**558This case comes to us by way of three certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Given the lengthy history of this case, the facts are familiar to the federal courts and to ours. As the receiver of the Buckhead Community Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sued nine former directors *118and officers
Before trial, the former directors and officers requested that the district court instruct the jury to apportion damages among them, in the event that the jury found any of the former directors and officers liable. The district court denied the requested instruction and the case proceeded to trial. During trial, the former directors and officers again requested-and the district court again denied-a jury instruction on apportionment. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found that some of the former directors and officers were negligent in approving four of the ten loans at issue and awarded the FDIC $4,986,993 in damages. The district court entered a final judgment in that amount and held the former directors and officers jointly and severally liable. They timely appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
On appeal, the former directors and officers sought a retrial, arguing that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on apportionment, which, they say, is required by OCGA § 51-12-33 because purely pecuniary harms-such as the losses at issue here-are included within "injury to person or property" under Georgia's apportionment statute. The FDIC countered that OCGA § 51-12-33 **560does not apply because the statute is in derogation of common law and the definition of "property" in the apportionment statute must be construed narrowly to refer only to realty or other tangible property. The FDIC further argued that, even if the apportionment statute generally abrogates joint and several liability for most tort claims, Georgia's common-law rule imposing joint and several liability on tortfeasors who "act in concert" survived enactment of the apportionment statute-meaning that joint and several liability still applies to the concerted actions of tortfeasors, including (it says) to the former directors' and officers' approval of the loans at issue here. The former directors and officers disagreed that the common-law concerted-action rule survived the apportionment statute and argued that the FDIC's case was tried based on the former directors' and officers' individual behavior and decision-making, not on a theory of concerted action.
Concluding that these arguments required answers to questions of law that "have not been squarely answered by the Georgia Supreme Court or the Georgia Court of Appeals,"
*119the Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions to our Court:
1. Does Georgia's apportionment statute, OCGA § 51-12-33, apply to tort claims for purely pecuniary losses against bank directors and officers?
2. Did Georgia's apportionment statute, OCGA § 51-12-33, abrogate Georgia's common-law rule imposing joint and several liability on tortfeasors who act in concert?
3. In a negligence action premised upon the negligence of individual board members in their decision-making process, is a decision of a bank's board of directors a "concerted action" such that the board members should be held jointly and severally liable for negligence?
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that OCGA § 51-12-33 does apply to tort claims for purely pecuniary losses against bank directors and officers. We further conclude that OCGA § 51-12-33 did not abrogate Georgia's common-law rule imposing joint and several liability on tortfeasors who act in concert insofar as a claim of concerted action invokes the narrow and traditional common-law doctrine of concerted action based on a legal theory of mutual agency and thus imputed fault. Given our answers to the first two questions and the related guidance we provide below, we decline to further answer the Eleventh Circuit's third question.
**561Does Georgia's apportionment statute, OCGA § 51-12-33, apply to tort claims for purely pecuniary losses against bank directors and officers?
1. To answer the first question before us, we must determine the reach of OCGA § 51-12-33 's application-and specifically, whether the scope of Georgia's apportionment statute includes tort claims for purely pecuniary losses, such as the economic losses the FDIC sought to recover in this suit.
*120Where an action is brought against more than one person for injury to person or property , the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall after a reduction of damages pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section, if any, apportion its award of **562damages among the persons who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each person. Damages apportioned by the trier of fact as provided in this Code section shall be the liability of each person against whom they are awarded, shall not be a joint liability among the persons liable, and shall not be subject to any right of contribution.
Because it is undisputed that the FDIC's suit was "brought against more than one person," the critical question is whether this action-a tort claim for negligence and gross negligence seeking damages for purely pecuniary losses against a bank's directors and officers-is brought "for injury to person or property." To answer that question, we first look to the text because " '[a] statute draws its meaning ... from its text.' " Zaldivar v. Prickett ,
Here, we construe the meaning of "property" as it is used in OCGA § 51-12-33 (b), in the particular context of subsection (b)'s reference to actions brought "for injury to person or property," and in the context of the apportionment statute as a whole. In evaluating the meaning of "property," we note that neither Title 51 (Torts) nor the **563apportionment statute ( OCGA § 51-12-33 ) defines the term. But the Georgia Code provides a general definition: "[a]s used in this Code or in any other law of this state," " '[p]roperty' includes real and personal property." OCGA § 1-3-3 (16).
The FDIC argues for a narrower definition, insisting that "injury to person or property" extends only to tangible property.
