Dennis McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Inst.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25767
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- Dennis McGuire, an Ohio death-row inmate, challenged his death sentence for rape and murder; his federal habeas petition was denied in 2008, affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, and certiorari was denied in 2011.
- McGuire contended his penalty-phase trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence; that claim was raised at various stages in state court but was ultimately found forfeited or barred (res judicata) in state proceedings.
- McGuire later filed a Rule 60(b) motion (2012) seeking to reopen his final federal habeas judgment, relying on Martinez v. Ryan and later Trevino v. Thaler to argue post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness should excuse procedural default.
- The district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion; the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether Martinez/Trevino required reopening and whether relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was warranted.
- The Sixth Circuit concluded Trevino did not create the extraordinary circumstances necessary for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, and additionally found McGuire’s underlying ineffective-assistance claim was not sufficiently substantial (prejudice and deficient performance under Strickland).
Issues
| Issue | McGuire's Argument | State/Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez/Trevino excuse procedural default and permit reopening under Rule 60(b) | Trevino/Martinez create an exception allowing ineffective post-conviction counsel to supply "cause" to excuse default and thus justify reopening final judgment | Trevino/Martinez do not necessarily apply to Ohio or do not by themselves justify reopening; finality of judgments and comity bar relief | Denied: Trevino does not by itself warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief here; applicability to Ohio is unclear and not enough to overcome finality concerns |
| Whether McGuire’s IAC claim is "substantial" under Martinez/Trevino (i.e., meets Strickland) | The additional affidavits and a later neuropsychological report (Dr. Burch) show trial counsel’s mitigation investigation was deficient and prejudiced the sentencing outcome | The additional evidence is largely cumulative of mitigation presented at trial; Dr. Kuehnl’s evaluation at sentencing was reasonable; McGuire cannot show prejudice | Denied: the new evidence is cumulative or inconclusive; the IAC claim is not sufficiently substantial to satisfy Martinez/Trevino requirement |
| Whether an intervening change in law (Trevino) alone is an extraordinary circumstance under Rule 60(b)(6) | Trevino is an intervening Supreme Court decision that should permit reopening in appropriate cases | A change in decisional law alone usually is insufficient; Rule 60(b)(6) relief is limited to extraordinary, equitable circumstances | Denied: change in law alone does not justify relief here; this case is not extraordinary in the relevant sense |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (narrow equitable exception excusing procedural default where initial-review collateral counsel was absent or ineffective)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (applies Martinez in contexts where direct appeal does not provide a meaningful opportunity to present IAC claims)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction; counsel error in those proceedings generally cannot supply cause)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance + prejudice)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (limits reopening final habeas judgments based on intervening changes in federal decisional law)
- Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluded Martinez did not apply to Ohio under pre-Trevino analysis)
- Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2009) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief granted where an intervening change in state procedural law created extraordinary circumstances)