Culver v. Armstrong
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14583
| 10th Cir. | 2016Background
- At ~2:26 a.m. in Greybull, WY, Sgt. Shannon Armstrong observed a white Chevrolet pickup drive without headlights and leave the public roadway behind a store; he followed the pickup in his patrol car and activated lights.
- The pickup stopped near North 4th Street; Armstrong detained William Reed nearby when Reed admitted drinking and appeared evasive. Body/dash camera video recorded the encounter.
- Thomas Culver (plaintiff) approached the scene on foot, asked what was happening, repeatedly refused direct questions from Armstrong, and ignored commands to leave the area or come to the patrol car.
- Armstrong ordered Culver to produce ID, threatened to use a taser when Culver did not comply, and ultimately arrested and cited Culver for public intoxication; the charge was later dismissed by a magistrate.
- Culver sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest (Fourth Amendment). The district court granted Armstrong qualified immunity; Culver appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Culver's Argument | Armstrong's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Armstrong’s warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because it lacked probable cause | Culver: Arrest without probable cause was unlawful; the general right against warrantless arrest without probable cause is long-established | Armstrong: Officer reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Culver for interfering with an officer or public intoxication based on Culver’s conduct and state law | Court: Did not decide actual probable cause; held qualified immunity applies because an officer could have reasonably believed arguable probable cause existed to arrest Culver for interference under Wyoming law |
| Whether the unlawfulness of Armstrong’s conduct was clearly established at the time | Culver: The Fourth Amendment prohibition on warrantless arrests without probable cause was sufficient to show law was clearly established | Armstrong: The question requires case-specific clarity; pre-existing Wyoming decisions permitted speech-based interference charges | Court: Law was not clearly established in Culver’s favor given Wyoming precedent interpreting the interference statute, so qualified immunity applies |
| Whether speech and evasive conduct can constitute interference with an officer under Wyoming law | Culver: His verbal responses were mere remonstrance/criticism and protected | Armstrong: Under Wyoming law, speech can obstruct or interfere if sufficiently intense or under the totality of circumstances | Court: Cited Tillett and Newton: Wyoming law permits speech to constitute interference, supporting an objectively reasonable belief of probable cause |
| Whether the officer’s subjective motives matter to objective probable cause/qualified immunity | Culver: Officer’s subjective belief and choice of charge undermine lawfulness | Armstrong: Objective standard controls; an officer may be justified by any offense a reasonable officer could have believed occurred | Court: Applied objective standard; a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed, so qualified immunity shields Armstrong |
Key Cases Cited
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (probable cause for any offense can justify an arrest irrespective of officer’s actual stated reason)
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (probable cause defined by facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe an offense occurred)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (qualified immunity shields officers unless conduct violates clearly established law)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may decide qualified immunity by addressing the ‘‘clearly established’’ prong first)
- Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2014) (discusses ‘‘arguable probable cause’’ standard for qualified immunity)
- Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2015) (analyzing whether state law clearly establishes that specific conduct constitutes an offense for § 1983 arrest claims)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (a videotape may nullify a plaintiff’s contrary version of events on summary judgment)
- Tillett v. State, 637 P.2d 261 (Wyo. 1981) (speech alone may become interference if sufficiently intense or considered with other acts)
- Newton v. State, 698 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 1985) (reaffirming that speech can amount to obstructing or interfering with an officer)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (unlawfulness must be apparent in light of pre-existing law for § 1983 liability)