Crangle v. Kelly
838 F.3d 673
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- Thomas Crangle pleaded guilty in Ohio (Feb 2007) to rape with a recommended life sentence and parole eligibility after 10 years; plea form referenced post-release control but at sentencing the judge and defense counsel told him he would receive "straight parole," and the journal entry did not mention post-release control.
- Crangle’s direct appeal was denied; conviction became final Dec 20, 2008 (no Ohio Supreme Court appeal). He sought relief after State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick clarified Ohio law on mandatory post-release control (June 16, 2010).
- Crangle filed pro se motions in Aug 2010 to withdraw his plea and to have post-release control lawfully imposed; the trial court denied the plea-withdrawal but issued a nunc pro tunc judgment (Nov 19, 2010) adding a mandatory five-year post-release control term and sanctions, backdated to the original sentencing.
- Crangle exhausted state remedies (appeals and applications to reopen) and then placed a federal § 2254 habeas petition in the prison mailing system on Mar 28, 2013 alleging ineffective assistance and an involuntary plea due to misadvice about post-release control.
- The district court dismissed the habeas petition as untimely under AEDPA, ruling the conviction became final in Dec 2008 and the nunc pro tunc order did not restart the § 2244(d)(1)(A) limitations clock; the Sixth Circuit granted a COA on timeliness issues and, after King v. Morgan, asked for supplemental briefing.
- The Sixth Circuit majority held the Nov. 2010 nunc pro tunc order imposed a new, worse-than-before sentence (post-release control materially changed liberty conditions) and therefore created a new judgment that reset AEDPA’s one-year limitations period; Crangle’s federal petition was timely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Nov. 2010 nunc pro tunc order was a "new judgment" that restarts AEDPA’s one-year clock under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) | The nunc pro tunc imposed mandatory post-release control and thus changed Crangle’s sentence; it is a new judgment restarting the limitations period | The nunc pro tunc merely corrected nomenclature and is substantively identical to prior "parole" sentence, so it did not create a new judgment | Court: The order changed substantive conditions (sanctions, residential options, collateral consequences) and therefore created a new judgment that restarts AEDPA’s clock; district court reversed |
| Whether post-release control is materially different from parole for purposes of creating a new, worse sentence | Post-release control imposes statutory mandatory sanctions and possible unfavorable termination designations affecting future sentencing — materially different | Parole and post-release control both involve supervision; imposition of five years is the same outcome so no substantive change | Court: Post-release control differs materially (statutory sanctions, residential sanctions, unfavorable designation consequences); this supports finding a new judgment |
| Applicability of Magwood/King to resetting statute of limitations after resentencing | Resentencing that changes sentence produces a new judgment; King implies a new judgment also "normally resets" the limitations clock | State relied on pre-King precedent (Mackey/Eberle) holding limited resentencing didn’t restart the clock in similar contexts | Court: Magwood and King control; a new sentence creates a new judgment and restarts AEDPA’s one-year period |
| Whether petition also timely under § 2244(d)(1)(D) (factual-predicate discovery) | (Raised in concurrence) The Nov. 2010 order is a factual predicate under Johnson and Crangle exercised due diligence in seeking it after discovering Carnail | State argued petitioner had inquiry notice earlier and new case law (Camail) cannot serve as the factual predicate or excuse delay | Majority did not decide § 2244(d)(1)(D); concurrence would hold nunc pro tunc is a factual predicate and Crangle acted with due diligence after Carnail |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruiz v. United States, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (plea validity requires sufficient awareness of circumstances and consequences)
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (resentencing that produces a new judgment avoids second-or-successive bar)
- King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 2015) (a new judgment from resentencing permits attacks on both sentence and original conviction and normally resets AEDPA’s clock)
- Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (the sentence is part of the judgment for habeas purposes)
- Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005) (a state-court vacatur can be a "factual predicate" that restarts limitations under the "due diligence" clause)
- State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 Ohio St.3d 124 (Ohio 2010) (post-release control is mandatory for certain felonies and sentencing entries must include it)