Dancy v. McGinley, 141 F. Supp. 3d 231

Plaintiff Jayvon Elting sued Officer Gregg McGinley under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution arising from an October 2, 2009 arrest; co-plaintiff Jarquez Dancy asserted related claims against a different officer.
Court denied defendants’ summary judgment; after settlement efforts failed, a jury trial was held in December 2014. The court granted Rule 50 motions as to liability elements and the jury awarded Elting $115,000 (false arrest) and $100,000 (excessive force); judgment entered Dec. 15, 2014.
McGinley moved for remittitur/new trial and appealed; the court later reduced excessive-force damages to $81,500 (remittitur) and Elting accepted; appeals followed.
Elting moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; defendants did not dispute prevailing-party status but challenged hourly rates and hours billed.
The magistrate judge evaluated rates for five attorneys, scrutinized time entries (including travel, clerical tasks, and work related solely to Dancy or to dismissed claims), applied customary travel-rate practice, made specific hour reductions, and awarded fees and costs accordingly.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Elting is a prevailing party eligible for § 1988 fees	Elting prevailed on core claims and is therefore entitled to fees	Did not dispute prevailing-party status	Elting is a prevailing party; eligible for fees under § 1988
Reasonableness of hourly rates for counsel	Proposed rates ($250–$475) reflect experience and district practice	Some rates excessive given case complexity	Court approved $250 (Kim), $300 (Whateley), $400 (Bergstein, Watkins), and $450 (Sussman) after assessing experience and case complexity
Reasonableness of hours billed (including travel and clerical time)	Hours were necessary and largely intertwined with co-plaintiff’s claims; travel was productive	Reduce hours for work on unsuccessful claims, excessive time, and apply 50% travel-rate; exclude clerical tasks	Court reduced specific time entries (detailed in opinion), applied 50% rate to travel time, deducted clerical entries, and trimmed hours for work solely on Dancy or on malicious-prosecution claims
Whether fees should be reduced because of partial success or remittitur	Elting sought full lodestar because claims were intertwined and results substantial	Fees should be reduced for partial success (some claims lost by Elting or Dancy) and remittitur	Court made targeted reductions for work solely attributable to unsuccessful claims but declined broad proportional reduction; remittitur did not justify reducing fee award

Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2011) (lodestar creates a presumptively reasonable fee)
LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998) (use current rates and district prevailing rates)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (U.S. 1983) (lodestar: reasonable hours × reasonable rate; reduce for limited success)
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2008) (consider what a paying client would pay)
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (U.S. 2010) (lodestar presumptively reasonable; enhanced fee standards)
Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2005) (partial success can justify lodestar reduction)
Green v. Torres, 361 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming percentage reduction for limited success arising from common nucleus)
Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858 (2d Cir. 1998) (fees judged by ultimate success, not interim stages)
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (U.S. 1986) (fee awards under § 1988 need not be proportional to damages)

Award: Court granted attorneys’ fees of $158,122.50 and costs of $1,756.78 after the specific reductions described above.