Doe v. Attorney General of the United States
659 F.3d 266
3rd Cir.2011Background
- Rodov, a Belarus-born refugee and lawful permanent resident since 2001, was paroled into the U.S. for prosecution after an arrest warrant related to a wire‑fraud scheme.
- He pled guilty in 2008 to aiding and abetting wire fraud; the plea and stipulation identified a scheme causing losses over $120,000, with a specific $6,447 transfer cited.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings, arguing Rodov’s conviction involved moral turpitude and rendered him inadmissible or ineligible for cancellation; Rodov sought cancellation of removal and CAT relief.
- The IJ cancelled removal under § 1229b(a) finding Rodov not an aggravated felon and reserved CAT/asylum issues for later, indicating potential CAT relief if needed.
- The BIA reversed, holding Rodov’s loss amount and conduct met aggravated felony criteria; it denied asylum and CAT relief, and declined remand for CAT considerations.
- Rodov petitioned for review; the Third Circuit affirmed in part, reversed as to CAT, and remanded for CAT consideration, with a concurring/dissenting view on the burden of proof at entry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a returning LPR can be treated as an applicant for admission at the border | Rodov argues he is an LPR, not an applicant for admission, so parole was improper. | DHS may treat a returning LPR as an applicant for admission if the crime statute applies under § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). | Yes; the majority holds Rodov could be regarded as an applicant for admission at entry under probable cause standard. |
| What burden of proof applies to showing 'committed' under § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) | Rodov contends government burden should require clear evidence or conviction. | Government may rely on a lesser standard leveraging probable cause at the border. | Government bears the burden under a probable-cause standard to show 'committed' before treating him as seeking admission. |
| Whether Rodov’s offense constitutes an aggravated felony for removal purposes | Rodov argues the loss amount tied to the single counted transaction is below $10,000 and not aggravated. | The total loss from the entire scheme, as evidenced by the plea/stipulation, supports aggravated felony. | The court adopts a tailored, fact-focused approach (modified categorical) and upholds that the entire scheme supports aggravated felony. |
| Remand for CAT and asylum considerations | Rodov seeks CAT/asylum relief if removal based on the aggravated felony is upheld. | BIA appropriately denied CAT/asylum; no remand necessary. | Remand is required for the immigration judge to address CAT claims; BIA’s CAT statements are vacated to the extent they constitute an order. |
Key Cases Cited
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2004) (aggravated felony analysis and standard of proof for moral turpitude offenses)
- Restrepo v. Att'y Gen., 617 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 2010) (modified categorical approach for crimes with varying conduct)
- Alaka v. Att'y Gen., 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006) (focus on conviction versus acts; loss attributed to specific offense)
- Khalayleh v. INS, 287 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 2002) (discusses scope of 'offense' for aggregated losses in certain contexts)
- De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (interprets 'committed' to include conduct beyond formal convictions)
- United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (use of 'committed' to consider underlying conduct beyond elements)
- United States v. Charlesworth, 217 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (plain meaning of 'committed' in sentencing context)
- Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993) (due process considerations in restraint/retention of status)
