Danny Jones v. Charles Ryan, 1 F.4th 1179

Background

In 1992 Danny Lee Jones killed two people (an adult and a seven-year-old) and was convicted of two counts of first‑degree murder and an attempted murder; the trial court sentenced him to death.
Jones was represented at trial by an inexperienced public defender who requested $5,000 for experts but received only $2,000 (used for a crime‑scene investigator and an addictionologist).
The court appointed Dr. Jack Potts (a forensic psychiatrist) under Rule 26.5; Dr. Potts performed a short, court‑ordered evaluation, produced a six‑page report, and recommended further neurological/neuropsychological testing.
Trial counsel did not retain a defense mental‑health expert or obtain neuro/neuropsychological testing until the eve of sentencing; counsel moved for testing/continuance the night before sentencing and was denied.
The state PCR court denied funding and an evidentiary hearing on these mitigation/testing issues, relying largely on its recollection that Dr. Potts had adequately addressed mental‑health issues. Federal habeas proceedings developed extensive neuropsychological and mitigation evidence.
The Ninth Circuit (applying AEDPA standards) held counsel’s failure to obtain a defense mental‑health expert and timely testing was constitutionally deficient and prejudicial, found the state PCR fact‑finding defective, reversed, and remanded with instructions to grant relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure a defense mental‑health expert before sentencing	Jones: counsel had clear indicia of mental impairment (head injuries, early substance abuse, family reports); counsel should have investigated and retained a defense expert earlier	State/PCR court: Dr. Potts (court‑appointed psychiatrist) adequately addressed mental‑health mitigation; no prejudice shown	Court: Counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland; state court unreasonably applied federal law (§2254(d)(1)); on de novo review prejudice shown; relief ordered
2. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to timely seek neurological/neuropsychological testing	Jones: records and family history put counsel on notice; testing would have revealed organic brain damage and other disorders useful at sentencing	State/PCR court: no substantial basis for testing; earlier funding sufficed; PCR judge declined additional testing	Court: Failure to seek testing was deficient; PCR fact‑finding was unreasonable (§2254(d)(2)); de novo review shows testing would likely have produced mitigating evidence and prejudiced sentence
3. Whether the PCR court’s factual process (denying funding/hearing) was reasonable under AEDPA	Jones: PCR judge relied on untested memory, denied funding and hearing, producing an incomplete record and a ‘‘self‑fulfilling prophecy’’	State: PCR disposition on the record was sufficient; Dr. Potts’s testimony justified denial	Held: PCR court employed a defective fact‑finding process (relied on personal recollection and misapprehended record); §2254(d)(2) relief warranted and federal evidentiary development was appropriate

Key Cases Cited

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits §2254(d) review to state‑court record)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective‑assistance two‑prong test)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (counsel’s duty to investigate defendant background/mitigation)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (counsel must follow leads to mitigation evidence)
Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (failure to seek available expert funding can be deficient)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (AEDPA deference plus Strickland is doubly deferential)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (when ineffective PCR counsel can excuse procedural default)
Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (en banc 9th Cir.) (application of Martinez in AEDPA context)