Danielle Leigh Edwards v. the State of Texas, 03-20-00138-CR

Background

Danielle Edwards was convicted of injury to a child (recklessly causing "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury") and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment after a jury found she allowed her infant daughter L.B. to access and ingest cocaine.
L.B.’s hair tested positive for cocaine and metabolites; the lab result exceeded the instrument’s 20,000 pg/mg limit and an estimated concentration exceeded 37,000 pg/mg. Edwards admitted recent cocaine use and was nursing L.B.; the husband denied using or giving cocaine to the child.
Expert testimony described the levels as consistent with heavy use, potentially causing addiction, withdrawal, and harms to the nervous system, but no witness testified that L.B. actually suffered the specific mental harms alleged.
On initial appeal this Court affirmed; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding the State presented no evidence that L.B. actually suffered the charged "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury." The CCA remanded to consider whether reformation to a lesser-included offense was appropriate.
On remand this Court held (1) attempt was not a lesser-included offense because attempt requires specific intent, (2) endangering a child (Tex. Penal Code §22.041(c)) is a lesser-included offense of injury to a child as charged, and (3) the evidence sufficed to support conviction for endangering a child. The court reformed the judgment to a state-jail felony of endangering a child, reversed the sentencing portion, and remanded for a new punishment hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Edwards)	Held
1) Sufficiency of evidence that L.B. suffered "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury"	Jury could reasonably infer L.B. ingested an amount causing addiction/withdrawal and resulting mental harm from hair tests, admissions, and expert testimony	No testimony or other evidence showed L.B. actually suffered the alleged serious mental harm	CCA: evidence insufficient to prove actual serious mental injury (reversed original conviction on that element)
2) Whether attempt to commit injury to a child is a lesser-included offense	State could seek attempt as lesser-included	Attempt requires specific intent, while charged offense alleged recklessness	Held: Attempt is not a lesser-included offense here because attempt requires specific intent and jury conviction for reckless mental state does not necessarily find specific intent
3) Whether endangering a child (§22.041(c)) is a lesser-included offense of injury to a child (§22.04) as charged	Elements overlap: same victim-age element, same reckless mental state, and causing serious mental harm implies placing child in imminent danger of mental impairment	Edwards implied reformation inappropriate because original conviction was for a different statutory harm	Held: Endangering a child is a lesser-included offense here; the jury necessarily found elements required by §22.041(c)
4) Sufficiency of evidence to support conviction for endangering a child (§22.041(c))	Hair results, Edwards’s admission of cocaine use while nursing, and expert testimony allowed a rational jury to find Edwards recklessly placed L.B. in imminent danger of mental impairment	No proof L.B. actually suffered impairment; CCA error requires acquittal rather than reformation	Held: Viewing evidence in favor of the lesser offense, a rational jury could find Edwards recklessly placed L.B. in imminent danger of mental impairment; conviction reformed to state-jail felony endangering and remanded for punishment

Key Cases Cited

Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (CCA reversed for insufficiency on "serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury" and remanded to consider lesser-included offenses)
Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (two-prong test for reforming a conviction to a lesser-included offense)
Rabb v. State, 483 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (attempt may not be a lesser-included offense when charged offense requires recklessness)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (legal standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (articulating Jackson standard and appellate review approach)
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (review of reasonable inferences from combined, cumulative evidence)
Cheney v. State, 755 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (statutory construction principles regarding attempt and intent)
Nowlin v. State, 473 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (example of reforming a conviction to a lesser-included offense under Thornton)