This case touches on issues that have been the subject of increasing public attention and controversy: how colleges and universities address allegations of sexual assault on campus. Plaintiff is a male college student who was suspended from Columbia University after having been found to have engaged in non-consensual sex with a female classmate.
Columbia now moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) for failure to state a claim. Significantly, Columbia’s motion does not call upon the Court to wade into the larger public debates about how colleges and universities adjudicate (and, indeed, whether they even should adjudicate) allegations of sexual misconduct on campus. Nor is it the Court’s task to revisit Columbia’s adjudication by weighing Plaintiffs account of what happened against the account of his accuser; in fact, the Court is required at this stage in the litigation to assume the truth of the factual assertions that Plaintiff makes in the Complaint. Instead, the Court’s narrow task is to decide whether the non-conclusory allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to plausibly infer that Columbia’s treatment of Plaintiff was motivated in part by his sex. Applying well-established precedent of the Supreme Court and Second Circuit, the Court concludes that the non-conclusory allegations in the Complaint are insufficient. Specifically, ignoring the Complaint’s conclusory (and sometimes overwrought) assertions of “anti-male bias” — as the Court must — there are no factual allegations in the Complaint that plausibly suggest Columbia acted because of, rather than in spite of, Plaintiffs sex. Plaintiffs subjective belief that he was the victim of sex discrimination, even if firmly held, does not suffice. The same is true of the fact that Columbia’s policies with respect to gender-based misconduct complaints may well disproportionately affect male students. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated below, Columbia’s motion is granted, and the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
Addressing allegations of sexual assault (on campus and elsewhere) can be complicated because the facts are often hotly disputed and come down to a contest of credibility between the accuser and accused. That may well have been the case here, but — as noted above — in considering Columbia’s motion to dismiss, the Court is required to treat the facts alleged in Plain
A. Columbia’s Gender-Based Misconduct Policies
At all times relevant to this case, Columbia had in place formal policies — copies of which were provided to Plaintiff upon his acceptance to the school — defining “Gender-Based Misconduct” and setting forth procedures for handling complaints of such misconduct. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19).
The GBMPS in effect at the time of the events in this case provided that, once Columbia received a complaint of gender-based misconduct, the student against whom the complaint was made (the “respondent”) would be given notice of the complaint and an opportunity to meet with the Assistant Director for Student Services for Gender-Based and Sexual Misconduct to review the GBMPS. (Id. at 11-12). A staff member designated by the Assistant Director would then be tasked with conducting an investigation of the incident and drafting a report based on his or her findings. (Id. at 12). If Columbia determined at that stage that there was “reasonable cause” to believe that a policy violation had occurred, both the student making the complaint (the “complainant”) and the respondent were to be given a chance to review the investigative report. (GBMPS at 13). If the respondent did not “accept responsibility” for the incident, the school would then convene a hearing panel — typically comprised of two deans or senior-level administrators and one student chosen from a specially trained pool of panelists (any of whose participation could be challenged by the complainant or the respondent on the ground of a perceived conflict of interest). (Id. at 12-14). Throughout the investigation and hearing process, both the complainant and the respondent were entitled to have a “supporter” present, but supporters were expressly prohibited from, “in any way, interven[ing] in the meeting/hearing or addressing] the investigator/hearing panel.” (Id. at 12-13; see Am. Compl. ¶ 22).
Before a hearing, the three-member hearing panel was. charged with reviewing the investigative report and any other documentation. (GBMPS at 14). Under the GBMPS, both the complainant and the respondent had an opportunity to give a statement at the hearing and to 'answer questions posed by the panel. (Id.). The panelists were to determine, based on their review of the relevant testimony and documents, which other witnesses (if any)
B. Plaintiffs Allegations
1. The Sexual Encounter Between Plaintiff and Jane Doe
Plaintiff in this case is a Florida native who, after excelling in high school, was admitted into Columbia’s class of 2016. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-17). Shortly after arriving on Columbia’s campus in August 2012, Plaintiff became acquainted with a female first-year student (“Jane Doe”), who was assigned to the same residence hall floor as Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27). During the first semester of their first year, Jane Doe dated Plaintiffs roommate, and Plaintiff also became close to Jane Doe’s roommate. (Id. ¶ 27). By virtue of their shared social circle, Plaintiff and Jane Doe saw each other “nearly on a daily basis” and often spent time together at social outings on the weekends. (Id. ¶ 28).
