County of Amador v. United States Department of the Interior
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19658
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Amador County challenged the Department of the Interior’s 2012 Record of Decision (ROD) taking the Plymouth Parcels into trust for the Ione Band and approving a casino under IGRA. The Band intervened in support of Interior.
- The Ione Band traces federal interactions back to efforts (beginning c.1915) by BIA agents to acquire land for the Band; multiple federal purchase attempts stalled for title and other reasons.
- The Band was administratively recognized (reaffirmation of a 1972 determination) by Interior in 1994 and listed in the Federal Register beginning in 1995.
- Carcieri (2009) held the IRA permits trust acquisitions only for tribes that were “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, creating two contested questions here: (1) whether recognition must have existed in 1934 or may occur later, and (2) what “under Federal jurisdiction” means.
- Interior concluded the Band was both (a) under Federal jurisdiction in 1934 based on its historical dealings with the federal government, and (b) eligible to use the land for gaming under IGRA’s "restored tribe" exception, applying a 2006 Indian lands determination and invoking a 2008 regulatory "grandfather" provision.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Interior and the Band, upholding both the IRA eligibility and the IGRA grandfathering decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether recognition had to exist in 1934 (timing-of-recognition) | County: "now under Federal jurisdiction" modifies "recognized" so tribe must have been recognized in 1934 | Interior/Band: "recognized" and "now under Federal jurisdiction" are distinct; recognition can occur later | Court: Recognition may occur anytime before the trust decision; tribe must be under Federal jurisdiction in 1934 and recognized at the time of the trust decision |
| Meaning of "under Federal jurisdiction" in 1934 | County: It required reservation/treaty status or equivalent formal federal arrangement by 1934 | Interior/Band: Means significant historical federal relationship—actions/obligations showing federal authority/responsibility, not strictly reservation/treaty | Court: Adopts Interior’s two-part, context-sensitive test (showing of federal actions/obligations pre-1934 and continuity into 1934) |
| Whether Interior’s finding that Ione Band was under Federal jurisdiction in 1934 was arbitrary/capricious | County: Failed purchase attempts and informal interactions are insufficient to show jurisdiction | Interior/Band: Longstanding federal efforts to acquire land and ongoing dealings show federal obligations and continuity | Court: Not arbitrary; record supports finding given sustained federal efforts beginning 1915 and around 1934 |
| Whether IGRA’s "restored tribe" exception could be applied via pre-2008 opinions (grandfathering) | County: 2008 regs reflect Congress’ intent to limit restored-tribe exception to Part 83/legislative/court restorations; grandfathering pending applications is unlawful | Interior/Band: Congress left ambiguity; Interior reasonably grandfathered in pre-2008 written opinions (2006 Determination) | Court: Congress did not clearly foreclose non-Part-83 administrative restorations; Interior permissibly applied §292.26(b) grandfathering and adopted the 2006 determination |
Key Cases Cited
- Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (IRA permits trust acquisitions only for tribes that were "under Federal jurisdiction" in 1934)
- Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Community of Or. v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (examining timing-of-recognition ambiguity under the IRA)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency construction of ambiguous statute entitled to deference)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (framework for respect owed to agency interpretations short of Chevron)
- United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (federal supervision need not be continuous to attach jurisdictional authority)
- Pac. Dawn LLC v. Pritzker, 831 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) (arbitrary-and-capricious standard for agency action)
- Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (considerations for retroactive application and reliance during rule changes)