Diaz v. Carcamo
126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443
| Cal. | 2011Background
- Diaz was injured when Tagliaferri, driving behind Carcamo, changed lanes without signaling and collided with Carcamo's truck, causing Diaz's SUV injuries.
- Carcamo was Sugar Transport of the Northwest, LLC's employee; Sugar Transport admitted vicarious liability for Carcamo's negligent driving at trial.
- Plaintiff alleged negligent driving by Carcamo and Tagliaferri and negligent hiring/retention by Sugar Transport.
- Trial admitted Carcamo's driving evidence and Sugar Transport's hiring history over Sugar Transport's objection after it offered to admit vicarious liability.
- Jury allocated fault among Tagliaferri (45%), Sugar Transport (35%), and Carcamo (20%); judgment followed Proposition 51 allocation principles.
- Court of Appeal affirmed, relying on Armenta v. Churchill to bar negligent entrustment despite comparative fault; Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Sugar Transport's pretrial offer to admit vicarious liability bar negligent entrustment claims under Armenta with Prop 51 in play? | Diaz argues Armenta bars negligent entrustment when vicarious liability is admitted. | Sugar Transport argues Armenta should bar entrustment claim and hiring evidence, given comparative fault. | No: Armenta controls and bars entrustment claim when vicarious liability is admitted, even under Prop 51. |
| Has Armenta been undermined by comparative fault and Prop 51 allocations? | Diaz contends Prop 51 requires including employer's direct fault, reintroducing entrustment liability. | Sugar Transport argues comparative fault requires and permits direct employer fault alongside vicarious liability. | Armenta is reaffirmed; a defendant-employer's admission of vicarious liability bars negligent entrustment, even with Prop 51. |
| Was the admission and related evidence of hiring history prejudicial to Sugar Transport, requiring reversal? | Evidence of Carcamo's past accidents and Sugar Transport's hiring practices would influence jurors beyond issue at hand. | Admission of vicarious liability should render entrustment evidence irrelevant and should not prejudice the defense. | Yes; prejudicial error respecting admissible evidence and jury form warranted reversal. |
| Did failure to bifurcate or pretrial admission affect forfeiture or viability of entrustment claims? | Admission should not be limited to pretrial; entrustment claims remain viable. | Admission renders entrustment claims moot. | Forfeiture not required; Armenta applies and entrustment claims remain irrelevant after admission. |
Key Cases Cited
- Armenta v. Churchill, 42 Cal.2d 448 (1954) (employer admission of vicarious liability bars negligent entrustment)
- Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court, 131 Cal.App.4th 853 (2005) (applied Armenta to bar negligent entrustment when vicarious liability admitted; discusses comparative fault context)
- Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804 (1975) (adopted comparative fault system for tort liability)
- DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 2 Cal.4th 593 (1992) (discussed allocation of fault among tortfeasors; comparatives)
- American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 578 (1978) (abandoned all-or-nothing liability; comparative fault groundwork)
- Miller v. Stouffer, 9 Cal.App.4th 70 (1992) (allocation of fault for vicarious liability context)
- Rashtian v. BRAC-BH, Inc., 9 Cal.App.4th 1847 (1992) (limitations on joint liability in Prop 51 context)
- Srithong v. Total Investment Co., 23 Cal.App.4th 721 (1994) (Prop 51 applicability to vicarious liability cases)
- Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal.4th 296 (1992) (described flexible fault allocation objective)
- Syah v. Johnson, 247 Cal.App.2d 534 (1966) (noted as inconsistent with later majority view (disapproved in part))