On the night of May 12, 2013, Plaintiff was studying for his statistics final in a lounge on the seventh floor of his residence hall. (Id. ¶ 29). At approximately 1:00 a.m. (i.e., technically on May 13, 2013), Jane Doe arrived outside the lounge and began speaking with one of Plaintiffs and Jane Doe’s mutual friends. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30). Ten or twenty minutes later, Jane Doe came into the lounge and sat down next to
Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 31). They then talked until approximately 2:30 a.m., when Plaintiff suggested that they go for a walk outside; Jane Doe agreed. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32). Plaintiff and Jane Doe strolled around the Columbia University neighborhood for approximately one hour, at which point they returned to the lounge where Plaintiff had been studying. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33). As Plaintiff gathered his books, Jane Doe and Plaintiff began to flirt with each other, and they discussed “hooking up” instead of going to bed. (Id. ¶ 33). Because each of their roommates was asleep at the time— and Plaintiffs roommate was Jane Doe’s ex-boyfriend — Jane Doe suggested that they go to the bathroom located within her suite rather than to either of their bedrooms. (Id. ¶ 34).
Plaintiff dropped his bag off in his room, and then the two walked together to Jane Doe’s suite. (Id. ¶ 35). When they reached the bathroom located within Jane Doe’s suite, Jane Doe instructed Plaintiff to wait there while she went into her bedroom to find a condom. (Id. ¶ 35). When Jane Doe came back into the bathroom, she undressed herself in front of Plaintiff, and the two proceeded to have sex. (Id.). Afterwards, Jane Doe took a shower, and Plaintiff returned to his room to go to sleep. (Id. ¶ 36).
In the following weeks, Jane Doe contacted Plaintiff a few times to express concern about how their sexual encounter might appear to others in their social circle, particularly because Jane Doe had dated Plaintiffs roommate. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38). At or about the same time, Jane Doe also spoke about the encounter to Claire Kao, a resident adviser to both her and Plaintiff, who then approached Plaintiff to discuss the evening. Kao told Plaintiff that she had been advised that he had engaged in “consensual sexual intercourse” with Jane Doe on the night of May 12th, and that
2. Jane Doe’s Complaint Against Plaintiff and Columbia’s Investigation
Plaintiff and Jane Doe returned to campus in the fall of 2013 to begin their sophomore years. On September 24, 2013, Rosalie Siler, Columbia’s then-Assistant Director for Gender-Based and Sexual Misconduct, informed Plaintiff that a fellow student (namely, Jane Doe) had filed a sexual assault complaint against him for an incident that had occurred on May 12, 2013. (Id. ¶ 42). The next day, Siler met with Plaintiff, and gave him a formal notice that he was being charged with having engaged in “Non-Consensual Sexual Intercourse,” in violation of the GBMPS. (Id. ¶ 43). Siler also told Plaintiff that the school had issued a “no contact” order barring him from any contact with Jane Doe. (Id.).
That same day, Plaintiff met with Columbia’s Title IX investigator, Jilleian Sessions-Stackhouse, to provide his account of what had happened on May 12th. (Id. ¶ 47). According to the Complaint, “Sessions-Stackhouse is not an independent fact finder or disinterested party with any specialized training; she is employed by Columbia University and her role is essentially one of prosecuting sexual assault on campus. As such, [her] line of questioning was more akin to cross-examination calculated to illicit, [sic] a confession” than it was “an objective attempt to factually reconstruct an event.” (Id. ¶ 48). Moreover, Sessions-Stackhouse did not record the interview with Plaintiff, but took handwritten — and in Plaintiff’s view, selective— notes. (Id.). Pointedly, the Complaint charges that, “having worked for a women’s resource center in the past, Ms. Sessions-Stackhouse does not come from a gender-neutral background.” (Id.).
In their first meeting, Plaintiff told Sessions-Stackhouse that there were several other students present in the lounge on the night of May 12th; Sessions-Stack-house, however, did not ask Plaintiff any follow-up questions or engage in any further investigation 'as to who those students were. (Id. ¶ 47). Moreover, the Complaint charges that, at no point in the meeting or in any follow-up meetings did Sessions-Stackhouse advise Plaintiff that he had a right under the GBMPS to submit a written statement to her or to the soon-to-be-convened hearing panel, or inform Plaintiff of his right to bring a silent advocate or “supporter” to any of the meetings during the investigation and disciplinary process. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52).
