David Grisham v. City of Fort Worth, Texas
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17118
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- David Grisham, an evangelical who hands out religious literature, was prevented by Fort Worth police from distributing tracts at a public Pride festival; officers issued a trespass warning that kept him and his family off the festival area and adjacent sidewalk.
- Grisham sued the City, the police chief, and an officer under § 1983 alleging First Amendment and due process violations; individual-officer claims were dismissed on qualified immunity.
- The City and police chief entered a consent decree: the City agreed to $1 in nominal damages, to allow constitutionally protected expression on downtown public sidewalks during free public events (subject to lawful time/place/manner rules), and to notify event permittees that speakers are allowed.
- The consent decree required Grisham to file a § 1988 fee application; he sought $79,074.36 in fees and expenses; the City opposed, arguing he was not a prevailing party.
- The district court deemed Grisham a technical prevailing party but denied all fees, reasoning the $1 nominal award produced only an insignificant change in the parties’ relationship (and alternatively finding some billed time excessive).
- The Fifth Circuit held Grisham is a prevailing party and that the district court erred in treating degree of success as a special circumstance justifying a total denial of fees; it vacated and remanded to calculate reasonable fees (including appellate fees) and to reduce any excessive hours rather than deny fees entirely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Grisham is a "prevailing party" for § 1988 because of a $1 nominal award in a consent decree | Grisham: nominal damages and injunctive relief materially altered the legal relationship, so he is prevailing | City: the nominal $1 and consent decree did not meaningfully change legal relationship; thus no prevailing party | Court: Grisham is a prevailing party; nominal damages in a consent decree effect a material alteration of the legal relationship |
| Whether "degree of success" or limited relief can justify denying fees entirely as a "special circumstance" | Grisham: degree of success may affect amount but not justify total denial; his relief matched his requests | City: the insignificance of recovery (only $1) warrants denial of fees | Court: Degree of success is not a special circumstance permitting complete denial; special circumstances allowing total denial are narrow and not present here |
| Whether Farrar (denial of fees where only nominal damages awarded after failed compensatory claim) controls | Grisham: Farrar is distinguishable because he sought and obtained nominal and prospective relief, not primarily compensatory damages | City: Farrar supports denying fees when only nominal damages are awarded | Court: Farrar applies when plaintiff sought substantial compensatory relief but failed; it does not control this case |
| Whether the requested hours and fees are reasonable | Grisham: submitted detailed billing and affidavits supporting the request | City: some billed hours are excessive or duplicative | Court: District court may reduce excessive hours but may not deny all fees; remand to calculate reasonable reductions and include appellate fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (establishes "material alteration of the legal relationship" test for prevailing party)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (nominal damages create prevailing-party status but denial of fees may be appropriate when plaintiff sought substantial compensatory relief and recovered only nominal damages)
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (consent decrees can effect a change in legal relationship for prevailing-party purposes)
- Sanchez v. City of Austin, 774 F.3d 873 (5th Cir.) (degree of success is not a special circumstance to deny fees; narrowness of special-circumstances exception)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (fee reductions for limited success; reasonableness standard)
- Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539 (5th Cir.) (examples of rare special circumstances permitting denial of fees)
- Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.) (Congress intended fee awards to incentivize civil-rights enforcement; high bar for denying fees)
- Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041 (5th Cir.) (reducing fees where hours disproportionate to modest recovery)
- Jimenez v. Wood Cty., Tex., 621 F.3d 372 (5th Cir.) (deference to district court in determining whether time entries are excessive or duplicative)