Dancy v. McGinleyDancy v. McGinley
DECISION & ORDER
Fоllowing a judgment entered in his favor on December 15, 2014, Plaintiff Jayvon Elting moved for an award of reasonable attorneys’ • fees 'arid costs pursuant to
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jayvon Elting commenced this action on November 7,. 20,11, asserting claims for false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution against Defendant Officer Gregg McGinley. Compl. ¶¶ 31-32, Nov. 7, 201Í, ECF No. 1.
Thereafter, Officer McGinley answered the Complaint, generally denying all allegations of wrongdoing. Answer, Dec. 28, 2011, ECF No. 5. Elting’s claims stemmed from an incident on October 2, 2009, during which Officer McGinley arrested Elt-ing, and thereafter charged Elting with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (New York Penal Law (“Penal Law”) § 195.05), resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (Penal Law § 220.03).
On June 5, 2014, the Court denied Officer McGinley’s motion for summary judgment on Elting’s claims for false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution. Decision & Order, June 5, 2014, ECF No. 51. A jury trial was scheduled to commence on September 15, 2014. Minute Entry, June 18, 2014. Thereafter, the parties notified the Court that the .parties had reached a verbal settlement agreement. Notice of Settlement, Aug. 20, 2014, ECF No. 60. On August 26, 2014, the Court entered an Order of Discontinuance subject to reopening should a settlement not be concluded within forty-five (45) days of the date of the. Order. Order, Aug. 26, 2014, ECF.No. 61. Elting’s counsel notified the Court оn September 18, 2014, that a settlement could not be' finalized. PL’s Letter Mot., Sept. 18, 2014, ECF No. 62. On December 1, 2014, the Court granted Elting’s' motion to reopen the matter and scheduled a jury trial to commence. Order, Sept. 19, 2014, ECF No. 69; Minute Entry, Oct. 1, 2014. Ón November 21, 2014, the Court’ so ordered the parties’ stipulation to discontinue Elting’s malicious prosecution, claim against Officer McGinley. , Partial Stipulation & Order, Nov. 21, 2014, ECF No. 87.
The jury trial lasted from December 1, 2014, until December 9; 2014. After the close Of evidence on December 4, 2014, the Court as a matter of law granted Elting’s
On January 12, 2015, Officer McGinley moved for a remittitur of the damages awarded to Elting on his claims of false arrest and excessive force or, in the alternative, a new trial on damages pursuant to
On January 16, 2015, Elting filed his motion for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. See PL’s Mot., Jan. 16, 2015; Watkins Affirm., Jan. 16, ECF No. 102; Whateley Affirm., Jan. 16, 2015, ECF No. 103; PL’s Mem. L., Jan. 16,2015, ECF No. 104. On January 30, 2015, Officer McGinley requested an extension of time to respond to Elting’s motion. Def.’s Letter Motion, Jan. 30, 2015, ECF No. 121. Officer McGinley’s request was granted. Order, Jan. 30, 2015, ECF No. 124. Officer McGinley subsequently requested that his time to respond be held in abeyance pending the Court’s determination of his motion for a remittitur or a new trial. Def.’s Letter Motion, March 2, 2015, ECF No. 141. Elting consented to that request. PL’s Letter, Mar. 3, 2015, ECF No. 141. On March 5, 2015, the Court granted Officer McGinley’s request. Memo Endorsement, Mar. 5, 2015, ECF No. 144.
By Decision & Order dated May 11, 2015, the Court denied Officer McGinley’s motion for a remittitur as to the damages awarded for Elting’s false arrest claim, but granted the motion as to the damages awarded for Elting’s excessive force claim. Decision & Order, May 11, 2015, ECF No. 153. Elting accepted a reduced damage award of $81,500 for his excessive force claim. Notice of Acceptance of Reduced Damages Award, May 11, 2015, ECF No. 154. On June 9, 2015, Officer McGinley appealed the Court’s May 11, 2015, Decision & Order. Notice of Appeal, June 9, 2015, ECF No. 160.
On May 12, 2015, Elting supplemented his motion for an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to account for counsel’s time spent on opposing Officer McGinley’s motion for a remittitur or a new trial. Bergstein Affirm., May 12, 2015, ECF No. 155; Watkins Supp. Affirm., May 12, 2015, ECF No. 156. On August 10, 2015, Officer McGinley opposed Elting’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Def.’s Opp. Br., Aug. 10, 2015, ECF No. 170. Elting filed a reply, and sought a further award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to account for the time his counsel spent preparing the reply affirmation and memorandum of law. PL’s Reply Mem. L., Aug. 20, 2015, ECF No. 171; Watkins Reply Affirm., Aug. 20, 2015, ECF No. 172.
