Doe v. Massachusetts Parole Board
979 N.E.2d 226
Mass. App. Ct.2012Background
- Doe was convicted of kidnapping and rape in 1988 and sentenced to 30 years; paroled in 1992.
- Parole revoked in 1994 after charges for threatening to murder girlfriend and related acts; he was returned to custody and later reparoled in 1998.
- Upon reparole in 1998, the parole board imposed special conditions including stay-away, sex offender program, drug/alcohol supervision, and mandatory group counseling.
- In 2000, the parole board added periodic polygraph testing; in 2002, he was classified as a level 2 sex offender under the Sex Offender Registry; these classifications triggered further IPSO conditions.
- In 2004, IPSO policies for sex offenders were added; in 2006 IPSO was expanded, with level-based conditions and an amended travel restriction; GPS tracking was later required by statute for court-ordered parole supervision.
- During this appeal, Doe was reclassified to level 1, with modifications to some IPSO conditions; GPS, polygraph every six months, Internet restriction, and records/waiver remained in force.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were IPSO conditions adopted without formal rulemaking lawful? | Doe argues IPSO lacked required rulemaking procedures. | Board contends IPSO conditions are internal guidelines not rules of general application. | IPSO provisions not regulations; dismissal of rulemaking claim affirmed. |
| Is GPS monitoring a permissible parole condition given a liberty interest? | GPS creates punitive restraint; imposes liberty deprivation without adequate change in circumstances. | Parole conditions may be modified; no liberty interest in parole itself negates due process. | GPS with exclusion zones is punitive and requires proper due process; summary judgment on GPS claim vacated. |
| Did the lack of a predeprivation hearing violate due process for GPS and IPSO modifications? | Doe was entitled to notice and hearing before modification. | Parole modifications fall within broad board discretion; no hearing required in all cases. | Given the GPS issue, due process was violated; no need to reach other hearing claims. |
| Are other IPSO conditions subject to the same liberty-interest and due-process analysis? | All IPSO conditions infringe liberty without adequate process or relation to goals. | Board should interpret its own regulations in first instance; some issues are moot or waived. | Claims regarding other IPSO conditions are waived or moot; no need to resolve liberty interest in those. |
| Is there a self-incrimination barrier to treatment-record disclosure and related implications? | Mandatory disclosure coerces self-incrimination and hampers therapy participation. | No direct coercion or automatic consequences; therapy-related disclosures permitted. | No substantial issue; no appellate ruling required beyond express limitations stated. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559 (Mass. 2009) (GPS with exclusion zones punitive; substantial burden on liberty)
- Chairperson, 454 Mass. 1018 (Mass. 2009) (GPS monitoring in parole context; ex post facto considerations)
- Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11 (Mass. 2010) (GPS addition to probation without change in circumstances violates double jeopardy)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (due process protections in parole revocation)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (due process in probation/parole revocation; liberty interests)
- Pike, 428 Mass. 393 (Mass. 1981) (reasonableness relatedness of conditions to goals of sentencing)
- Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (Mass. 1979) (due process considerations in parole/post-release conditions)
- Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (U.S. 1973) (due process for revocation of parole; evidentiary support)
- Stefanik v. State Bd. of Parole, 372 Mass. 726 (Mass. 1977) (due process requirements for parole revocation)
- Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (parole revocation due process standards)