On October 21, 2013, Plaintiff met with Siler again in order to inform her that some of Jane Doe’s friends had “harassed and assaulted [him] on campus,” harassment that he contended was “on the basis of gender as a male accused of sexual assault.” (Id. ¶ 54). According to Plaintiff, “Siler did not take [his] complaint of gender-based harassment seriously and quickly dismissed” it. (Id.).
The next day, October 22, 2013, Plaintiff spoke again with Sessions-Stackhouse and reviewed her notes from their September meeting. (Id. ¶ 55). Plaintiff observed that Sessions-Stackhouse had inaccurately paraphrased his account of the events of
On January 25, 2014, Plaintiff met with Columbia’s Deputy Title IX Coordinator, Virginia Ryan, in order to review Sessions-Stackhouse’s completed investigative report. (Id. ¶¶ 60-61). Upon seeing the report, Plaintiff noted that it disregarded Plaintiffs statement that Jane Doe had “clear[ly] expressed verbal consent” on the night of the incident, and that Sessions-Stackhouse had failed to investigate or reconcile the conflicting accounts of the evening given by Jane Doe and Knight. (Id. ¶ 61). The report also contained no mention of an interview with, or any statements from, Jane Doe’s roommate or the two students with whom Jane Doe had chatted outside the lounge on the night of May 12th. (Id. ¶ 63). All in all, Plaintiff alleges that Sessions-Stackhouse “adopted Jane Doe’s version” of the night in question, “to the exclusion of important details provided by [Plaintiff].” (Id. ¶ 64).
3. The Disciplinary Hearing and Plaintiffs Suspension
On February 12, 2014, at approximately 8 p.m., Plaintiffs disciplinary hearing began before three members of the Columbia community: two staff members and one graduate student. (Id. ¶¶79, 82). This time, Plaintiff was accompanied by a “support person,” his roommate at the time. (Id. ¶ 80). Jane Doe brought her own “support person”: Sarah Weinstein, the membership director of the Columbia Democrats and a prominent critic of Columbia’s handling of sexual assault complaints on campus. (Id. ¶¶ 71-72, 80). At the beginning of the hearing, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to make a statement; not having been advised about that part of the process, however, Plaintiff simply stated that he had “done nothing wrong.” (Id. ¶ 85).
Jane Doe and Plaintiff then both gave their accounts of what had happened on the night of May 12, 2013. (Id. ¶ 86). The panel also received Sessions-Stackhouse’s investigative report, which was entered into evidence. (Id. ¶ 89). No witnesses appeared at the hearing to support Plaintiffs defense, which Plaintiff attributes to the failure of Sessions-Stackhouse to adequately investigate the incident and discover such witnesses. (Id. ¶¶ 90, 92). Further, although witnesses were entitled to submit written statements during the process, none did on Plaintiffs behalf, as Columbia failed to “obtain or afford” Plaintiff “the right to submit witness statements.” (Id. ¶ 92). All told, the hearing lasted less than two hours. (Id. ¶ 95).
On February 18, 2014, Ryan gave Plaintiff formal notice of the hearing’s results. (Id. ¶ 96). The hearing panel concluded that Plaintiff had engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with Jane Doe. (Id.). Significantly, the panel found, in particular, “that it is more likely than not that [Plaintiff] directed unreasonable pressure for sexual activity toward [Jane Doe] over a period of weeks,” and that this constituted coercion within the definition of “nonconsensual sexual intercourse” in the GBMPS. (Id.; see also GBMPS at 2). On February 26, 2014, the Dean of Student Affairs, Terry Martinez, sanctioned Plain
On March 3, 2014, Plaintiff did appeal to the Dean of the College, James Valentini. (Id. ¶ 104). Plaintiff argued that Columbia had committed procedural errors, and submitted emails and interviews with student witnesses that had not been included in Sessions-Stackhouse’s investigative report or mentioned at the hearing. (Id.). Plaintiff also contended that Columbia had “facilitated a breach of confidentiality,” citing the fact that the results of Plaintiffs disciplinary hearing had been revealed to an editor at a Columbia student-run newspaper, The Blue and the White. (Id. ¶¶ 103-04). Notably, Jane Doe herself also appealed to Dean Valentini to reduce the severity of the sanction. (Id. ¶ 105).