DISCUSSION
Elting sеeks a total of $171,225 in reasonable attorneys’ fees
“The district court retains discretion to determine ... what constitutes a reasonable fee.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co.,
I. Attorneys’ Fees
A. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates
In determining whether the requested hourly, rate is reasonable, a court must analyze whеther the “requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson,
Here, the fee applicant is Elting, who seeks $171,225 in attorneys’ fees. "This amount includes compensation for five attorneys: Jénnie G. Kim, Mary Jo Whate-ley, Stephen Bergstein, Christopher D. Watkins, and Michael H. Sussman. Wat
1. Jennie G. Kim
Jennie G. Kim graduated from the City University of New York Law School in 2006. Watkins Affirm. Ex. 3. She worked on this instant matter during 2012 and 2013 at Sussman & Watkins, but she is no longer an associate at the firm. Watkins Affirm. ¶ 22. Prior to working at Sussman & Watkins, Kim worked at Legal Services of the Hudson Valley beginning in 2006. Plaintiff seeks compensation for Kim’s services at a rate of $250 per hour. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Kim’s involvement in the litigation was primarily during discovery. See Watkins Affirm. Ex. 2.
Officer McGinley did not oppose Kim’s proposed hourly rate. Moreover, Defendant’s opposition brief states that the “appropriate range” of fees in this case is $250 to $350 “based upon counsel’s experience.” Def.’s Opp. Br. at 8. Thus, Kim’s proposed hourly rate is at the low end of Defendants’ proposed range. Kim’s proposed hourly rate of $250 also falls within the low end of the range approved by courts in this district for attorneys of similar experience in civil rights litigation. See G.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist.,
2. Mary Jo Whateley
Mary Jo Whateley graduated from the Pace University School of Law in 1995. Whateley Affirm. ¶ 2. Whateley previously worked as an associate in the Law Offices of Michael H. Sussman for five years between 1996 and 2001. From 2001 to 2012, Whateley worked at Legal Services of the Hudson Valley, representing tenants of federally-subsidized housing and children with disabilities. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. In 2012 she joined Sussman & Watkins as an associate attorney. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 7. Whateley has provided training in disability and special education law. Id. ¶ 9. She requests an hourly rate of $300 per hour. Id. ¶ 1Í. Her role in this matter consisted of assisting Watkins for triаl preparation and assisting Watkins during trial. Id. ¶
Defendant did not oppose Whateley’s proposed hourly rate. See Def.’s Opp. Br. at 8. Moreover, this hourly rate was found to be reasonable for Whateley in G.B. ex rel. N.B.,
3. Stephen Bergstein
Stephen Bergstein graduated from the City University of New York Law School in '1993, and, from that year through to September, 2001, he worked in the Law Offices of Michael H. Sussman. Bergstein Affirm. ¶ 4. Since 2001 he has been a partner at Bergstein & Ullrich LLP. A major focus of his practice- since- 1993 has been civil rights litigation. Id. Since February, 2012, the New York Law Journal has regularly published Bergstein’s commentary on case law in the Second Circuit. Id. He also presents continuing legal education courses. Id. Bergstein requests an hourly rate of $400 per hour. Id. ¶ 8. His involvement in. this, instant matter consisted of drafting Elting’s opposition to Officer McGinley’s motion for a remittitur or a new trial. Id. Ex. 2. '
Defendant opposes such an hourly rate, on the ground that it is excessive. Defs.’ Opp. Br. at 8. Defendant contends that “[t]he market rate for civil rights litigation services is lower than that for some other areas of practice.” Id. at 6.
