Daniel Jordan v. State, A21A0170

Daniel Jordan was convicted of rape, two counts of aggravated child molestation, and two counts of child molestation; original sentences included lengthy prison terms and life probation.
This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal in 2012.
On collateral challenge the Court later held Jordan’s child-molestation sentences void under former OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b) because they were imposed as ten-year prison terms instead of the required split sentence; the case was remanded for resentencing.
The trial court entered an amended (and then second amended) sentence that modified the child-molestation counts to ten years with nine years to serve and one year probation; the rest of the sentence remained the same.
Jordan filed a pro se motion more than a year later claiming the resentencing was void because the trial court failed to follow the Court’s mandate and because he was not present at resentencing; the trial court denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Jordan’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding his claims were not colorable void-sentence claims and thus not appealable under void-sentence procedures.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court’s denial of Jordan’s post-resentencing motion was an appealable order because the sentence is void	Jordan: resentencing is void; he may challenge it now	State: Jordan’s allegations are procedural, not a claim that the sentence exceeds lawful punishment	Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; not a colorable void-sentence claim
Whether failure to follow the Court’s mandate and Jordan’s absence at resentencing render the sentence void	Jordan: mandate was not properly implemented and his absence invalidates the sentence	State: procedural errors or unfairness do not make a sentence legally unauthorized; remedy is habeas corpus	Court: such claims do not render the sentence void; they are not grounds for direct appeal

Jordan v. State, 317 Ga. App. 160 (2012) (direct appeal affirming convictions)
Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346 (2010) (time limits for modifying sentence: one year or 120 days after remittitur)
Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216 (2009) (direct appeal lies only for colorable void-sentence claims)
Burg v. State, 297 Ga. App. 118 (2009) (same rule on appealability of void-sentence motions)
Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610 (1991) (sentence is void only if law does not authorize the punishment)
von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569 (2013) (void-sentence claims typically limited to sentences exceeding statutory maximum)
Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669 (2004) (procedural or fairness complaints are not void-sentence claims; habeas is proper remedy)