REYNOLDS v. REYNOLDS
S14A1656
Supreme Court of Georgia
February 2, 2015
769 SE2d 511 | 296 Ga. 461
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
Ga. 584, 587 (2) (a) (732 SE2d 53) (2012). In аny event, he has made absolutely no showing that the State even knew what the firearms examiner would say on cross-examination, much less that the State elicited that information or otherwise acted in bad faith. See Redding v. State, 239 Ga. App. 718, 720-721 (3) (521 SE2d 840) (1999). Accordingly, the failure of Bryant‘s lawyer to object on discovery grounds to the testimony of which Bryant now complains did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Yancey, 292 Ga. at 819 (4).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 2, 2015.
Robinson & Associates, Thomas S. Robinson III, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Paige Reese Whitaker, Lenny I. Krick, Assistant District Attorneys, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ryan A. Kolb, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
S14A1656. REYNOLDS v. REYNOLDS. (769 SE2d 511)
HUNSTEIN, Justice.
We granted the discretionary application of Appellant Dorothy M. Reynolds (Wife) pursuant to Supreme Court Rulе 34 in this divorce case. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court‘s order denying Wife‘s motion to set aside.
Wife replied by filing a motion to suppress many of Husband‘s statements in his response. She asked the court to strike Husband‘s statement that her non-resident status was a typographical error because Husband‘s counsel would not have made such a mistake in filing the complaint, and instead, she contended that Husband had committed a fraud upon the court. Counsel for Husband filed an amended response to Wife‘s motion to set aside and motion to suppress, contending that if Wife did not receive notice of Husband‘s complaint for divorce, it was due to Wife‘s own negligence and fault.
Wife appeared pro se for a hearing on her motion to set aside and was instructed by the court to seek the assistance of counsel. Wife subsequently appeared with counsel for a hearing on her motiоn to set aside, but no hearing appears to be have been held. Instead, the court issued an order denying Wife‘s motion to set aside. This Court then granted Wife‘s discretionary application to appeal the court‘s order denying her motion to set aside and directed the parties to address whether the court erred by denying Wife‘s motion to set aside the divorce deсree in regard to Wife‘s contention that service of the divorce action by publication was improper.
Wife argues that the trial court erred by granting an order for service by publiсation because Husband‘s affidavit did not meet the standards for service by publication pursuant to
[W]hether a proceeding is in rem or in personam, due process requires that a chosen method of service be reasonаbly certain to give actual notice of the pendency of a proceeding to those parties whose liberty or property interests may be adversely affected by the рroceeding. Because notice by publication is a notoriously unreliable means of actually informing interested parties about pending suits, the constitutional prerequisite for allоwing such service when the addresses of those parties are unknown is a showing that reasonable diligence has been exercised in attempting to ascertain their whereabouts.
Abba Gana v. Abba Gana, 251 Ga. 340, 343 (1) (304 SE2d 909) (1983) (citаtions omitted). “[I]t is the duty of the courts to determine whether the movant has exercised due diligence in pursuing every reasonably available channel of information.” Id. Though the trial court makes this determination initially, this Court must independently review whether the search for the absentee party was legally adequate. Id.
In addition,
[T]he affiant shall state generally in the affidavit that at a previous time such person resided outside this state in a certain place (naming the place and stating the latest date known to affiant when the party so resided there); that such place is the last place in which the party resided to the knowledge of affiant; that the party no longer resides at the place; that affiant does not know the present place of residence of the party or where the party can be found; and that affiant does not know and hаs never been informed and has no reason to believe that the party now resides in this state; and, in such case, it shall be presumed that the party still resides and remains outside the state, and the affidavit shall be deemed to be a sufficient showing of due diligence to find the defendant.
Husband‘s affidavit in support of service by publication pursuant to this statute was not sufficient. Husband failed to state that Wife resided outside of Georgia at a previous time and in a certain place; that this certain place was the last place where Wife resided to Husband‘s knowledgе; that Wife no longer resided at this place; that he did not know where Wife presently resided or could be found; and that he did not know, had never been informed, and had no reason to believе that Wife now resided in Georgia. See
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 2, 2015.
Handsford Law, Selinda D. Handsford, for appellant.
The Kendall Law Firm, Martin M. Kendall, for appellee.