It is this fixed, common-law definition of property, the FDIC argues, that the Georgia Court of Appeals must have implicitly relied on in 1964 when it asserted (without citing any legal authority) that " '[p]roperty' at common law was limited to tangible realty or personalty." City of Atlanta v. J.J. Black & Co. ,
We disagree. The proposition set forth in J.J. Black does not support the absolute principle that the term property always includes only tangible property; instead, J.J. Black merely held that claims sounding in contract did not implicate a statutory municipal ante litem notice requirement because the ante litem statute applied only **565to tort damages for "injury to person or property." See J.J. Black ,
Moreover, it does not appear that English common law treated the definition of "property" so definitively. The former directors and officers point to the very same passages from Blackstone the FDIC cites to argue the contrary position: that "property" cannot be interpreted narrowly, in light of Blackstone's acknowledgement that personal property includes "money" and extends beyond just chattels to "things thereunto incident." 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1st ed. 1768), 117, 144. Indeed, our Court of **566Appeals recognized a more expansive common-law definition of "injury to personalty" in Davis v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. ,
Whatever the exact parameters of the common-law definition of "property" were or are in the context of tort actions for "injury to person or property," it thus appears that the definition does not categorically exclude property that could be characterized as "intangible." As a result, we reject the FDIC's contention that "injury to person or property" retained a fixed, common-law meaning at all, let alone a meaning that excludes intangible property as a potential source of tort injury that may be subject to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33 (b). We instead adopt the usual and customary meaning of the term "property," as used in a legal context, *123and conclude that "injury to person or property" in OCGA § 51-12-33 (b) includes both tortious injuries to tangible and intangible property.
Importantly, this broad definition of "property" comports with long-standing Georgia precedents that have, in various contexts, determined that injuries to "property" are not restricted to tangible property. In Crawford v. Crawford ,
Similarly, in Frost v. Arnaud ,
And in Bowers v. Fulton County ,
The definition we adopt today is also consistent with the handful of Court of Appeals cases since 2005 that have applied the apportionment statute in cases involving economic and business torts, though none of those cases faced the question of statutory interpretation we have confronted today. See I.A. Group Ltd. v. RMNANDCO, Inc. ,
And it makes good sense that OCGA § 51-12-33 (b) -a statute enacted in derogation of a common-law system of awarding damages for torts, see Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc. ,
We therefore answer the first certified question in the affirmative: Georgia's apportionment statute, OCGA § 51-12-33, applies to tort claims for purely pecuniary losses against bank directors and officers. As a result, the type of damages the FDIC seeks here are not, as a threshold matter of law, excluded from apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33 (b).
**569Did Georgia's apportionment statute, OCGA § 51-12-33, abrogate Georgia's common-law rule imposing joint and several liability on tortfeasors who act in concert?
2. Our answer to the first certified question does not necessarily answer whether damages in this case can be apportioned, because our textual interpretation of "injury to person or property" does not decide whether certain common-law rules for imposition of joint and several liability survive enactment of OCGA § 51-12-33 (b). We therefore move to the second question before us: whether OCGA § 51-12-33 abrogates Georgia's common-law rule imposing joint and several liability on tortfeasors who act in concert. As explained below, the answer is no, with an important caveat: concerted action survives the apportionment statute, but only insofar as it was traditionally understood at common law within the context of torts.
We begin by considering the common-law origins of the doctrine. Concerted action appears to be rooted in criminal trespass, where a legal theory of vicarious liability imputed the unlawful acts of one member of a "joint enterprise" to another. Prosser & Keeton § 46, at 323 ("[T]he act of one is the act of all of the same party being present." (citation and punctuation omitted)). Under that theory, because "[a]ll might be joined as defendants in the same action at law, and since each was liable for all, the jury would not be permitted to apportion the damages."
*125Id. at 323. The principles of concerted action later "extended beyond its original scope" to torts, so that all people who, "in pursuit of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit, are equally liable." Id. "Express agreement is not necessary" to establish concerted action; "all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding." Id. But it is "essential that each particular defendant who is to be charged with responsibility shall be proceeding tortiously, which is to say with the intent requisite to committing a tort, or with negligence." Id. at 324. "Such concerted wrongdoers were considered 'joint tort feasors' by the early common law." Prosser & Keeton § 52, at 346.
Concerted action for torts was thus born out of a legal theory of mutual agency in which the acts (and ultimately the liability) of one wrongdoer were imputed as a matter of law to another who was **570part of the same "joint enterprise." Id. ("In legal contemplation, there is a joint enterprise, and a mutual agency, so that the act of one is the act of all, and liability for all that is done is visited upon each."). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, cmt. (a) ("Parties are acting in concert when they act in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular result." The early common law theory "was that there was a mutual agency of each to act for the others, which made all liable for the tortious acts of any one.").
