959 F.3d 357
9th Cir.2020Background
- Dr. Eugene Scott created and broadcasted religious sermons, licensed distribution to Dolores Press, and bequeathed his copyrights to his widow, Melissa Scott.
- In 2014 Patrick Robinson (Doc’s Dream) posted Scott’s works online after being refused permission and sued, claiming Scott had abandoned his copyrights and the works were in the public domain.
- Dolores Press defended and obtained summary judgment rejecting Doc’s Dream’s abandonment claim; the Ninth Circuit previously affirmed aspects of the litigation in a related appeal.
- Dolores moved for attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505; the district court denied fees, reasoning a declaratory judgment on abandonment did not require construction of the Copyright Act and abandonment is a judge-made equitable doctrine.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit held that claims turning on the existence, scope, or abandonment of a copyright invoke the Copyright Act for § 505 purposes, vacated the denial of fees, and remanded for application of the governing fee factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a declaratory action alleging copyright abandonment is a “civil action under” the Copyright Act for § 505 fee purposes | Dolores: Yes — disputes over whether works fall outside copyright require construction of the Act, so § 505 applies | Doc’s Dream: No — action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act and abandonment is a judicial doctrine outside the Act | Held: Yes — actions that turn on copyright validity, scope, or infringement (including abandonment) invoke the Copyright Act and can support § 505 fees |
| Whether the judicial origin of the abandonment doctrine places such suits outside § 505 | Dolores: Origin doesn’t matter if resolution requires construing statutory copyright provisions | Doc’s Dream: Abandonment predates the Act and resembles general property law, so it’s outside Title 17 | Held: Rejected — even if doctrinally judicial, adjudicating abandonment here required construing the Copyright Act (e.g., licensing, notices, attribution provisions) |
| Whether invoking the Declaratory Judgment Act precludes application of § 505 | Dolores: DJA and Copyright Act operate together; DJA does not create federal jurisdiction alone | Doc’s Dream: Suit was a DJA action, not a copyright action | Held: Rejected — DJA does not supplant the Copyright Act; complaint alleged federal copyright questions and expressly invoked § 505 and federal jurisdiction |
| Whether district court properly exercised discretion in denying fees without applying fee factors | Dolores: District court declined fees based on mistaken legal premise | Doc’s Dream: District court exercised discretion based on its reading of the law | Held: Vacated and remanded — denial rested on erroneous legal view; district court must reconsider fee request under Fogerty/Kirtsaeng factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016) (Supreme Court guidance on awarding fees under the Copyright Act and discretionary factors)
- Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (Supreme Court: standards and discretion for fee awards in copyright cases)
- Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (analyzing abandonment with reference to license provisions of the Copyright Act)
- Nat’l Comics Publ’ns v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951) (origin of the copyright-abandonment doctrine)
- Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960) (adopting the Learned Hand abandonment standard in this circuit)
- Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1993) (when a complaint arises under federal copyright law)
- Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) (Declaratory Judgment Act does not alter the types of issues that give access to federal courts)
- Shame On You Prods., Inc. v. Banks, 893 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2018) (discussing discretionary nature of § 505 awards and appellate review)
- Doc’s Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc., 766 F. App’x 467 (9th Cir. 2019) (prior appeal in these related proceedings)