One week later, Dean Valentini denied Plaintiffs appeal, finding, among other things, that Sessions-Stackhouse had discretion about whom to interview; that Plaintiff had failed to identify his witnesses until the appeal; and that those witnesses would not necessarily have exonerated Plaintiff in any event, as the coercive behavior for which he was found responsible had been committed over the course of the weeks leading up to May 12th, outside the presence of the witnesses. (Id. ¶ 106; see Mem. Law Supp. Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl. Pursuant R. 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 35) (“Defs.’ Mem.”)). Dean Valentini further found that the length of Plaintiffs suspension was appropriate. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106, 108). As a result, Plaintiff remains suspended until this upcoming fall, which he alleges has “ruined” his academic career and caused other forms of damage. (Id. ¶¶ 110-13).
LEGAL STANDARDS
In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all facts set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See, e.g., Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc.,
As discussed below, courts have interpreted Title IX by looking to case law interpreting other discrimination statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Yusuf v. Vassar Coll.,
PLAINTIFF’S TITLE IX CLAIM
With that guidance in mind, the Court turns to the only federal claim that Plaintiff is pursuing: his claim of discrimination in violation of Title IX.
Because “Title IX was enacted to supplement the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s bans on racial discrimination in the workplace and in universities ... [and] because Title IX mirrors the substantive provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... courts have interpreted Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the caselaw interpreting Title VII.” Yusuf,
In Yusuf, the Second Circuit explained that cases attacking university disciplinary proceedings on the ground of gender bias “fall generally within two categories.” Yusuf,
Regardless of the type of claim asserted by a plaintiff, “wholly conclusory allegations,” as noted above, are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. It follows that “allegations of a procedurally or otherwise flawed proceeding that has led to an ... erroneous outcome combined with a conclusory allegation of gender discrimination” will not withstand scrutiny at this stage of the litigation. Id.; see also id. (noting that allegations in support of a Title IX claim must “do more than merely recite the pleader’s conclusion that the complained-of conduct was discriminatory”); Sanders-Peay,
In this case, Plaintiff brings both an “erroneous outcome” claim and a “selective enforcement” claim. See Yusuf,
A. The Erroneous Outcome Claim
Applying the foregoing principles, the Court concludes first that Plaintiffs nonconclusory factual allegations do not move his erroneous outcome claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly,
In any event, even assuming arguendo that the Complaint satisfies the “articulable doubt” prong of the Yusuf test, it still has one “fatal gap”: the lack of any non-conclusory factual allegations giving rise to a plausible inference that the erroneous outcome was motivated by Plaintiffs sex. Yusuf,
Under Iqbal and Twombly, however, the Court must ignore those conclusory statements. See Iqbal,
The only arguably factual allegation that Plaintiff makes in support of his assertion that Sessions-Stackhouse was motivated by “an anti-male gender bias” is that she had “worked for a women’s resource center in the past” and thus did “not come from a gender-neutral background.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 48). That ad feminem allegation, however, is plainly insufficient to show that Sessions-Stack-house’s actions — let alone Columbia’s ultimate decisions — with respect to Plaintiff were motivated by gender bias. And while Columbia may well have treated Jane Doe more favorably than Plaintiff during the disciplinary process, the mere fact that Plaintiff is male and Jane Doe is female does not suggest that the disparate treatment was because 'of Plaintiff’s sex. Indeed, the alleged treatment “ ‘could equally have been’ ” — and more plausibly was— “ ‘prompted by lawful, independent goals,’ ” such as a desire (enhanced, perhaps, by the fear of negative publicity or Title IX liability to the victims of sexual assault) to take allegations of rape on campus seriously and to treat complainants with a high degree of sensitivity. Twombly,
Notably, the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs allegations fail as a matter of law is consistent with the decisions of other district courts in similar cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Castleton State Coll.,
Similarly, in Brown, the plaintiff alleged that his former nursing program had, in connection with disciplinary proceedings against him, “ignored certain evidence and accepted other evidence unquestioningly.”
The Second Circuit’s decision in Yusuf does not call for a different result. To be sure, the Yusuf Court held that the plaintiffs allegations were sufficient to state a claim under Title IX and relied in part on an allegation that is repeated nearly verbatim in the Complaint here (Am. Compl. ¶ 139): that males accused of sexual harassment at the school were “invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence, or lack thereof.”
