Doe v. Town of W. Hartford
177 A.3d 1128
Conn.2018Background
- John Doe was involuntarily hospitalized May–June 2007 and filed suit against multiple defendants; a three‑year statute of limitations applied.
- Spinella (former counsel) prepared complaint and summons May 19, 2010; state marshal Griffin served defendants on June 9, 2010 — after the limitations period expired.
- Section 52‑593a provides a savings rule: if process is delivered to a marshal before the limitations period ends and served within 30 days, the action is saved; subsection (b) directs the marshal to endorse under oath the delivery date on the return.
- Spinella averred (affidavit) that he delivered the papers to Griffin on May 20, 2010; Griffin’s return lacked the required endorsement and Griffin later executed an affidavit prepared by Spinella but could not independently recall the pickup date.
- Trial court struck or disregarded plaintiff’s affidavits as lacking personal knowledge/hearsay and granted summary judgment to defendants as time‑barred; the Appellate Court reversed, holding (1) subsection (b) endorsement is directory and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed about timely delivery. The Supreme Court granted certification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 52‑593a(b)'s marshal endorsement is mandatory or directory | § 52‑593a(b) is directory; plaintiff may prove timely delivery by other admissible evidence | The word "shall" makes the endorsement mandatory; absence of endorsement precludes reliance on § 52‑593a | The endorsement requirement is directory; other admissible proof of timely delivery is allowed |
| Whether admissible evidence created a genuine issue that process was delivered before limitations expired | Spinella's deposition and surrounding circumstances (routine pickup, urgency, later absence of papers on counter) create a genuine issue of timely delivery | Spinella's testimony is hearsay/speculative/loose; trial court properly discredited it; service delay (June 9) undercuts timeliness inference | Even excluding hearsay portions, Spinella's deposition and circumstantial evidence were probative and created a genuine factual dispute; summary judgment improper |
| Whether trial court properly excluded/discounted deposition and affidavit evidence on summary judgment | Deposition was admissible and should be considered; credibility/weight are for the factfinder | Trial court correctly rejected affidavit and portions of deposition as lacking personal knowledge or hearsay | Trial court erred by resolving credibility and excluding probative deposition testimony on summary judgment; those determinations are for the factfinder |
| Whether any consideration of hearsay portions by Appellate Court required reversal | Appellate Court improperly relied on hearsay | Even if some deposition parts were hearsay, remaining admissible testimony sufficed to create a genuine issue | Any consideration of hearsay was harmless error; a genuine issue remains on the admissible record |
Key Cases Cited
- Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673 (statute saves action when marshal receives papers close to limitations end)
- Dorry v. Garden, 313 Conn. 516 (remedial statutes construed liberally)
- Isaac v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 210 Conn. 721 (savings statutes' broad remedial purpose)
- Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania, 314 Conn. 749 (factors for mandatory vs. directory statutory duties)
- Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 751 (preference for merits determinations and against procedural termination)
- Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304 (summary judgment framework for statute of limitations defenses)
- Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99 (trial court may not resolve credibility on summary judgment)