275 F. Supp. 3d 1196
N.D. Cal.2017Background
- President Trump issued Executive Order 13768 (Jan. 25, 2017), §9(a) of which directs the Attorney General and DHS Secretary to render “sanctuary jurisdictions” ineligible for federal grants for noncompliance with 8 U.S.C. §1373 and to take “appropriate enforcement action.”
- Santa Clara County and the City & County of San Francisco sued, seeking a facial injunction against §9(a) and declaratory relief that San Francisco complies with §1373; the court previously entered a preliminary injunction and denied reconsideration after an AG memorandum attempted to narrow the Order’s scope.
- The AG Memorandum (May 22, 2017) claimed §9(a) applies only to DOJ/DHS-administered grants that already require §1373 certifications and promised notice; the court found this memorandum nonbinding and inadequate to cure constitutional defects.
- The Counties rely heavily on their substantial reliance on federal grants (many hundreds of millions annually) and on public statements by the President and Attorney General threatening defunding to show a concrete risk of enforcement and concrete injury.
- The Court held on summary judgment that §9(a) (as written) exceeds the President’s authority under the Constitution, violates the Spending Clause limitations and the Tenth Amendment (commandeering), and is unconstitutionally vague and procedurally deficient under the Fifth Amendment; it permanently enjoined enforcement of §9(a) nationwide.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Counties have Article III standing & ripeness to challenge §9(a) | Counties: public statements + identification of them as targets + reliance on grant funding create a credible threat and concrete injury | Gov: no concrete risk; EO is internal directive; AG Memo narrows threat | Court: Counties have standing and claims are ripe — credible threat and concrete budgetary injury established |
| Whether §9(a) unlawfully exercises Congress’s spending power (separation of powers) | EO attempts to impose new conditions on all federal grants, a power reserved to Congress | Gov: EO is administrative direction to enforce existing law; facial challenge standard requires invalidity in all applications | Court: EO improperly purports to condition grants beyond Congress’s authority; violates separation of powers |
| Whether §9(a) violates Spending Clause limits (unambiguous notice, nexus, coercion) | Counties: conditions are retroactive/ambiguous, lack nexus to most grants, and are coercive given magnitude of grants | Gov: AG Memo narrows application; not coercive; does not force unconstitutional acts | Court: EO fails unambiguous and nexus requirements and is coercive (could coerce jurisdictions into compliance) |
| Whether §9(a) violates Tenth Amendment anti‑commandeering principles | Counties: EO coerces states/localities to enforce federal immigration law (e.g., honor detainers) | Gov: (largely) argues narrow reading and procedural safeguards in AG Memo | Court: EO coerces and conscripts local governments; violates Tenth Amendment |
| Whether §9(a) is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment | Counties: terms like “sanctuary jurisdiction,” “willfully refuse,” and “hinder” are undefined and grant unfettered discretion | Gov: AG Memo clarifies scope and practice; EO is internal guidance | Court: EO is vague and standardless; AG Memo insufficient to cure vagueness |
| Whether §9(a) denies procedural due process | Counties: EO allows withholding/clawback of appropriated funds without notice or hearing | Gov: AG Memo limits application to funds without protected property interest | Court: Counties have property interest in appropriated grants; EO lacks required notice and hearing procedures; violates due process |
Key Cases Cited
- Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (President cannot unilaterally amend or repeal parts of duly enacted statutes)
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (limits on Presidential power when contrary to Congress’s will)
- South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (Spending Clause limits: conditions must be unambiguous and related to program purpose)
- Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Spending Clause coercion analysis; unconstitutional compulsion if financial inducement is coercive)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Federal government may not commandeer state officials to administer federal programs)
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Federal government cannot compel states to enforce federal regulatory programs)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (Due process vagueness standards require fair notice and explicit standards for enforcement)
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (statutory interpretation cannot rest on a construction that rewrites the statute)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (statutes that authorize arbitrary enforcement are void for vagueness)
- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (existence and threatened enforcement of a law can cause present injury for standing)