“[I]n the general civil rights context, courts in this district have noted that consistent precedent in the Southern District revéals that rates awarded to experienced civil rights attorneys over the past ten years have ranged from $250 to $600[.]” G.B. ex rel. N.B.,
Bergstein is an experienced civil rights attorney: he has litigated civil rights actions for more than two decades and is a partner at a civil rights firm. A rate of $400 per hour is reasonable based on Bergstein’s experience. See, e.g., Munoz v. Manhattan Club Timeshare Ass’n, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7037,
4. Christopher D. Watkins
Christopher D. Watkins is a 1996 graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, He was an associate
Watkins’ requested rate is reasonable. Watkins has wоrked on civil rights litigation for approximately sixteen years, and he is a partner at a law firm that litigates in civil rights actions. See id. ¶¶3-6. Watkins was also lead counsel during most of the duration of this case. ' Id. ¶ 12. Moreover, Watkins was awarded an hourly rate of $375 in 2012 in the matter of Thankachan v. Peekskill Housing Auth., 07 Civ. 8332(PED), a civil rights action brought pursuant to
5. Michael H. Sussman
Michael H. Sussman is a graduate of Harvard Law School, and has thirty-six years of experience as a civil rights lawyer. Watkins Affirm. ¶24. He requests an hourly rate of $475 per hour. Id. Sussman was awarded a rate of $450 per hour in 2012 in the matter of G.B. ex reí. N.B.,
Defendant argues that Sussman’s requested rate is unreasonable in рart because, “[t]here was no element of this case that made it either unusually difficult or complex.” Def.’s. Opp. Br. at 7. Elting initially had three relatively straightforward claims of false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution. Only two of the claims went to trial. While it seems clear that, for experienced attorneys, hourly rates of $300-400 are unremarkable in civil rights cases in the Southern District, some courts find, that “awards [exceeding $400 per hour] are only warranted in ‘unusually difficult and complex’ cases.” E.S. & M.S. v. Katonah Lewisboro Sch. Dist.,
B. Reasonableness of Hours Expended
In determining the number of hours reasonably expended by Biting’s counsel in this case, the Court must consider both “contemporaneous time records ... [that] specify, for each attorney, the date, hours expended, and nature of the work done,” New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey,
1. Reductions Based on Partial Success
Defendant contend that “it is unconscionable for counsel’s fees to nearly equal the recovery actually awarded- to the client.” Def.’s Opp. Br. at 8: Defendant argues that this Circuit “recognizes that the degree of success obtained by the plaintiff is the most important factor in determining the appropriate fee award.” Id. Defendant also argues that Elting only succeeded on two claims out of a total of six claims which were litigated in this matter, and therefore should have his attorneys fees reduced accordingly. Id, at 1.
Elting contends that the six claims were inextricably intertwined, and the Court should therefore not reduce the award of attorneys’ fees to Elting based on the unsuccessful claims. PL’s Mem. L. at 3-6. Elting further argues that his attorneys should recover a fully compensatory fee because he obtained “excellent results.”" PL’s Reply Br. at 1 (citing G.B. ex rel. N.B.,
The Second Circuit has “clearly adopted the view ... that a district judge’s authority to reduce the feе awarded to a prevailing plaintiff below the lodestar by reason of the plaintiffs ‘partial or limited success’ is not restricted either to cases of multiple, discrete theories or to cases in which the plaintiff won only a nominal or technical victory.” Kassim v. City of Schenectady,
In Green v. Torres, a plaintiff sued thé City of New York and five police officers, alleging claims of false arrest and mali
As explained above, the instant matter began with two plaintiffs, Elting and Dan-cy, who each asserted claims of false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution. Elting received a substantial award of' damages in the amount of $215,000 for his false arrest and excessive force claims. Judgment, Dee. 11, 2014. The Court subsequently remitted $18,500 of Plaintiffs damages award. Decision & Order, May 11, 2015. Elting had pursued his malicious prosecution claim until the end of discovery, and he agreed to dismiss that claim prior to trial. Stipulation & Order, Nov. 21, 2014. Dancy was unsuccessful on all three of his claims. By Decision & Order'dated June 5, 2014, this Court dismissed Dancy’s malicious prosecution claim on summary judgment. Decision & Order, June 5, 2014. Dancy’s false arrest claim was dismissed following a jury trial finding in favor of Officer Williams on that claim, and his excessive force claim was dismissed after a subsequent jury trial finding in favor of Officer Williams on the excessive force claim. See Judgment, December 11, 2014; Judgment, February 5, 2015.