Notably, Plaintiff relies on only one case other than Yusuf to support his contention
In.short, because Plaintiffs non-conclusory factual allegations fail to give rise to a plausible inference that the outcome of his disciplinary proceeding was motivated by gender, Plaintiffs erroneous outcome claim must be and is dismissed.
B. Plaintiffs Selective Enforcement Claim
For similar reasons, Plaintiffs selective enforcement claim also fails. As noted above, to state such a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “regardless of the student’s guilt or innocence, the severity of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was affected by the student’s gender.” Yusuf,
In this case, the Complaint not only fails to establish gender as a plausible motivating factor behind the investigation and ultimate punishment, but it also fails to include any allegations that female stu
In so holding, the Court does not mean to suggest that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a male plaintiff in Plaintiffs position must necessarily be able to allege that a female student charged with sexual assault was treated differently. Given the allegedly higher incidence of male-on-female sexual assaults (and sexual assault complaints) on campus (see Am. Compl. ¶ 138), that could pose an impossible pleading burden in some cases.
PLAINTIFF’S STATE-LAW CLAIMS
In light of the dismissal of Plaintiffs federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state-law claims. Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1367, a district court has discretion over whether to exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims “that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have made clear, however, that, as a general rule, “when the federal claims are dismissed the ‘state claims should be dismissed as well.’ ” In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P’ships Litig.,
CONCLUSION
This Court’s “role, of course, is [not] to advocate for best practices or policies” with respect to the treatment of sexual assault complaints on college and university campuses. Yu,
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, Columbia’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Docket No. 34 and to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit under seal on May 19, 2014. (Docket No. 1). After the Court ordered that the case be unsealed (Docket No. 3), Columbia consented to Plaintiff’s request to proceed pseudonymously in light of the "sensitive subject matter and the age of the students involved” (Docket No. 19).
. On August 15, 2014, Columbia made significant changes to its gender-based misconduct policies and practices. (Am. Compl. ¶ 134). As those changes post-dated the events at issue here, they are irrelevant for purposes of this case.
. The Complaint does not explain why, if Kao had been told that the encounter was "consensual,” she would nonetheless have been required to report it to the school.
. The Complaint also includes a claim based on Columbia's alleged violation of "rules” relating to Title IX promulgated by the United States Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 138-157). But Plaintiff failed to respond to Columbia’s motion to dismiss that claim, so the claim is deemed abandoned and dismissed on that basis. See Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F.Supp.2d 363, 392 (S.D.N.Y.2013) ("A court may, and generally will, deem a claim abandoned when a plaintiff fails to respond to a defendant's arguments that the claim should be dismissed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Jackson v. Federal Exp.,
. Liberally construed, the Complaint could also be read to bring more generic due process and equal protection claims. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 126). To the extent it does, the claims fail, as such constitutional claims may be brought only against "state actors.” See Giano v. Senkowski,
. Whether Columbia’s definition of "non-consensual sex” is unduly broad may well be the subject of legitimate debate, but it is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims in this case and thus well beyond the scope of this Opinion.
. In fact, the Complaint alleges that the disciplinary process against Plaintiff took place during a time when Columbia was "under fire” for its handling of sexual assault complaints, culminating in the filing, by twenty-three students from Columbia and Barnard
. Although not necessary to its ultimate conclusion, the Court notes its skepticism of the Yusuf Court’s reasoning that the plaintiff's allegation about males invariably losing provides a "verifiable causal connection” between Vassar's treatment of the plaintiff and his gender.
. Of course, there is nothing inherently gendered about sexual misconduct or sexual misconduct complaints. That is, universities presumably receive at least some complaints of sexual misconduct from men against men, women against women, or women against men (if not complaints involving students who self-identify with neither gender), especially where the definition as sexual misconduct is as broad as it was in the GBMPS at the time relevant to this case. (Notably, the Complaint here does not allege that all sexual misconduct complaints at Columbia in the relevant time were made by women against men; it merely alleges a "higher incidence” of such complaints. (Am. Compl. ¶ 138).) Given that, a plaintiff alleging a violation of Title IX based on the handling of a sexual misconduct complaint may well be able to identify a similarly situated comparator.