327 F. Supp. 3d 397
D.R.I.2018Background
- John Doe, an African-American Brown student and varsity athlete, was accused of sexual misconduct by a white classmate (Jane) arising from a September 2013 encounter; Brown investigated and after a February 2014 student-conduct hearing found John "responsible" for nonconsensual contact and underage drinking and imposed a one-year deferred suspension and no-contact order.
- John alleges Brown treated him discriminatorily (race and sex), allowed Jane procedural leeway, refused to investigate Jane’s alleged misconduct, and permitted breaches of confidentiality by Jane without discipline.
- In May 2014 Brown opened a second investigation based on a separate complaint (Sally), immediately imposed an interim separation from campus, and notified John; John alleges administrators communicated animus (e.g., "We got your boy now") and pressured him, contributing to severe emotional distress and a suicide attempt.
- John filed suit in 2017 asserting federal and state claims: Title IX (hostile environment, erroneous outcome, selective enforcement), Title VI, RICRA (gender, race, disability), §1981, IIED, and multiple contract-based claims tied to Brown’s student-conduct Code and policies.
- Brown moved to dismiss on statute-of-limitations and plausibility grounds; the court evaluated continuing-violation tolling, deliberate-indifference and comparator theories, and multiple contract theories tied to procedural rights and specific Code provisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether earlier (2013–14) acts are timely under continuing-violation doctrine for Title IX/VI | The 2013–14 Jane investigation is part of an ongoing discriminatory campaign culminating in the 2014 Sally investigation; the May 2014 acts anchor earlier claims | The investigations were discrete; claims based on pre-May 4, 2014 events are time-barred | Court: Continuing-violation applies to some claims; Counts I, II, and V survive as to the ongoing pattern, but Counts III and IV challenging the first investigation’s outcome/selection are time-barred as to the first investigation |
| Whether John plausibly alleged deliberate indifference / hostile-education-environment (Title IX) | Brown failed to investigate Jane’s complaint against John, limited his defense at the hearing, ignored Jane's confidentiality breaches, and imposed/ enforced sanctions discriminatorily | Brown contends its responses were reasonable and procedures were followed | Court: Allegations sufficiently plead deliberate indifference and hostile environment; Counts I & II survive |
| Whether erroneous-outcome and selective-enforcement Title IX claims are plausible/timely | Erroneous outcome: disciplinary errors in both investigations show gender bias; Selective enforcement: Brown enforced against John but not Jane | Brown: cannot challenge outcome of the first investigation (outside limitations); comparator argument invalid as conduct pre-dates limitations | Court: Erroneous-outcome claim as to first investigation fails; selective-enforcement claim survives as to the second investigation but time-barred as to the first |
| Whether contract, state-law and race claims survive plausibility review | Contract: Brown breached Code/policies and procedural rights (including unlawful interim separation); RICRA/Title VI/§1981: facts show racial animus (differential treatment, statements) | Brown: many contractual theories rely on policies not in effect, Plaintiff failed to exhaust appeals, disability and some contract theories lack specificity | Court: Title VI and §1981 plausibly pleaded and survive; most contract theories dismissed except breach for improper May 2014 interim separation and related covenant-of-good-faith claim; IIED survives; disability (RICRA) and several contract theories dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard: plausibility requirement)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (continuing-violation doctrine and discrete acts distinction)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (Title IX framework and school liability context)
- Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709 (erroneous-outcome and gender-bias framework)
- Loubriel v. Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 694 F.3d 139 (First Circuit discussion of continuing-violation tolling)
- Doe v. Trs. of Bos. Coll., 892 F.3d 67 (Title IX deliberate-indifference standard in the First Circuit)