396 F.Supp.3d 126
D.D.C.2019Background
- Six current or former Howard University students (Jane Does 1–6) allege Title IX discrimination and, for three plaintiffs, retaliation after reporting campus sexual assaults between 2014–2016.
- Plaintiffs claim Howard received actual notice, inadequately investigated or delayed responses, allowed alleged assailants continued campus access, and took adverse actions (e.g., firing an RA, financial/academic obstacles).
- Howard moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the court accepted factual allegations as true for pleading-stage review.
- Central legal dispute: whether Title IX liability requires that a school’s deliberate indifference cause actual subsequent harassment, or whether making a student “vulnerable to” further harassment suffices.
- Court concluded vulnerability is sufficient and evaluated whether each plaintiff plausibly pleaded deliberate indifference and resulting vulnerability or harm.
- Result: denial of dismissal as to Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VIII, and IX; dismissal with leave to amend as to Counts V and VII (claims of Jane Does 3 and 5).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title IX requires proof of actual subsequent harassment (vs. vulnerability) | Plaintiffs: deliberate indifference that makes a student "liable or vulnerable" to further harassment satisfies Davis. | Howard: plaintiffs must allege subsequent acts of harassment caused by the school's indifference. | Court: follows circuits allowing vulnerability as sufficient (e.g., Tenth Circuit); vulnerability can support a Title IX claim. |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded deliberate indifference by Howard | Plaintiffs: alleged prolonged delays, minimal investigation, continued campus access for assailants, hostile/insensitive administrator comments, and resulting educational harm. | Howard: responses were reasonable or disciplinary/administrative actions justified; challenges sufficiency of pleadings for some plaintiffs. | Court: found allegations sufficient for Does 1,2,4,6,5 (partly) to plausibly show deliberate indifference; Doe 3’s claim dismissed for failing to plausibly show vulnerability/continued risk, with leave to amend. |
| Whether conduct also supports Title IX retaliation claims | Plaintiffs: reporting assault is protected activity; adverse actions (termination, financial/academic obstacles, delayed accommodations) could deter reporting and thus constitute retaliation. | Howard: disputes causal link and contends some actions are proper school discipline or unrelated. | Court: found retaliation claims by Does 1,2,5 adequately pleaded (timing, disparate treatment, and material adverse effects); survived motion to dismiss. |
| Pleading sufficiency and remedies at dismissal stage | Plaintiffs: sufficient factual allegations to make claims plausible; discovery needed to resolve disputes. | Howard: many factual assertions insufficient; some plaintiffs fail to plead essential elements. | Court: denied dismissal on majority of counts, but dismissed Counts V and VII (Doe 3 and Doe 5 discrimination claims) with leave to amend. |
Key Cases Cited
- Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Rule 12(b)(6) legal-sufficiency standard discussion)
- Blue v. District of Columbia, 811 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Iqbal/Twombly pleading principles)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility and spoiler of conclusory allegations)
- Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (Title IX deliberate indifference standard for student-on-student harassment)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (implied private right under Title IX; deliberate indifference theory)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (Title IX covers retaliation claims)
- Farmer v. Kansas State University, 918 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding vulnerability suffices under Davis)
- Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Title IX’s objectives protecting students)
- Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (materially adverse action standard for retaliation)