Dominguez v. State, 348 P.3d 183

Background

In 2002 Rodrigo Dominguez was convicted of voluntary manslaughter (death of Ricky Solisz), aggravated battery (injury to Vince Martinez), two counts of shooting at/from a motor vehicle, and conspiracy to tamper with evidence.
The shootings occurred during a group confrontation; Dominguez supplied guns and aided and abetted others who fired from vehicles, producing both a homicide and a serious battery to another person.
On direct review (Dominguez I) the New Mexico Supreme Court (divided) affirmed, applying the Blockburger/Gonzales line and holding cumulative punishment for the separate statutes did not violate Double Jeopardy.
In 2013 this Court overruled Gonzales and Dominguez I in Montoya, announcing a new “substantive sameness” approach that precludes cumulative punishment when the shooting and the homicide (or injury) stem from the same bullet/action and same victim.
Dominguez filed a Rule 5-802 habeas petition seeking retroactive application of Montoya to vacate his cumulative convictions; the trial court dismissed as previously litigated and this Court granted certiorari to resolve retroactivity.
The Court concluded Montoya announced a new procedural rule and, applying Kersey/Teague retroactivity doctrine, held Montoya does not apply retroactively to Dominguez’s convictions; the habeas dismissal was affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Dominguez)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether Dominguez may relitigate previously decided double jeopardy claims in habeas	Dominguez: Clark permits relitigation when an intervening change in law occurs; Montoya is such a change and he previously argued the same theory	State: Relitigation is limited by finality doctrine and retroactivity principles; prior litigation bars relief absent proper retroactivity showing	Court: Relitigation allowed under Clark because Montoya is an intervening change (new rule)
Whether Montoya should be applied retroactively to Dominguez’s convictions	Dominguez: Montoya embodies the rule he previously advocated and should be applied to his case	State: Under Kersey/Teague Montoya is a new procedural rule and not subject to retroactive application	Court: Montoya is a new procedural rule and does not meet Teague’s substantive or watershed exceptions; not retroactive
Whether Kersey (Teague adoption) should be overruled to permit Montoya’s retroactivity	Dominguez: Kersey mischaracterizes Montoya as procedural or wrongly adopted Teague; should be overturned	State: Kersey is sound, followed recently, and overturning precedent requires strong justification	Court: Kersey remains controlling under stare decisis; not overruled
Whether Forbes requires application of a new rule to a petitioner who previously argued it on appeal	Dominguez: Forbes suggests a litigant who previously advanced the new-rule argument should get retroactive benefit	State: Forbes is narrow and limited to cases where later decisions vindicate previously existing precedent, not where a decision overrules prior law	Court: Forbes does not apply; it is limited to vindication of existing precedent, so Dominguez cannot rely on it

Key Cases Cited

State v. Montoya, 306 P.3d 426 (N.M. 2013) (adopts substantive-sameness approach and overrules Gonzales/Dominguez I regarding cumulative punishment for shooting from a vehicle and resulting homicide)
Kersey v. Hatch, 237 P.3d 683 (N.M. 2010) (adopts Teague retroactivity framework for state habeas review and explains new-rule analysis)
State v. Dominguez (Dominguez I), 106 P.3d 563 (N.M. 2005) (affirmed cumulative convictions under Gonzales/Blockburger; later overruled by Montoya)
State v. Gonzales, 824 P.2d 1023 (N.M. 1992) (prior precedent permitting cumulative punishments that Montoya later overruled)
State v. Frazier, 164 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2007) (held predicate felony subsumed in felony murder; Kersey treated Frazier as announcing a new procedural rule)
State v. Forbes, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005) (narrowly allows habeas relief when later authority vindicates pre-existing precedent available at time of conviction)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (federal rule limiting retroactive application of new rules; adopted in Kersey)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1963) (example of a substantive/watershed rule—the universal right to counsel—applied retroactively)
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (U.S. 2007) (explains Teague’s watershed exception standards)