873 F.3d 641
8th Cir.2017Background
- Fallon Frederick entered a convenience store armed with a four-inch folding knife, acted erratically, told the clerk to call 911, and indicated she was "being followed." Surveillance and audio captured the encounter.
- Officers Clifton and Torkelson confronted Frederick; she repeatedly refused commands to drop the knife, questioned whether they were police, and moved in a way officers perceived as threatening.
- Torkelson warned he would tase her, then fired his taser; one probe hit Frederick and the other lodged in her purse, so the probes did not incapacitate her.
- After a brief pause, Frederick raised her knife and charged toward Torkelson in a stabbing posture. Officer Motsinger shot her while protecting Torkelson; she died from gunshot wounds.
- Plaintiff (Estate) sued the City and officers under § 1983 (excessive force), state tort claims, AWDS, and ACRA; defendants moved for summary judgment and asserted qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment; the Estate appealed only the excessive-force claims.
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo, rejected the Estate’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s "provocation rule" (preempted by County of Los Angeles v. Mendez), and affirmed summary judgment dismissing the tasing and shooting claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Torkelson’s use of the taser an unconstitutional use of force? | Tasing was excessive and proximately caused the subsequent deadly force because it provoked Frederick’s charge. | Tasing was reasonable to disarm a person who refused commands while brandishing a knife in a confined public space. | Held: Use of the taser was objectively reasonable under Graham given the knife, erratic behavior, and safety risk. |
| Can defendants’ use of lethal force be excused by prior provocation (provocation rule)? | Estate argued provocation made the later shooting attributable to the taser. | Defendants argued the shooting must be judged independently; if reasonable, prior conduct cannot manufacture liability. | Held: Court rejected the provocation rule per County of L.A. v. Mendez; deadly force is evaluated on what officers knew when they shot. |
| Was Motsinger’s shooting of Frederick an excessive use of force? | Estate initially argued connection to tasing but conceded the shooting itself was not unreasonable. | Defendants: shooting was reasonable because Frederick charged an officer with a knife in a stabbing position. | Held: Shooting was objectively reasonable; consistent precedent supports lethal force against a person charging an officer with a knife. |
| Are the officers entitled to qualified immunity for the tasing? | Estate: tasing violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. | Defendants: law did not place the unconstitutionality of tasing in these facts beyond debate. | Held: Qualified immunity applies; existing precedent did not clearly establish that tasing a person refusing to drop a knife in a public confined space was unconstitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective reasonableness standard for excessive force)
- County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (provocation rule rejected; analyze each seizure separately)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (clearly established law must be particularized)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (video evidence can show an actual and imminent threat)
- City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1775 (officers may act quickly when delay would gravely endanger life)
- Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491 (unlawful to tase nonviolent misdemeanant posing little threat)
- DeBoise v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 892 (upholding taser use against potentially violent detainees)
- Aipperspach v. McInerney, 766 F.3d 803 (Eighth Circuit support for reasonableness of deadly force in similar circumstances)
- Estate of Morgan v. Cook, 686 F.3d 494 (intoxication/impairment does not negate threat analysis)