Don Norton v. City of Springfield
806 F.3d 411
7th Cir.2015Background
- Springfield municipal code §131.06 prohibited oral requests for immediate donations (“panhandling”) within the downtown historic district (under 2% of the city, containing key public and commercial spaces). Signs and requests for deferred donations were allowed.
- Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as content-based because it distinguishes immediate oral requests from written requests and requests for future donations.
- The Seventh Circuit initially upheld the ordinance, reasoning it was not content- or viewpoint-based and regulated subject matter rather than message. 768 F.3d 713.
- The court deferred rehearing pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert (135 S. Ct. 2218). After Reed, the panel granted rehearing and invited supplemental briefs.
- Applying Reed, the court concluded the ordinance is content-based because it regulates speech “because of the topic discussed,” and therefore must survive strict scrutiny; the city had not argued the ordinance could meet that burden.
- The district court’s judgment was reversed and the case remanded for an injunction consistent with Reed and this opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Springfield’s anti-panhandling ordinance is content-based | The ordinance discriminates by content because it bans oral, immediate requests but allows signs and deferred requests | The ordinance is content-neutral: it targets conduct/subject matter (imposition/threat) not ideas or viewpoints; it narrows scope for safety, not to suppress speech | Applying Reed, the court held the ordinance is content-based because it applies to particular speech “because of the topic discussed” and thus triggers strict scrutiny |
| Whether the absence of viewpoint discrimination saves the ordinance | Non-viewpoint discrimination means content neutrality; no animus toward message so regulation is permissible | City argued neutrality and benign motive justify lesser scrutiny | Court rejected this: Reed requires strict scrutiny for facially content-based laws regardless of motive |
| Whether subject-matter regulation differs from content regulation post-Reed | Subject-matter distinctions are not content-based under prior precedent | City relied on prior panel reasoning categorizing the ordinance as subject-matter regulation | Court held Reed collapses the distinction: regulation tied to subject matter is content-based |
| Whether the ordinance survives First Amendment scrutiny | Plaintiffs argued it cannot pass strict scrutiny | City did not attempt to show a compelling justification under strict scrutiny | Because ordinance is content-based and city did not justify it, the ordinance fails; remand for injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (speech regulation targeting specific subject matter is content-based and subject to strict scrutiny)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (time, place, and manner doctrine and earlier content-neutrality inquiry)
- Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014) (panhandling-ordinance decision remanded in light of Reed)
- Springfield (prior panel opinion), 768 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2014) (initial Seventh Circuit decision classifying the ordinance as subject-matter regulation)