David Walton v. Ashley Nehls, 135 F.4th 1070

David Walton, a Wisconsin prisoner, sued Ashley Nehls, a prison nurse, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights based on a sexual relationship.
Walton consistently described the relationship as consensual but later argued that such consent is legally invalid due to inherent prison power dynamics.
The district court granted summary judgment to Nehls, holding that a consensual sexual relationship with a prison official does not rise to cruel and unusual punishment.
Walton appealed, asking the Seventh Circuit to adopt a legal presumption that any sexual activity between an inmate and prison official is nonconsensual unless the official proves an absence of coercion (following the Sixth and Ninth Circuits).
The Seventh Circuit considered, but did not resolve, whether to adopt this presumption, concluding that even under such a presumption Nehls would prevail based on the evidentiary record showing lack of coercion.
The opinion extensively discussed the evolving legal landscape and referenced nationwide legislation criminalizing sexual contact between inmates and prison officials regardless of consent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether consensual sex with a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment	Such relationships should be presumed nonconsensual under the Eighth Amendment due to inherent coercion.	Relationship was consensual and thus not unconstitutional.	Even if presumption adopted, facts showed lack of coercion, so no constitutional violation.
Proper summary judgment standard	Material fact disputes preclude summary judgment if presumption is applied.	No evidence of coercion; summary judgment proper even under presumption.	District court correctly granted summary judgment for defendant.
Adoption of legal presumption of nonconsent	Seventh Circuit should follow Sixth and Ninth Circuit burden-shifting presumption.	No need for such presumption; facts do not show coercion.	Court declines to adopt presumption, but notes it may be appropriate in future cases.
Objective and subjective prongs of Eighth Amendment	Existence of a sexual relationship, even if seemingly consensual, meets objective and subjective requirements due to power imbalance.	No deliberate indifference or excessive risk; the relationship was voluntary.	Relationship did not meet Eighth Amendment's requirements for cruel and unusual punishment.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (establishes the objective and subjective requirements for Eighth Amendment claims)
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (sets out deliberate indifference standard)
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (defines objectively harmful conduct under the Eighth Amendment)
Estelle v. Gamble, 428 U.S. 97 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (cruel and unusual punishment analysis)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (distinguishes Fourteenth Amendment claims for pretrial detainees)
Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) (Fourteenth Amendment protections for pretrial detainees)
Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2012) (Eighth Amendment liability in prison sexual abuse cases)
J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2020) (deliberate indifference and sexual abuse in prisons)
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (Eighth Amendment and evolving standards of decency)
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (evolving standards of decency informed by legislative enactments)