Dipietro v. GATX Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 192196

Rita DiPietro was hired as a customer service representative at GATX in July 2016; Lucy Santorsola was her manager.
GATX required employees to record out-of-office time in a company calendar (the COO Program) in half-day (four-hour) increments; DiPietro alleged this overstated brief sick leaves she took to care for her mother.
On May 18, 2017 DiPietro complained to HR (Jenny Strable) and to Santorsola’s manager (Harriet McSweeney) about the COO Program; Santorsola learned DiPietro had complained.
In June 2017 Santorsola documented multiple performance issues and, after consulting HR and McSweeney, terminated DiPietro on June 26, 2017; DiPietro contends the documentation was fabricated or back-dated.
DiPietro sued for retaliatory discharge (claiming violation of the Illinois Employee Sick Leave Act and Chicago ordinance) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); defendants moved for summary judgment asserting lawful, performance-based termination.
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants; the appellate court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether termination violated clearly mandated public policy under the Illinois Employee Sick Leave Act (retaliatory discharge)	DiPietro: requiring half-day entries effectively denied or prejudiced her leave used to care for her mother; retaliation for complaining violated the Act	GATX: COO Program applied to all leave types equally; DiPietro was not denied leave and the policy did not violate the Act	Held: No public-policy violation. The COO rule applied evenly to all leave; DiPietro was not denied leave and the Act does not require minute-by-minute tracking, so summary judgment affirmed
Whether Santorsola’s alleged fabrication of performance records and conduct was extreme and outrageous enough to support IIED	DiPietro: Santorsola lied, fabricated and back-dated counseling notes in retaliation, abusing managerial power to cause severe distress	Defendants: Alleged misconduct was ordinary employment dispute/performance management, not the sort of egregious conduct required for IIED	Held: Conduct not extreme/outrageous as a matter of law; allegations amount to unpleasant employment actions and ill will, insufficient for IIED; summary judgment affirmed

Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124 (Ill. 1981) (defines retaliatory discharge public-policy exception)
Turner v. Memorial Medical Center, 233 Ill. 2d 494 (Ill. 2009) (elements for retaliatory discharge and need for clearly mandated public policy)
McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78 (Ill. 1988) (standard for extreme and outrageous conduct)
Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85 (Ill. 1976) (malice alone insufficient for IIED liability)
Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 318 Ill. App. 3d 736 (Ill. App. 2000) (employer’s widespread false allegations and sham investigation found extreme/outrageous)
Milton v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 101 Ill. App. 3d 75 (Ill. App. 1981) (sustained IIED where employer used power to coerce illegal acts and engaged in prolonged harassment)
Ulm v. Memorial Medical Center, 2012 IL App (4th) 110421 (Ill. App. 2012) (employer’s unpleasant but ordinary employment actions insufficient for IIED)
Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 2016 IL 120041 (Ill. 2016) (elements required to prove IIED)
Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, Inc., 223 Ill. 2d 352 (Ill. 2006) (summary judgment de novo review)
Bourgonje v. Machev, 362 Ill. App. 3d 984 (Ill. App. 2005) (summary judgment standards)