DeMoss v. Crain
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4219
| 5th Cir. | 2011Background
- DeMoss, an inmate, sues TDCJ and officials under RLUIPA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging five policies: cell restriction, recording, religious text, grooming, and dayroom.
- District court found unequal enforcement of the cell restriction policy violated RLUIPA and granted DeMoss summary judgment on that claim, while other claims proceeded to bench trial.
- Cell restriction policy was voluntarily abandoned before trial, allowing all inmates on cell restriction to attend religious services, which mooted injunctive/declaratory relief requests.
- District court concluded no RLUIPA or constitutional violation for the recording, grooming, dayroom, and religious text policies; text policy dismissed for failure to state a claim.
- Monetary damages: RLUIPA cannot support official- or individual-capacity damages, and § 1997e(e) bars compensatory damages absent physical injury; damages for unequal enforcement barred.
- On appeal, Fourth Circuit affirms district court’s judgment on most claims, but vacates to the extent it deemed the cell restriction policy lawful, citing mootness; otherwise rests affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of injunctive relief on cell restriction | DeMoss argues policy remains a live issue and injunctive relief is warranted. | Defendants contend policy change moots the claim. | Mootness; vacatur of related part; injunctive relief moot. |
| Religious text policy failure to state claim | Policies deny Qur’an/Bible access harming religious practice. | No plausible pressure to modify religious practice shown. | Dismissed for failure to state claim. |
| Dayroom and grooming policies and RLUIPA | Policies substantially burden religious exercise (prayer timing, beard requirements). | Policies serve compelling interests (security, costs) and are least restrictive. | No substantial burden; grooming policy upheld as rationally related to compelling interests. |
| Recording policy and First Amendment | Recording infringes free exercise by chilling discussion and imposing discipline risk. | Policy rationally related to security and allowed alternatives costly or burdensome. | Policy reasonable under Turner; not violative of First Amendment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009) (mootness and official-capacity damages under RLUIPA; precedent for mootness when policy is abandoned)
- Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (U.S. 2005) (prison regulations must consider penological interests; deference to prison administrators)
- Mayfield v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008) (framework for evaluating substantial burden and least restrictive means under RLUIPA)
- Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004) (substantial burden requires significant modification of religious practice)
- Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (U.S. 1987) (Turner test for inmate speech restrictions: rational connection, alternatives, impact, absence of alternatives)
- Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2000) (beard/identification interests in jail security context)
- Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007) (prison security interests as compelling state interests)
- Brown v. Baranowski, Cannot determine (Cannot determine) (Not cited in opinion; placeholder not used)