquiescence)
- United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2008) (consent to enter based on invitation; triable issue on what Logan implied)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (U.S. 1983) (free to leave; voluntary conversations not equivalent to consent)
- Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (hot pursuit not established; no immediate danger)
- Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (U.S. 1967) (hot pursuit exception to entry into a residence)
- Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (U.S. 1976) (pursuit of suspect to home triggers entry considerations)
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2006) (emergency aid exception to warrantless entry)
- Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2005) (standards for excessive force and injury need factual resolution)
- Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2012) (resistance and force assessment for qualified immunity)
- McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (U.S. 1948) (entry when magistrate not sought; caution against prescriptive entry)