Davis v. City of New York
902 F. Supp. 2d 405
S.D.N.Y.2012Background
- This is a putative class action challenging NYPD and NYCHA policies enforcing trespass prohibitions on public housing, alleging a pattern of unlawful stops, questioning, frisks, searches, and arrests of NYCHA residents and guests.
- Nine of the original eighteen plaintiffs remain; eight were arrested and five live in NYCHA housing; twelve causes of action purportedly raised under federal, state, and local laws and constitutions are addressed in this partial summary judgment phase.
- The court addresses the individual circumstances of arrests and tenancy (first part of briefing); a second part will address defendants’ practices and policies (Monell and broader systemic issues).
- Key constitutional and statutory claims include Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, Title VI, FHA, §1981, USHA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL against City, NYCHA, and related defendants.
- The court grants some claims and denies others on a motion for partial summary judgment, with additional briefing forthcoming on certain Monell and post-acquisition discrimination theories.
- The analysis emphasizes Terry stops, probable cause, and the distinction between trespass as a crime and loitering as a vague notice problem, particularly in NYCHA buildings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether arrests or stops of plaintiffs violated the Fourth Amendment | Arrests/stops were unlawful under Terry and absence of reasonable suspicion/probable cause. | Officers had probable cause or reasonable suspicion under totality of circumstances; some stops/arrests valid. | The court denies in part and grants in part; disputed factual issues remain for several plaintiffs; some arrests stops denied for lack of probable cause, others preserved. |
| Whether the City’s equal protection theory is supported by race-based challenged stops/arrests | Racial disparities indicate discriminatory intent and constitutional violation. | No direct evidence of racial animus; statistically significant disparities may not establish intent; Monell issues pending. | Summary judgment denied without prejudice on equal protection claims pending fuller record and Monell briefing. |
| Whether NYCHA is liable under Title VI, §1981, FHA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL for resident discrimination | Discriminatory policing impairs residents’ contractual rights and housing rights under federal and state law. | Defendants contest whether rights exist or are enforceable; agency relationships and post-acquisition discrimination contested. | Claims survive in part; some claims denied or deferred, with further briefing on Monell and specific rights recognized. |
| Whether the USHA claim can be maintained for unreasonable lease terms and lack of guest provisions | Leases contain unreasonable terms and lack guest accommodation rights enforceable under §1983. | Whether individual rights exist under §1983 is contested; statutory interpretation matters. | Denial of summary judgment without prejudice; factual issues about lease addenda and reasonableness remain for trial. |
| Whether Evans’s and others’ due process claims alleging interference with intimate associations survive | Stop/arrest patterns intrude on intimate relationships protected by due process. | Fourth Amendment violations predominate; substantive due process not applicable here. | Summary judgment granted for defendants on due process claim due to duplicative Fourth Amendment basis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (establishes reasonable suspicion standard for stops)
- Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (U.S. 1977) (discrimination exposure and impact evidence for equal protection claims)
- Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (U.S. 2004) (limits on compelled identification; testimony-based arrests)
- Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (U.S. 2002) (federal rights conferred by statutes must be clearly rights-creating)
- Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347 (2d Cir. 2011) (§1981 scope and rights in employment context; discrimination rights)
- Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 265 U.S. 395 (U.S. 1987) (housing-rights precedents for enforceable private rights under §1437d)
- Brown v. City of New York (loitering case contexts), 71 N.Y.2d 376 (N.Y. 1988) (loitering statutes and notice requirements)
- Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347 (2d Cir. 2011) (see above)