Doe v. Columbia University
101 F. Supp. 3d 356
S.D.N.Y.2015Background
- Plaintiff, a male Columbia student, was investigated and found to have engaged in "non-consensual sexual intercourse" with a female classmate and was suspended through fall 2015 after a disciplinary hearing.
- Columbia’s Gender-Based Misconduct Policies (GBMPS) governed investigation, hearing, and appeal procedures, using a preponderance standard and allowing a three-member hearing panel to decide responsibility and a dean to set sanctions.
- Plaintiff alleged investigative and procedural flaws: investigator Sessions-Stackhouse failed to record interviews, omitted potentially favorable witnesses, mischaracterized his account, and did not advise him of certain rights (e.g., to submit statements or bring a supporter to meetings).
- Plaintiff pleaded two Title IX theories: (1) "erroneous outcome" — he was wrongly found responsible; and (2) "selective enforcement" — the decision and sanction were motivated by anti-male bias and public pressure on Columbia to be tougher on accused males.
- Court reviewed Rule 12(b)(6) standards under Twombly/Iqbal, accepted nonconclusory factual allegations as true, but disregarded conclusory assertions of anti-male bias; it dismissed the federal Title IX claim for failure to plausibly allege sex-based motive and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Complaint plausibly alleges Title IX "erroneous outcome" based on sex bias | Columbia’s process was flawed and the outcome was wrong; bias against accused males motivated findings | Procedural irregularities do not show decision was motivated by sex; many allegations are conclusory | Dismissed — facts do not plausibly show gender was a motivating factor for the erroneous outcome |
| Whether Plaintiff plausibly pleads Title IX "selective enforcement" | Suspension/severity and initiation were affected by Plaintiff’s sex and by Columbia’s desire to respond to public criticism | No allegations of similarly situated opposite-sex comparators or other facts showing intentional sex-based disparate treatment | Dismissed — no plausible allegation that Columbia intentionally discriminated because of sex |
| Whether disparate treatment or investigator conduct suffices as evidence of discriminatory intent | Investigator’s background and differential treatment of complainant vs. respondent evidence bias | Investigator was not the ultimate decisionmaker; differential sensitivity can be explained by legitimate goals (protecting complainants, avoiding liability) | Dismissed — investigator conduct and disparate treatment are consistent with lawful motives and do not establish sex-based intent |
| Whether state-law claims should proceed after dismissal of federal claim | Plaintiff sought relief on state-law theories tied to the disciplinary process | Defendants moved to dismiss federal claim; court has discretion on supplemental jurisdiction | Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed state-law claims without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: courts ignore conclusory allegations and require plausibility)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must nudge claims from conceivable to plausible)
- Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994) (Title IX claims attacking university disciplinary outcomes subdivided into "erroneous outcome" and "selective enforcement")
- Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (Title IX liability for school’s deliberate indifference to student-on-student sexual harassment)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (Title IX remedies and standards for institutional liability)