Doe v. Tonti Management, 24 F.4th 1005

Doe and her boyfriend signed a lease at an apartment complex operated by Tonti; lease limited apartments to one animal and incorporated MAPS arbitration rules.
Doe, who has major depressive disorder and anxiety, sought an accommodation to keep a second emotional-support cat; Tonti refused.
Doe sued under the Fair Housing Act and Louisiana law; Tonti moved to compel arbitration under the lease clause and to stay the case.
The district court compelled arbitration, declined to sever the arbitration clause’s cost‑splitting provision or require Tonti to pay Doe’s share, and administratively closed the case while retaining jurisdiction.
After MAPS offered eight hours of free arbitration (but Doe rejected that offer) and Tonti refused to pay Doe’s share, Doe moved to re‑open the case and sever the cost‑splitting provision; the district court denied the motion, directing cost disputes to the arbitrator.
Doe appealed; the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under FAA §16(b)(3), rejected the collateral‑order argument, and declined to grant mandamus, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the denial of Doe's motion to re‑open / sever is appealable	The denial is effectively a reconsideration of the arbitration order and is appealable	The order is interlocutory because the underlying arbitration order stayed and administratively closed the case	Not appealable; appeal dismissed under FAA §16(b)(3)
Whether the collateral‑order doctrine permits immediate appeal	Collateral‑order doctrine applies to preserve Doe's ability to vindicate statutory rights and to review cost‑shifting now	FAA §16 provides the exclusive framework; collateral order should not override it	Collateral‑order doctrine does not apply; FAA §16 controls
Whether mandamus relief is appropriate	Mandamus is warranted because the district court impermissibly delegated the cost dispute and misapplied the law	No extraordinary circumstances; district court did not clearly abuse discretion	Mandamus denied; no extraordinary circumstances shown
Whether the district court erred by leaving cost allocation to the arbitrator	Doe argued the cost‑splitting clause was an unconscionable prospective waiver and sought severance and imposition of costs on Tonti	Tonti pointed to the arbitration clause and MAPS rules giving arbitrator discretion; no present, concrete cost dispute to decide	District court did not abuse discretion; MAPS rules and factual uncertainty made arbitrator the appropriate forum for any cost dispute

Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 772 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2014) (orders staying and administratively closing a case pending arbitration are interlocutory and unappealable)
Apache Bohai Corp. v. Texaco China, 330 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2003) (mandamus is a drastic remedy reserved for extraordinary situations)
Mire v. Full Spectrum Lending Inc., 389 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 2004) (orders compelling arbitration that stay and close a case are interlocutory)
Cargill Ferrous Int’l v. SEA PHOENIX MV, 325 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 2003) (court has duty to examine its own jurisdiction)
Al Rushaid v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, 814 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2016) (FAA §16 provides the exclusive appellate framework for arbitration orders; collateral‑order doctrine should not circumvent it)
Vantage Health Plan, Inc. v. Willis‑Knighton Med. Ctr., 913 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2019) (sets out collateral‑order doctrine factors)
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994) (Supreme Court articulation of the collateral‑order doctrine)