Doe 1 v. Cooper
842 F.3d 833
| 4th Cir. | 2016Background
- North Carolina law (2015 version) requires registration for certain sex-offense convictions and bars some registrants ("restricted sex offenders") from being at: (1) places intended primarily for minors; (2) within 300 feet of such places when those places sit on property not primarily for minors (e.g., malls); and (3) "any place where minors gather for regularly scheduled educational, recreational, or social programs."
- Violation of these provisions is a Class H felony; some statutory exceptions exist (e.g., parental presence at a child’s school).
- Five named Doe plaintiffs (restricted registrants with varying convictions and family/employment ties to places potentially covered) sued state officials under § 1983, challenging subsections (a)(1)–(a)(3) as overbroad (First Amendment) and vague (Fourteenth Amendment).
- District court upheld (a)(1) and its vagueness challenge to (a)(1) was denied; it permanently enjoined (a)(3) as unconstitutionally vague and (a)(2) as facially overbroad (because the State presented no evidence tailoring (a)(2) to dangerousness).
- State appealed; the Fourth Circuit reviews de novo and affirms the district court judgment enjoining (a)(2) and (a)(3).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 14-208.18(a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague (Due Process) | (Does) Language like "regularly scheduled" and "where minors gather" gives no clear standard; ordinary people and officers can't identify prohibited conduct. | (State) Read subsections in pari materia; (a)(3) gains clarity from (a)(1) and (a)(2) examples. | Court: (a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague; cannot read examples into (a)(3) and omissions are intentional. |
| Whether § 14-208.18(a)(2) is facially overbroad (First Amendment) | (Does) (a)(2) broadly restricts movement and First Amendment activity of all restricted offenders without accounting for individual dangerousness, burdening substantially more speech than necessary. | (State) Statute is content neutral and justified by the substantial interest in protecting minors; common sense and case examples show risk. | Court: (a)(2) is facially overbroad on the record; State failed to meet burden to show narrow tailoring or prove application fits only dangerous offenders. |
| Level of scrutiny applicable to (a)(2) | (Does) Intermediate scrutiny applies to time/place/manner restrictions. | (State) Agrees statute is content neutral and intermediate scrutiny applies. | Court: Applied intermediate scrutiny. |
| Burden of proof under intermediate scrutiny | (Does) State must show regulation materially advances interest and is narrowly tailored; State offered no empirical evidence. | (State) Relied on case anecdotes, logic, and common sense rather than empirical proof. | Court: Government bears burden; anecdote/commonsense insufficient; absence of evidence fatal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Brown, 503 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for state statute constitutionality)
- Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (distinguishes statutes that set an imprecise but comprehensible norm from those that provide no standard)
- Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (statute with a constitutional "core")
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (vagueness doctrine: a vague provision cannot be saved by some clear applications)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (criminal statutes must define offenses with sufficient definiteness)
- Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009) (statutory construction should give effect to all provisions)
- Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (public streets and parks as traditional public fora for assembly and expression)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations)
- Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (overbreadth doctrine limits)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (overbreadth must be real and substantial)
- Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (facial overbreadth requires realistic danger of chilling protected expression)
- Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 2002) (content-neutrality and scrutiny analysis)
- Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Fox, 470 F.3d 1074 (4th Cir. 2006) (intermediate scrutiny fit requirement)
- United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (government bears burden to show fit under intermediate scrutiny)
- McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014) (government must produce evidence to show regulation fits the asserted interest)