Curtis Clayton v. Martin Biter
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15842
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Curtis Clayton was convicted in 1997 and sentenced under California’s Three Strikes law to a lengthy term; his direct appeals and prior state and federal habeas efforts were unsuccessful.
- Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act, Nov. 2012) allowed certain defendants with non-serious/non-violent third strikes to petition for resentencing under Cal. Penal Code §1170.126, with petitions to be filed in the sentencing court.
- Clayton filed a §1170.126 resentencing petition in state superior court (Nov. 2012); the court denied it without a hearing, and the denial was affirmed on appeal.
- Clayton then filed a federal habeas petition arguing the state court’s summary denial deprived him of a liberty interest without procedural due process; the district court treated it as a second or successive petition and dismissed for lack of authorization under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b).
- Clayton applied to the Ninth Circuit for authorization to file a second or successive petition; the Ninth Circuit instead held the application unnecessary and transferred the petition to the district court to be treated as a first petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Clayton’s habeas petition challenging denial of a §1170.126 resentencing is “second or successive” under §2244(b) | Clayton: He challenges a new, post-judgment order denying resentencing (a new judgment) and so this petition is not successive | Government: The petition effectively reattacks his original sentence and is therefore second or successive requiring §2244 authorization | Held: Not second or successive — denial of §1170.126 relief is a new/intervening judgment under California law and Magwood/Wentzell; no authorization required |
| Whether the Ninth Circuit should assess cognizability of the federal habeas claim when deciding a §2244(b)(3) authorization application | Clayton: His due-process claim (denial without hearing) alleges deprivation of a liberty interest and may be cognizable | Government: The claim is not cognizable and thus authorization should be denied | Held: Cognizability is for the district court to decide; the appellate authorization inquiry is limited to the §2244(b) gatekeeping criteria, so the Ninth Circuit will not resolve cognizability on authorization |
Key Cases Cited
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (Supreme Court 2007) ("second or successive" is not self-defining and must be interpreted relative to the judgment challenged)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court 2000) (discussion of "second or successive petition" as a term of art)
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (Supreme Court 2010) (a petition challenging a new or intervening judgment is not "second or successive")
- Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012) (a later petition challenging an intervening judgment is not successive even if it affects an unamended component)
- Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing challenges to release-date calculations from challenges to the original sentence for successive-petition purposes)
- Sherrod v. United States, 858 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding federal §3582(c)(2) reductions do not create a new judgment — contrasted here as distinguishable)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (Supreme Court 2010) (characterizing §3582 sentence reductions as limited adjustments, not plenary resentencings)
- Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (Supreme Court 2011) (federal due-process review of state procedures evaluating state-law-created liberty interests)
- Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (standards for summary dismissal of habeas petitions as "palpably incredible" or "patently frivolous")