Davis v. State
415 P.3d 666
Wyo.2018Background
- At 17, Donald Clyde Davis pled guilty (1983) to first-degree murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery; sentenced to life plus consecutive 20–50 years.
- After Miller and Montgomery, Wyoming converted his life term to life with parole eligibility after 25 years; Davis was paroled from the life term in 2015 and faced a resentencing hearing on the consecutive term.
- The district court held an individualized Miller hearing in 2016, heard testimony (including Davis and his mother), considered prison records and historical psychological reports, and reimposed the original aggregate sentence.
- Davis appealed, arguing the aggregate sentence is a de facto life-without-parole for juveniles, that Miller/Montgomery entitles him to relief, and that the resentencing procedures were deficient.
- The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed Miller retroactivity issues, the proper Miller hearing procedures (presumptions, burdens, evidence, findings, standard of review), and whether the district court abused its discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Davis) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the aggregate sentence a de facto LWOP in violation of the U.S. Constitution? | Aggregate minimums effectively deny meaningful release and are the functional equivalent of LWOP. | Aggregate result alone does not automatically violate the Eighth Amendment if an individualized Miller hearing occurred. | Functional equivalence exists, but not automatically unconstitutional; requires proper Miller analysis. |
| May the court simply keep the sentence and make Davis immediately parole-eligible (per Montgomery suggestion)? | Davis opposed as inadequate to cure constitutional defect. | State argued court lacks authority to make immediate parole eligibility. | Court declined to adopt that remedy here because neither party requested it. |
| Does the Wyoming Constitution categorically bar de facto juvenile LWOP? | Davis urged broader state-constitutional protection. | State argued issue waived/res judicata and no greater protection than federal law. | Issue not preserved below; court refused to consider it for the first time on appeal. |
| What procedures/burdens/evidence/findings/standard apply to retroactive Miller hearings? | Davis urged heightened procedural protections (analogous to death-penalty rules). | State urged application of ordinary sentencing practice (no presumption; no special burden). | Court requires a presumption against LWOP (or functional equivalent) for juveniles, places burden on the State to prove permanent incorrigibility beyond a reasonable doubt, permits relevant evidence (including prison record and expert testimony case-by-case), requires specific Miller-factor findings, and reviews for a nonlenient abuse of discretion with de novo review of legal conclusions. |
| Did the district court abuse discretion in Davis's resentencing? | District court failed to give mitigating weight to youth, misapplied Miller factors, relied on dated evaluations and prison infractions, and failed to find permanent incorrigibility based on Miller factors. | State contended the district court complied with Miller/Bear Cloud and did not abuse discretion. | Court reversed: district court abused its discretion by misweighing age, offense circumstances, psychological evidence, rehabilitation potential, and by failing to make explicit findings of permanent incorrigibility; remanded for a new individualized hearing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory juvenile LWOP unconstitutional; sentencing must account for youth)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller applies retroactively; states may provide parole eligibility as one remedy)
- Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2013) (Bear Cloud II) (Wyoming guidance on Miller-factor consideration)
- Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III) (Miller protections extend to aggregate sentences that are functional equivalents to LWOP)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile death penalty barred; children are different)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide crimes barred)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (presumption against juvenile LWOP; State must rebut beyond a reasonable doubt)