27 I. & N. Dec. 57
BIA2017Background
- Respondent (Sudanese LPR) convicted in South Dakota (§ 32-4-5) of receipt of a stolen motor vehicle (5-year sentence); statute punishes possessing a motor vehicle the defendant "knows, or has reason to believe, has been stolen."
- IJ terminated removal proceedings, concluding the conviction is not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G). DHS appealed.
- Core legal question: whether the generic aggravated-felony offense "receipt of stolen property" requires a mens rea of "knowledge or belief" (intent to deprive) and thus excludes statutes that allow conviction on a "reason to believe" standard.
- BIA reviewed circuit authority (Fifth and Ninth Circuits) and surveyed Federal, state, and Model Penal Code statutes as of 1994 (when Congress added "receipt of stolen property" to the aggravated-felony definition).
- Majority held the generic meaning requires "knowledge or belief" (includes willful blindness) and excludes the lesser "reason to believe" standard; because SD law is indivisible and permits conviction on "reason to believe," the conviction does not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony.
- The Board dismissed DHS’s appeal and remanded the record for possible new charges; one member dissented, arguing the statutory landscape lacked consensus and Congress likely intended to include "reason to believe."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DHS) | Defendant's Argument (Respondent) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether INA § 101(a)(43)(G) "receipt of stolen property" requires a mens rea of "knowledge or belief" (intent to deprive) | Sierra should be limited; DHS argues statutes like South Dakota's qualify as aggravated felonies even with a "reason to believe" mens rea | Respondent: generic aggravated-felony receipt requires "knowledge or belief," excluding "reason to believe"; SD statute is indivisible and allows the lesser mens rea so it does not categorically match | Held: Generic "receipt of stolen property" requires "knowledge or belief" (includes willful blindness) and excludes "reason to believe." SD conviction does not categorically qualify as an aggravated felony. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sanchez-Rodriguez v. United States, 830 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2016) (receipt statute requiring constructive knowledge/reason-to-believe does not require intent to deprive and thus is not aggravated felony)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (generic-offense inquiry uses the contemporary, generic meaning at time of enactment)
- Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017) (survey of contemporaneous state and federal law informs generic definition)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (ambiguities in immigration-removal statutes resolved in alien's favor)
- United States v. Fields, 466 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1972) (historical treatment of receipt statutes)
- Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (willful blindness equates to knowledge)