43 F.4th 595
6th Cir.2022Background
- Wallace, a juvenile-turned-adult offender, pleaded guilty in Tennessee to attempted second-degree murder after serving ~3 years pretrial; state court imposed a 10-year suspended sentence and probation that barred firearm possession.
- Weeks after his release (June 2015), Wallace participated in an attempted Hobbs Act robbery of a convenience store; an accomplice was shot dead and an employee was severely injured.
- A week later officers found a handgun in the car Wallace was in; federal indictments followed: attempted and conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. §1951), discharging a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in death (18 U.S.C. §924(j)), and multiple counts of felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)).
- Wallace pleaded guilty to all counts; district court imposed concurrent statutory maximums for the Hobbs Act and §922(g) counts and a consecutive 10-year §924(j) term, resulting in an effective 30-year sentence.
- Wallace filed a §2255 motion after the Supreme Court decided Davis and Rehaif, arguing (1) §924(j) conviction invalid under Davis and later Taylor, and (2) his §922(g)(1) pleas were involuntary under Rehaif because the court did not advise him the government must prove he knew his prior conviction was punishable by over one year.
- The district court denied relief; the Sixth Circuit granted COAs and on appeal reversed the §924(j) conviction and affirmed denial as to the §922(g)(1) convictions, remanding for appropriate remedy on the §924(j) error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wallace's §924(j) conviction survives Davis/Taylor (i.e., whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under the elements clause) | Davis/Taylor render the residual clause void; attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause, so §924(j) cannot rest on it | The government argued attempted Hobbs Act robbery still qualifies under the elements clause; district court had so held | Reversed: Taylor controls—attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not meet the elements clause; §924(j) conviction vacated |
| Whether Wallace's §922(g)(1) convictions must be vacated under Rehaif because plea colloquy did not state knowledge-of-status element | Wallace: Rehaif requires knowledge of felony status; absence of such advice rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary | Government: Rehaif announced a retroactive rule, but Wallace procedurally defaulted by not raising it at trial/appeal and cannot show cause & prejudice or actual innocence to excuse default | Affirmed: Rehaif applies retroactively but Wallace defaulted and failed to show cause & prejudice or actual innocence; §922(g)(1) convictions remain |
| Remedy / Sentencing consequences after vacating §924(j) | Wallace seeks vacatur of §924(j) conviction and sentencing relief | Government: district court should determine remedy and any effect on total sentence | Remanded: District court to determine appropriate remedy and whether and how vacatur affects Wallace’s total sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (held §924(c)’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (held government must prove defendant knew of felon status under §922(g))
- United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) (held attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy §924(c)’s elements clause)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (rules for collateral attack based on plea involuntariness and actual-innocence gateway)
- Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021) (plain-error standard for unpreserved Rehaif claims on direct review)
- Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (procedural-default rule for collateral attacks)
- McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) (actual-innocence exception to procedural default)
