De Niz Robles v. Lynch
803 F.3d 1165
| 10th Cir. | 2015Background
- Alfonzo De Niz Robles filed an application for adjustment of status in 2007 after relying on this circuit’s decision in Padilla-Caldera I (holding the Attorney General retained discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) despite § 1182(a)(9)(C)).
- The BIA in In re Briones announced the opposite rule: § 1182(a)(9)(C) bars adjustment for certain illegal reentrants, leaving no agency discretion. The BIA applied Briones to deny Robles’s pending petition.
- This court initially deferred to Briones under Chevron step two and Brand X, overruling Padilla-Caldera I in Padilla-Caldera II.
- Robles challenged the BIA’s retroactive application of Briones to his petition filed before Briones and filed in reliance on Padilla-Caldera I, raising due process and equal protection/retroactivity arguments.
- The panel framed the core question: when an agency uses Chevron/Brand X policymaking in adjudication to overturn court precedent, may the agency apply that new rule retroactively to pending petitions filed under the prior judicial rule?
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May BIA apply Briones retroactively to petitions filed before Briones that relied on circuit precedent? | Robles: No; Chevron/Brand X do not permit retroactive application to past filings relied on under prior judicial precedent — due process and reliance interests require prospectivity. | BIA: Its decision is not retroactive or, even if it is, reliance was unreasonable because the statutory conflict was obvious and agency revision was foreseeable. | Court: BIA may not apply Briones retroactively to Robles; decisions announced under Chevron/Brand X are presumptively prospective absent clear congressional authorization. |
| What presumption governs retroactivity for agency adjudications that function like legislation? | Robles: Such agency policymaking should be treated like legislative rulemaking and presumptively prospective. | BIA: Agency adjudications explain the law and need not be treated like new legislative rules. | Court: When agency action under Chevron/Brand X is functionally legislative, Bowen-style presumption against retroactivity applies. |
| How should courts balance retroactivity factors for agency adjudications? | Robles: Reliance, settled expectations, and hardship on petitioner outweigh government interest in uniformity. | BIA: Interests in correct, uniform application and notice to all outweigh individual reliance. | Court: Applying Chenery II and Stewart Capital factors, reliance and hardship favor prospectivity here; BIA identified no compelling countervailing interest. |
| Is Brand X/Chevron deference a license for agencies to strip rights retroactively? | Robles: No; deference does not authorize retroactive deprivation of reliance-based opportunities without congressional authorization. | BIA: Brand X/Chevron permit agency policy choices that can supersede prior judicial interpretations. | Court: Brand X/Chevron can change controlling interpretation prospectively, but agencies cannot routinely apply such new policies retroactively to pending matters where petitioners reasonably relied on prior precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for deference to agency interpretations when statute ambiguous)
- National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (agencies may receive Chevron deference even when it requires displacing prior judicial interpretations)
- Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (agency rulemaking presumptively prospective absent clear congressional authorization)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (retroactive application of new rules can raise serious due process concerns)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (presumption against retroactive legislation; reliance and settled expectations central)
- SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (agency adjudications may be prospective; courts should balance retroactivity harms and administrative interests)
- Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2005) (Padilla-Caldera I — initial circuit decision permitting adjustment of status)
- Padilla-Caldera v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011) (Padilla-Caldera II — court deferred to BIA under Chevron/Brand X)
- In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) (agency decision barring adjustment for certain illegal reentrants)
- Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (consideration of retroactivity of Briones in a related context)
- Acosta-Olivarria v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2015) (refused retroactive application of Briones to petitioner who filed before Briones and relied on prior circuit precedent)