Crowder v. State of Georgia
309 Ga. 66
Ga.2020Background
- Police seized $46,820 in cash from Shara Cumins at Atlanta airport; State filed an in rem forfeiture complaint naming Cumins and later amended to name James Crowder (an Alabama resident) as a potential owner.
- The State attempted personal service on Crowder unsuccessfully and obtained an order for service by publication under OCGA § 9-16-12(b)(3); final publication date was April 26, 2017.
- Crowder filed an unverified, late answer on December 29, 2017 admitting ownership but asserting improper service; the State moved for judgment on the pleadings and for a more definite statement.
- The superior court concluded the statute required personal service, found service insufficient, but nevertheless addressed the merits and awarded the property to Crowder.
- The Court of Appeals reversed: it held publication in the first instance is permitted for out-of-state owners under OCGA § 9-16-12(b)(3) and that Crowder’s answer failed the special pleading requirements, entitling the State to relief.
- The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve (1) whether OCGA § 9-16-12(b)(3) permits service by publication in the first instance when an owner resides out of state, and (2) whether a trial court must rule on a motion for a more definite statement before striking an answer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Crowder) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OCGA § 9-16-12(b)(3) permits service by publication in the first instance if owner resides out of state | (Crowder) The statute’s cross-reference to OCGA § 9-11-4(e) requires personal service; § 9-16-12(b)(3) is only a notice provision and does not authorize service by publication in the first instance | (State) Paragraph (b)(3) plainly authorizes publication as an alternative method of service when owner resides out of state | Service by publication in the first instance is permitted under OCGA § 9-16-12(b)(3); Court of Appeals was correct on statutory interpretation, but remand required for due process review |
| Whether service by publication here satisfied constitutional due process | (Crowder) Even if publication is statutorily authorized, the State must show reasonable diligence to make publication constitutionally adequate | (State) Publication authorized under statute and Crowder had actual notice; publication was sufficient | Not decided on merits by Supreme Court — remand to trial court to address Crowder’s due process arguments in the first instance |
| Whether a trial court must rule on a motion for a more definite statement before striking a claimant’s answer under OCGA § 9-16-12(c)(2) | (Crowder) Court must grant the motion and give the claimant the court-ordered time to comply before striking the answer | (State) Court of Appeals held trial court could strike/dismiss based on answer’s noncompliance | Trial court must first rule on a motion for a more definite statement and allow time to comply before striking the pleading; Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise |
Key Cases Cited
- Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 558 (statutory interpretation principles; read statute in most natural, reasonable way)
- Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (Due Process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties)
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (publication may be constitutionally permissible only when reasonably calculated to give notice)
- Reynolds v. Reynolds, 296 Ga. 461 (Georgia precedent requiring reasonable diligence before permitting service by publication)
- Abba Gana v. Abba Gana, 251 Ga. 340 (publication unreliable; diligence requirement)
- Rehman v. Belisle, 294 Ga. 71 (defect in service is not cured by actual knowledge of proceeding)
- Ga. Pines Community Svc. Bd. v. Summerlin, 282 Ga. 339 (definition of “service” and that publication can constitute service in context)
- Crowder v. State of Ga., 348 Ga. App. 850 (Court of Appeals decision below reversing superior court on statutory service and pleading sufficiency)