Georgia historically has recognized this principle: "[i]t has always been true that where concert of action appears, a joint tortfeasor relation is presented and all joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the full amount of plaintiff's damage." Gilson v. Mitchell ,
Practically speaking, the invocation of concerted action at common law paved for plaintiffs a direct path to joint and several liability for an entire group of wrongdoers. Gilson ,
**571Gilson was, of course, decided 30 years before the current version of the apportionment statute was enacted. The FDIC nonetheless seizes on Gilson to argue that damages *126must be awarded here under joint and several liability because (1) the former directors and officers engaged in concerted action, and concerted action (and the joint and several liability that attaches to it) survived enactment of the apportionment statute; and (2) the former directors and officers caused a "single, indivisible injury." As to its first argument, FDIC asserts that "liability for concerted action is vicarious" and argues (among other things) that concerted action survives the apportionment statute because "liability among tortfeasors who act in concert cannot rationally be apportioned." It also points to PN Express Inc. v. Zegel ,
As to this latter argument, we disagree: in Couch , we rejected as "unfounded" the plaintiff's argument that her "single, indivisible" injury could not be apportioned and held that "[w]hile the injury may be singular, the damages flowing from that injury may be apportioned by statute among the tortfeasors responsible for causing it."
Indeed, OCGA § 51-12-33 (b) reveals a different analytical touchstone for damages analysis: whether fault is divisible.
Under OCGA § 51-12-33, the pertinent inquiry is therefore whether fault is capable of division. When fault is divisible and the other requirements of OCGA § 51-12-33 (b) are met, then the trier of fact "shall" apportion. If fault is indivisible, then the trier of fact cannot carry out the statute's directive of awarding damages "according to the percentage of fault of each person" and the apportionment statute does not govern how damages are awarded. See OCGA § 51-12-33 (b).
In light of this statutory command, we must determine whether fault is divisible *127when an action under OCGA § 51-12-33 (b) is brought against more than one person when those persons have acted in concert. Given the common-law focus of concerted action as a legal theory of mutual agency in tort, and in light of the apportionment statute's directive to apportion "according to the percentage of fault of each person," we cannot say that OCGA § 51-12-33 abrogates concerted action in its traditional form. That is because true concerted action is predicated on the idea that wrongdoers "in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act ... are equally liable," and that through "joint enterprise" and "mutual agency ... the act of one is the act of all." Prosser & Keeton § 46, at 323;
Our reasoning is consonant with what is commonly called "civil conspiracy" under Georgia law, which appears to be the same or almost identical to common-law concerted action.
The similarities between civil conspiracy, a legal theory predicated on a "common design" which we have recognized as imputing the acts of one co-conspirator to another, and concerted action, a legal theory predicated on "joint enterprise" where the acts of one are imputed to another, support the conclusion that the fault resulting from concerted action (in its traditional, common-law form) is not divisible as a matter of law and, therefore, cannot be apportioned.
We are further persuaded of this view because it gives full effect to the statutes that surround the apportionment statute, and-in construing a statute-we seek to "avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage." Ga. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc. ,
In a negligence action premised upon the negligence of individual board members in their decision-making process, is a decision of a bank's board of directors a "concerted action" such that the board members should be held jointly and severally liable for negligence?
3. Whether a plaintiff adequately has pleaded and established the existence of a concerted action such that defendants should be held jointly and severally liable depends on the legal theories and facts presented in each particular case. See, e.g., Phillips ,
Certified questions answered.
All the Justices concur.
R. Charles Loudermilk, Sr., Hugh C. Aldredge, David B. Allman, Marvin Cosgray, Louis J. Douglass III, John D. Margeson, and Larry P. Martindale were directors of the Bank. In addition to their roles as directors, Cosgray and Douglass also served as officers of the Bank, along with Gregory W. Holden and Darryl L. Overall. Margeson passed away during the pendency of the case; his estate settled the FDIC's claims against him, and his estate is not a party to this appeal.
In its entirety, the apportionment statute provides:
(a) Where an action is brought against one or more persons for injury to person or property and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the injury or damages claimed, the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff and the judge shall reduce the amount of damages otherwise awarded to the plaintiff in proportion to his or her percentage of fault.
(b) Where an action is brought against more than one person for injury to person or property, the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall after a reduction of damages pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section, if any, apportion its award of damages among the persons who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each person. Damages apportioned by the trier of fact as provided in this Code section shall be the liability of each person against whom they are awarded, shall not be a joint liability among the persons liable, and shall not be subject to any right of contribution.
(c) In assessing percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or damages, regardless of whether the person or entity was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit.
(d) (1) Negligence or fault of a nonparty shall be considered if the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the nonparty or if a defending party gives notice not later than 120 days prior to the date of trial that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault.
(2) The notice shall be given by filing a pleading in the action designating the nonparty and setting forth the nonparty's name and last known address, or the best identification of the nonparty which is possible under the circumstances, together with a brief statement of the basis for believing the nonparty to be at fault.
