David Ramirez v. David Shinn
971 F.3d 1116
9th Cir.2020Background
- David Ramirez and Barry Jones were convicted and sentenced to death in Arizona; both raised new ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel (IATC) claims in federal habeas that were not developed in state postconviction proceedings.
- Both men alleged their state postconviction counsel failed to develop or raise those IATC claims; Martinez v. Ryan was decided while their appeals were pending and recognized a narrow equitable exception allowing postconviction counsel’s ineffectiveness to establish "cause" to excuse procedural default for IATC claims.
- 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (an AEDPA provision) restricts federal habeas courts from receiving new evidence not developed in state court except under narrow statutory exceptions; Williams v. Taylor and Holland v. Jackson interpret and reinforce those limits.
- District courts in both cases conducted evidentiary proceedings (or accepted new evidence) to determine whether Martinez’s cause-and-prejudice exception applied; Jones’s district court also held a merits hearing and granted relief; Ramirez’s district court accepted new exhibits and resolved the merits without a separate evidentiary hearing.
- Ninth Circuit panels in Jones and Ramirez allowed use (and, in Ramirez, further development) of new evidence despite § 2254(e)(2), creating a judge‑made Martinez-based exception to § 2254(e)(2); three Ninth Circuit judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing this conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and statutory text.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez excuse allows federal courts to consider new evidence contrary to § 2254(e)(2) | Martinez’s equitable exception to procedural default should permit consideration of evidence developed to show cause | § 2254(e)(2) bars new evidence unless statutory exceptions are met; Martinez cannot override statute | Panels held Martinez permits consideration (Jones) and broader evidentiary development (Ramirez); dissent says this conflicts with Williams/Holland and statutory text |
| Whether evidence developed at a Martinez hearing may be used on the merits of the underlying IATC claim | Evidence admitted to show cause should also be considered on the merits to avoid waste and inconsistency | Evidence developed post-state proceedings is barred by § 2254(e)(2) and cannot be used on the merits absent statutory exceptions | Jones panel allowed use of Martinez-hearing evidence on the merits; dissent says Holland and Williams prohibit this without § 2254(e)(2) exceptions |
| Whether a court may permit additional evidentiary development after Martinez is satisfied | Once cause excused, petitioner should be allowed full development to litigate the merits | § 2254(e)(2) still applies; meeting Martinez does not eliminate statutory limits on new evidence | Ramirez panel authorized further development after Martinez; dissent argues that completely bypassing § 2254(e)(2) is unlawful |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrow equitable rule excusing procedural default for IATC when postconviction counsel was ineffective and the underlying claim is substantial)
- Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004) (attorney negligence in state proceedings is chargeable to the client; § 2254(e)(2) bars new evidence developed outside state court)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000) (§ 2254(e)(2) preserves Keeney’s definition of failure to develop the record and imposes stricter exceptions than the old cause-and-prejudice test)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (attorney error generally does not constitute "cause" to excuse procedural default; counsel is agent of the client)
- Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (failure to develop the state-court record triggers a cause-and-prejudice requirement; attorney negligence was previously treated as chargeable)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (statutory exhaustion rules differ from judge-made rules; courts may not create judge-made exceptions to statutory requirements)
- Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (held that evidence to establish Martinez cause is not itself a "claim" under § 2254(e)(2))
- Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc plurality) (endorsed entertaining Martinez hearings and, in certain views, treating evidence from those hearings flexibly)
- Jones v. Shinn, 943 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2019) (panel held Martinez exception permits consideration of evidence not previously presented to state court when addressing merits)
- Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2019) (panel allowed further evidentiary development after finding Martinez satisfied; dissenters argue this exceeds authority under § 2254(e)(2))
- Sasser v. Hobbs, 735 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2013) (held that cause excusing a failure may mean there was no ‘‘failure to develop’’ under § 2254(e)(2))
- Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2000) (similar to Sasser on interaction of cause and § 2254(e)(2))
- McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) (discusses AEDPA’s modification of equitable doctrines; courts should follow controlling Supreme Court precedent)
- Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (courts of appeals must follow Supreme Court precedent even if conflicting with other lines of decisions)