Dimitracopoulos v. City of New York
26 F. Supp. 3d 200
E.D.N.Y2014Background
- Madelyn Dimitracopoulos, a 72–73-year-old tenured English teacher at Flushing High School since 1962, alleges age discrimination and retaliation by DOE, principals, and assistant principals after receiving multiple "unsatisfactory" evaluations (2011–2014) and temporary loss of per-session assignments.
- She previously sued the DOE for age discrimination and retaliation in 2009; that suit settled in 2010. She filed an EEOC charge June 26, 2013 and this action on January 31, 2014.
- Key contested events: a 2011–2012 year-end unsatisfactory rating by Principal Hudson; 2012–2013 and 2013–2014 evaluations/observations by Principal Radovich, Assistant Principal Morgan, and Principal Brown; denial of per-session (after-school) work Sept–Dec 2013; schedule changes and repeated co-teaching assignments.
- Court held a bench "mini-trial" colloquy with parties; applied Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard informed by judicial questioning and found some claims could plausibly be accepted by a jury.
- Court dismissed claims against the City of New York (DOE is separate). It held parts of the complaint time-barred, dismissed some defendants/claims, and allowed limited claims to proceed to discovery and possible trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / statute of limitations | Challenges and several adverse acts fall within filing windows; continuing violations make earlier acts timely | Many discrete acts (e.g., 2011–2012 rating) predate limitations and are time-barred; continuing-violation inapplicable to discrete acts | Claims based on acts before the governing limitations cutoffs are time-barred; 2011–2012 rating is untimely for federal/state DOE claims |
| Adverse employment action (ADEA/§1983) | Negative evaluations, schedule changes, co-teaching, mailing error, involuntary medical exam, and loss of per-session work were adverse | Most are routine supervision/administrative adjustments not materially adverse; only loss of per-session work is materially adverse | Only the temporary deprivation of per-session employment (with link to the evaluations) plausibly constitutes a materially adverse action; other alleged acts are insufficient |
| Inference of discrimination / disparate treatment | Younger teachers were treated better; negative ratings were a campaign to push her out because of age | Ratings and actions aimed at performance improvement or fiscal/seniority concerns, not age; pension/salary motives may be independent of age | Plaintiff plausibly pleaded inference as to DOE, Radovich, and Morgan based on disparate treatment and linkage to lost per-session work; claims against Hudson and Brown dismissed for lack of connection |
| Retaliation (SDHR filing and prior lawsuit) | Retaliation followed protected filings (SDHR June 2013 and current suit); adverse evaluations and loss of per-session work were retaliatory | Temporal gaps, different actors, and benign explanations defeat causal inference; 2009 suit too remote | Retaliation claims based on the June 2013 SDHR filing and the instant litigation survive as to certain defendants (Radovich, Morgan, Brown for specified acts); retaliation inference from 2009 suit is implausible |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013) (judicial experience and common sense may inform plausibility assessment)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: factual allegations must plausibly show entitlement to relief)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (employment discrimination plaintiffs need not plead full prima facie case)
- Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (ADEA requires but-for causation for age discrimination)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation requires materially adverse action likely to deter complaints)
- Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (discrete discriminatory acts are individually time-barred if untimely)
- Weeks v. N.Y. State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2001) (definition of materially adverse employment action)
- Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (elements of retaliation claim under federal law)
- Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (employment decision motivated by factors correlated with age does not necessarily implicate ADEA)