Davin J. Anderson v. Alaska Housing Finance Corporation
462 P.3d 19
Alaska2020Background
- AHFC is a state-created public corporation (board members are state officials or governor appointees), and it purchased Anderson’s mortgage loan from Wells Fargo and contracted Wells Fargo to service the loan.
- Anderson fell behind on payments, sought a loan modification or workout from AHFC/Wells Fargo, and at various points communicated with both AHFC and Wells Fargo about loss mitigation.
- AHFC authorized a non-judicial power-of-sale foreclosure under the deed of trust; statutory notice and trustee procedures were used and the sale occurred in August 2017, with AHFC acquiring the property.
- Anderson sued in April 2017 to enjoin the sale and later pressed a due process claim that AHFC denied him a pre-foreclosure opportunity to present his entitlement to loan assistance; he did not obtain an injunction and the sale proceeded.
- The superior court granted AHFC summary judgment on all claims; the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed only the due process issue, reversed on that point, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Anderson) | Defendant's Argument (AHFC) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AHFC is a state actor for due process purposes | AHFC is a state actor because it was created by statute to further governmental housing objectives and is controlled by state appointees | AHFC suggests foreclosure here is contractual/state-rights enforcement and resists characterizing itself as state action | Held: Yes — under Lebron/Laverty framework AHFC is a government actor (state-created and state-controlled) |
| Whether Anderson had a constitutionally protected property interest and was deprived of it | Ownership/possession of home is a protected property interest; non-judicial foreclosure by a state actor effects a constitutional deprivation | AHFC: foreclosure was a contractual remedy; no constitutional deprivation beyond contract remedies | Held: Yes — Anderson’s interest in the home is protected and foreclosure by a state actor was a deprivation triggering due process |
| Whether Anderson waived due process rights by agreeing to deed/note terms allowing non-judicial foreclosure | Anderson did not knowingly, voluntarily, or clearly waive constitutional rights; contracts are adhesionary and contain no express constitutional waiver | AHFC: deed provides the contractual notice and remedy; Anderson accepted those terms | Held: No waiver — waiver must be clear and knowing; adhesive nature of documents precludes implied constitutional waiver |
| Whether the foreclosure process provided constitutionally adequate pre-deprivation hearing | Anderson: statutory notice, ability to cure, servicer calls, trustee formalities, FDCPA notice, and post-sale remedies were insufficient; Alaska Constitution requires some pre-deprivation opportunity to be heard | AHFC: statutory notice & cure rights, servicer interactions, trustee safeguards, FDCPA verification, and ability to sue/raise defenses in court or eviction are adequate | Held: No — Alaska Constitution requires a pre-deprivation opportunity to be heard; the procedures here did not provide a meaningful pre-foreclosure hearing and Anderson was entitled to one; summary judgment for AHFC reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (state-created-and-controlled-corporation test for when a nominally private entity is a government actor)
- Laverty v. Alaska Railroad Corp., 13 P.3d 725 (Alaska 2000) (applying Lebron to Alaska public corporations to find constitutional obligations when state control is substantial)
- Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (pre-deprivation hearing required for replevin; due process protects temporary and permanent deprivations)
- Brandner v. Providence Health & Servs.–Washington, 394 P.3d 581 (Alaska 2017) (public/quasi-public entity violated due process by terminating privileges without pre-termination hearing)
- Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (pre-deprivation hearing requires decisionmaker able to rectify errors; post-hoc suit insufficient)
- City of North Pole v. Zabek, 934 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1997) (pre-termination hearing required even when outcome seems likely; opportunity to present facts may alter result)
- Ostrow v. Higgins, 722 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1986) (distinguishing non-judicial private foreclosures from state action; referenced for state-action analysis)