As in Green v. Torres, Elting and Dan-cy’s claims can be characterized as arising from a common nucleus of facts. Dancy and Elting were arrested on the night of October 2, 2009, after Officer McGinley stopped the two men while they were walking together on Cannon Street in Poughkeepsie. Officer Williams claimed that he identified Dancy as a person who fit the description of an alleged perpetrator of a robbery, which provided probable cause for Dancy’s arrest. Defs.’ Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Summary Judgment at 8-9, Jan. 2, 2014, ECF No. 26. Officer McGin-ley and Officer Williams argued in their motion for summary judgment that Officer McGinley had probable cause to arrest Elting based on Elting’s accompanying Dancy, whom the officers suspected of having committed a crime. See id. at 6-9. Officer Williams claimed that he used force on Dancy after observing Elting attempting to flee from Officer McGinley. See Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶39, Jan. 2, 2014, EGF No. 27. Although only Elting succeeded on claims for false arrest and excessive force, most of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s time expended on discovery, ■ opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and trial were necessary for both Elting’s claims and Dancy’s claims. In other words, the amount of time expended on both sets of claims cannot be severed to account for just Elting’s claims. Therefore, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs claim for attorneys’ fees should be reduced where counsel spent time on matters relating to both Dancy’s claims and Elting’s claims.
Nonetheless, in light of Elting’s partial success, the Court finds that it is reasonable-.to make certain reductions in Elting’s attorneys’ fees, where counsel’s work pertained, solely to Dancy’s claims or to Elting’s malicious prosecution claim. Based -on a. review of Elting’s counsel’s time records, the trial transcript, and Plaintiffs written submissions, it is appar
The Court does not find that counsel’s fees should be reduced based on Defendant’s contention that the fees claimed “nearly equal the recovery” awarded to Elting. Def.’s Opp. Br. at 8. Elting was ultimately awarded $190,500 (accounting for the $18,500 remittitur) in comрensatory damages, and he seeks a total amount of $171,225 in attorneys’ fees. Courts in this circuit have awarded attorneys’ fees greater than the amount of damages that plaintiffs have recovered in the same action. See, e.g., Millea,
The Court also does not find that Plaintiffs counsel is entitled to full compensation for the litigation.of this matter based on Plaintiffs argument, that he obtained “excellent results.” Pb’s Reply Br. at 1. In G.B. ex rel. N.B., defendants sought a reduction in plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees on the ground that the plaintiffs achieved only partial success.
The Court is also not convinced by Plaintiffs argument that Plaintiffs’ counsel should be fully compensated for this litiga
2. Initial Fee Application
i. Kim
Kim billed a totаl of 57.75 regular hours, and an additional 10.5 travel hours. Watkins Affirm. Ex. 2.
ii. Whateley
Whateley billed 52 hours, and an additional 8 hours of travel time. Whateley Affirm. Ex. 2. Whateley’s hours, which were primarily spent on preparing for the trial and attending the trial, are in most respects reasonable. However, deductions will be made for time spent only on Dan-cy’s claims that were separate from Elt-ing’s claims. Based on a review of the trial transcript and records, the Court finds that at least two hours of testimony at trial did not concern Elting, For example, testimony from Dancy’s mother about Dancy’s injuries, testimony from Dancy specifically about his own injuries, and testimony about what happened to Dancy after he was arrested and transported to the police department are not relevant to Elt-
Thus, this Court concludes that Whate-ley expended 50 reasonable hours, and an additional 8 travel hours. Her total amount of reasonable fees is therefore $16,200.
iii. Sussman
Sussman billed 14.6 hours. Watkins Affirm, Ex. 4. The Court finds that certain deductions from this total are warranted. The entry dated June 16, 2012, stating, “Meet with Ms. Kim re: matter,” is vague. Id. Therefore, the 1.5 hours billed for this entry will be deducted. An entry dated May 29, 2013, stated, “Draft letter to court.” Id. This entry is also vague, and there was no letter to the Court filed on or shortly after that date. Therefore, the 1.25 hours billed for this entry will be deducted. Finally, the November 1, 2011, entry for “Review of medical records and police reports” did not separate time spent reviewing Dancy’s medical records as opposed to time spent reviewing Elting’s medical records. Id. Therefore, one-half hour of time will be deducted from the 1.25 hours billed for this entry. Based on these deductions, the Court concludes that the total number of reasonable hours that Sussman expended was 11.35 hours. Sussman did not bill any travel hours. His total' amount of reasonable fees is therefore $5,107.50.