(e) Nothing in this Code section shall eliminate or diminish any defenses or immunities which currently exist, except as expressly stated in this Code section.
(f) (1) Assessments of percentages of fault of nonparties shall be used only in the determination of the percentage of fault of named parties.
(2) Where fault is assessed against nonparties pursuant to this Code section, findings of fault shall not subject any nonparty to liability in any action or be introduced as evidence of liability in any action.
(g) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Code section or any other provisions of law which might be construed to the contrary, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to receive any damages if the plaintiff is 50 percent or more responsible for the injury or damages claimed.
OCGA § 51-12-33 (2005).
See OCGA § 1-3-2 (legislatively defined words "shall have the meanings specified, unless the context in which the word or term is used clearly requires that a different meaning be used"); see also Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone ,
The FDIC also argues that the apportionment statute must be strictly construed because it is in derogation of the common law. See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend ,
The FDIC further contends that "property" refers only to tangible property because certain common-law torts such as trespass required an injury to tangible property. To support this, the FDIC cites 24 Edward W. Tuttle, Standard Encyclopaedia of Procedure, "Trespass," p. 922 (1920) ("The action of trespass will not lie if ... the matter affected is intangible, or the right affected is incorporeal.").
In Sims , the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' counterclaims for failure to comply with the municipal ante litem statute when those claims did not "arise out of contract" but instead were "tortious in nature."
To the extent that Benator held that this narrow construction of "injury to person or property" in the ante litem context separately applied to § 51-12-33 (b),
Other states with similar statutes are in agreement. See, e.g., ESCA Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick ,
Notably, rules of joinder at common law "were extremely strict," and the joinder of two or more defendants in a lawsuit was "limited to cases of concerted action, where a mutual agency might be found." Prosser & Keeton § 46, at 324-325.
In a case decided after Gilson but before the apportionment statute was enacted, we laid out five "likely factual circumstances" involving joint tortfeasors and concluded that only two met the "requirement" of concerted action at "early common law." Posey v. Med. Center-West, Inc. ,
The FDIC also points to a Comment to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which notes that "in jurisdictions that have modified or abolished joint and several liability, the rule ... imposes joint and several liability on all persons engaging in concerted action and, to that extent, supersedes the abolition or modification of joint and several liability." Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 15, cmt. a.
The former directors and officers therefore miss the mark when they argue that the plain text of the apportionment statute precludes joint and several liability for tortfeasors who act in concert because it "does not except from its application actions involving joint tortfeasors or actions for particular types of conduct." Strictly speaking, they are correct; there is no textual reference to "concerted action" or "acting in concert" in OCGA § 51-12-33 (b). But that argument ignores what is contained in the text of the apportionment statute: an instruction to apportion "among the persons who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each person." See
We have previously observed that for purposes of the apportionment statute, "fault" and "liability" are not identical, but that they are "closely connected" and that subsection (b) "specifies that the 'fault' of such a defendant" who is liable for the injury to the plaintiff "relative to the 'fault' of all-is the measure and limit of her liability." Zaldivar ,
See Woods v. Cole ,
In some cases, terms like "acting in concert" appear to be used interchangeably with "conspiracy," although other Georgia cases reference both terms or use one or the other. Nevertheless, the legal concepts of concerted action and conspiracy appear to be defined in much the same way.
The current version of the statute is materially identical: "In all cases, a person who maliciously procures an injury to be done to another, whether an actionable wrong or a breach of contract, is a joint wrongdoer and may be subject to an action either alone or jointly with the person who actually committed the injury." Notably, OCGA § 51-12-33 did not expressly repeal OCGA § 51-12-30.
We further explained that " 'the conspiracy itself furnishes no cause of action. The gist of the action, if a cause of action exists, is not the conspiracy alleged, but the tort committed against the plaintiff and the resulting damage.' " Metro Atlanta Task Force ,
We also noted that it "is usually within the province of the jury to draw ... inferences" about whether a conspiracy exists based on "the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interests of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances."
Generally speaking, under OCGA § 51-12-32 (b), "a defendant is entitled to contribution from his co-defendant when ... the judgment has been entered against both and ... it has actually been paid by one in an amount exceeding his pro rata share." Virginia Ins. Reciprocal v. Pilzer ,
Apart from concerted action, there may exist other legal theories that preclude division of fault as a matter of law-perhaps, for instance, vicarious liability or other agency-based or derivative theories of liability. And there may also be factual circumstances that impede a division of fault between persons, though we are considerably more skeptical that will be so. We provide these examples to illustrate areas where joint and several liability conceivably could apply, but emphasize that we do not decide today whether-or how-joint and several liability might apply in those or other cases.
