Curtis G. and Stacy S. Marks v. Commissioner of Revenue, Relator.
875 N.W.2d 321
Minn.2016Background
- Curtis and Stacy Marks moved from Minnesota to Florida in 1999, kept a Minnesota home, and re-established Minnesota domicile on August 1, 2007.
- In 2007 the Marks were physically present in Minnesota 257 days (more than 183); 104 of those days occurred before re-establishing Minnesota domicile.
- The Commissioner audited their 2007 return, applied Minn. Stat. § 290.01, subd. 7(b), treated them as full-year residents, and assessed additional tax, penalties, and interest.
- The tax court granted summary judgment to the Markses, holding that subdivision 7(b) counts only days spent in Minnesota while domiciled outside the state.
- The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether subdivision 7(b) permits counting all days in Minnesota during the tax year (including days spent while domiciled in Minnesota) when a taxpayer changes domicile midyear.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Marks) | Defendant's Argument (Commissioner) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Minn. Stat. § 290.01, subd. 7(b) allows counting only days spent in Minnesota while domiciled outside the state (so midyear domiciliary days cannot be aggregated) | Subdivision 7(b) requires the abode and >1/2-year presence to occur while domiciled outside Minnesota; days after reestablishing domicile cannot be counted | When domicile changes midyear, all days present in Minnesota during the tax year can be aggregated (including days spent as a domiciliary) to test subdivision 7(b) | The statute is ambiguous; applying purpose and longstanding administrative rule, the Court holds the Commissioner may count all days present in Minnesota during the tax year (including domiciliary days) to determine residency under subdivision 7(b). |
Key Cases Cited
- ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. County of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 2005) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 2010) (legislative intent guides statutory interpretation)
- American Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 2001) (plain meaning governs when statute is unambiguous)
- Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012) (statute is ambiguous if susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation)
- Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minnesota v. Comm’r of Revenue, 663 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2003) (use legislative purpose and circumstances in construing statutes)
- Luther v. Comm’r of Revenue, 588 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1999) (income tax tied to contacts with state and benefits received)
- Billion v. Comm’r of Revenue, 827 N.W.2d 773 (Minn. 2013) (administrative rules cannot conflict with statute)
- Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 184 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1971) (courts cannot supply omitted statutory language)
- Northland Country Club v. Comm’r of Taxation, 308 Minn. 265, 241 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1976) (tax statutes construed narrowly)
- Sanchez v. Comm’r of Revenue, 770 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 2009) (distinction between residence and domicile)
- Dreyling v. Comm’r of Revenue, 711 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 2006) (discussing § 290.01 definitions)
- Miller’s Estate v. Comm’r of Taxation, 240 Minn. 18, 59 N.W.2d 925 (Minn. 1953) (domicile requires residence plus intent)
- Davidner v. Davidner, 304 Minn. 491, 232 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 1975) (domicile is union of residence and intention)
- Benda v. Girard, 592 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 1999) (deference to agency interpretations)
- Greene v. Comm’r of Minn. Dept. of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 2008) (weight to longstanding agency interpretations)
- U.S. West Material Res., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 511 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1994) (agency rules implementing tax statutes have force when consistent)