iv. Watkins
In the initial fee application, Watkins billed 272.25 regular work hours, and 25 travel hours. Watkins Affirm. Ex. i. With regard to travel time, Watkins requests compensation at his full rate for days on which he drove Plaintiffs to the Court during trial and discussed the case with Plaintiffs during the drive. Watkins Affirm. ¶ 16. Defendant argues that the customary 50% rate for travel time should apply. Def.’s Opp. Br. at 4. Plaintiff argues in his reply memorandum of law that counsel “only requested 9 travel hours at his full rate.” PL’s Reply Mem. L. at 4. However, the Court identified 12 travel hours billed at 100% in Watkins’ time records. In an entry, dated November. 5, 2013, Watkins billed at 100% of his rate for 3 hours of travel to the Court to attend a settlement conference. The entries dated December 1, 2014, December 2, 2014, and December 3, 2014, which were trial days, included 9 hours of travel time billed at 100% of Watkins’ rate. Plaintiff argues that this time, was spent productively and should therefore be compensated in full. PL’s Reply Mem. L. at 4. However, it is unlikely that counsel 'can (or should) be operating at 100% productivity discussing matters with his client while operating a motor vehicle. The Court finds that it is reasonable to apply the customary 50% rate for counsel’s travel time.
A few additional deductions are warranted. For example, Watkins does not provide the date on which he spent 1.5 hours conferring with Kim and ‘ reviewing the Amended Complaint she drafted. Watkins Affirm. Ex. 1. Because this éntry is deficient the Court will deduct the 1.5 hours. In addition, time spent exclusively on Dan-cy’s claims will be’ deducted: On January 28, 2014, Watkins researched Jarqtiez Dancy’s false arrest claim for three hours. Id. An entry dated November 6, 2014, stated, “review pltfs’ med records,” and was billed for one hour. Id. The Court will deduct one-half hour to account for time that counsel reasonably would have spent reviewing Dancy’s medical records as opposed to those of Elting. ■ On November 13, 2014, Watkins' spent one hour reviewing an audiotape regarding Dancy. Id. On November 18, 2014, Watkins spent one hour researching Dancy’s false arrest claim. Id. On November 25, 2014, Watkins also spent one hour researching Dan-cy’s false arrest claim. Id. On December 10, 2014, Watkins spent one hour conferring with Sussman regarding retrial — an
The Court also finds it appropriate to deduct .25 hours on November 10, 2014, which Watkins spent on reviewing Defendants’ letter regarding Elting’s malicious prosecution claim, id., a claim on which Elting did not succeed. Watkin’s one-half hour spent on November 12, 2014, researching punitive jury instructions, id., will also be deducted as Elting did not succeed in obtaining punitive damages against McGinley. Finally, Watkins miscalculated his entry dated December 4, 2014. The entry states that he expended 3 hours on travel, 7 hours on trial attendance, and 2 hours on preparing for the next trial day, which should have totaled 3 hours of travel time and 9 hours of regular work time. Id. He billed 3 hours of travel time and 10 hours of regular work time. Id. The Court will therefore deduct one horn- of regular work time from this entry.
Defendant contends that the 64.75 .hours that Watkins spent working on opposing Officer McGinley and Officer Williams’ summary judgment motion should be reduced by “at least half.” Def.’s Opp. Br. at 4. However, as discussed supra, the Court finds that Dancy and Elting’s claims were in large-part intertwined, and therefore declines to reduce Watkins’ hours opposing Defendants’ summary judgment by half. Id.
Defendant also argues that Watkins’ time spent on opposing the motion for summary judgment should be reduced to account for the fact that Dancy’s malicious prosecution claim, as well as Elting’s malicious prosecution claim, were unsuccessful. The Court agrees that it would be unreasonable to order Defendants to pay for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s time spent on unsuccessful claims. However, Plaintiffs’ memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment did not brief the issue of Dancy’s malicious prosecution claim. Plaintiffs devoted approximately 1.5 pages out of the twenty-two pages of that memorandum of law arguing against dismissal of Elting’s malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the .Court will reduce the 64.75 hours that Watkins spent opposing the motion for summary judgment by 5 hours to account for the fact that Elting ultimately did not prevail on his malicious prosecution claim.
Finally, this Court disagrees with- Defendants’ argument that it would be unreasonable to order Defendants to pay for the entirety of the twenty-five hours that Watkins billed , for his time spent during the jury’s deliberations. See Defs.’ Opp. Br. at 5. Although one could speculate on what portions of the jury’s deliberations were limited to Dancy’s claims, it would be improper for the Court to do so. The jury’s deliberations are protected-as a matter of law, and must remain so. See e.g.,
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Watkins expended 242 reasonable hours, and an additionаl 37 travel hours.
Watkins billed 12.5 hours for opposing Defendants’ motion for a remittitur or new trial. Watkins Supp. Affirm. Ex. 1. Berg-stein billed 23.6 hours. Bergstein Affirm. Ex. 2. Defendants do not contest the number of hours that Watkins and Bergstein billed., Defendants argue, however, that the fees claims are unreasonable on the grounds that the rates are unreasonably high and the result of the motion practice resulted in. a reduction in thé. judgment. Pis.’ Opp. Br.,*8.
As discussed supra, the rates claimed by Watkins and Bergstein are reasonable and fall within the range of rates approved by courts in this district. However, Watkins’ time records include entries billing for time spent on “coordinat[ing] filing” on January 16, 2015, February 11, 2015, and May 12, 2015, Watkins. Supp. Affirm. Ex. 1. These entries are vague, and, in any event, “coordinating filing” appears to be a clerical task. Plaintiffs fee request will therefore be reduced because clerical tasks arе can be performed by a non-attorney staff. See, e.g., E.S. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist.,
Bergstein’s time records are detailed) and his time was spent on compensable legal research and writing. See Bergstein Affirm. Ex. 2; He will therefore be compensated for the requested 23.6 hours. His total amount of reasonable fees'is thus $9,440.'
With regard to Defendants’ argument that the fees should be reduced because the motion for a remittitur or a new trial resulted in a reduction in the judgment, see Defs.’ Opp. Br.¡ 8, the.Court does not find that the reduction in Plaintiffs recovery should result in a reduction in attorney fees. See, e.g., G.B. ex rel. N.B.,
Watkins billed 8.5 hours for preparing Elting’s reply brief in support of the motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Watkins Reply Affirm. Ex. 1. Watkins’ hourly rate is reasonable, and the time expended was on compensable legal work. Accordingly, Watkins will be compensated for the 8.5 hours billed. His total amount of reasonable fees for his supplemental fee application is thus $3,400.
II. Costs
Sussman & Watkins incurred $1,756.78 in costs, including a $350 filing fee, $120 in service fees, $27.02 for a copy of Elting’s medical records, $1,020 for deposition transcripts, and $239.76 for a transcript of a case captioned Nesheiwat v. City of Poughkeepsie. Watkins Affirm. Ex 5. Although it is unclear what the relevance of the case Nesheiwat v. City of Poughkeepsie was to this instant matter, Defendant effectively concedes the case’s relеvance to this litigation by not opposing this cost claimed by Plaintiff. The rest of the costs for which Elting seeks compensation appear reasonable and necessary for this litigation. Thus Elting will be awarded $1,756.78 in costs.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Elting’s motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs is granted to. the extent set forth herein. Elting is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $158,122.50 and to costs in the amount of $1,756,78.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The parties have consented to my exercise of jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
. Jarquez Dancy was a co-plaintiff in the action, but the motion addressed herein pertains solely to Elting's request for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Jarquez Dancy also asserted claims of false'arrest,, excessive forcе, and malicious prosecution, but his claims were asserted only against Defendant .Officer John Williams. Jarquez Dancy’s malicious prosecution claim was dismissed on summary judgment, his false arrest claim was dismissed by a judgment entered on December 15, 2014, following the conclusion' of a jury trial, and his. excessive force claim'was dismissed by a judgment entered on February. 5, 2015, following a secbnd jury trial.
. The original fee application requested a total amount of $153,385 in attorneys' fees. The first supplemental fee application requested $14,440 in attorneys’ fees. The second supplemental fee application requested $3,400 in attorneys’ fees. The Court notes that Elting’s first supplemental fee application made a mathematical error where it stated, ”[T]his Court should award plaintiff Elting $14,440 in reasonable attorneys' fees based on this supplemental application, in addition to the $153,385.00 previously requested, for a total of $167,815.00 in attorneys’ fees, to date.” Watkins Supp. Affirm. ¶ 14. The sum of $14,440 and $153,385 is $167,825, not $167,815.
. In the Southern District, travel hours are customarily compensated at one-half (.5) of the usual hourly rate. See, e.g. Sylvester v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 8760,
. The travel hours increased from 25 to 37, because the 12 travel hours that Watkins
. Watkins billed one-half hour on January 16, 2015, for coordinating filing, one-half hour on February 11, 2015, for coordinating filing, and one hour, on May 12, 2015, on preparing a supplemental fee affirmation and coordinating filing. Watkins Suppl, Affirm. Ex. 1. Half the time in the May 12, 2015, entry may be attributable to the clerical task of coordinating filing while the other half may be attributable to the compensable legal task of preparing the supplemental fee affirmation.